

TERRORIST ATTACKS

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TERRORIST ATTACKS

A Protective Service Guide for Executives, Bodyguards and Policemen

By


RAYMOND P. SILJANDER, B.A.

*Formerly, Security Investigator and Police Officer
Loss Prevention Engineer
Phoenix, Arizona*

With a Foreword by

Brigadier-General Paul Roos

Cape Town, South Africa



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To t
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To the precious memory of my sister Yvonne whose passing, at age twenty-one, has left a painful void in the lives of all who knew and loved her.

be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life (Rev. 2:10)

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FOREWORD

Over the last 100 years or so there have been surges of terrorism which have often followed four or five years after the ending of a war. This was certainly so after the two World Wars. A certain upsurge in the United States is probable following the Vietnam experience.

The so-called permissive society is a fertile field for the production of persons who are likely to turn to terrorism. The deliberate lowering of standards, ridicule of discipline, breakdown of family life and denigration of the forces of law and order are all taking their toll. One of the most significant factors favouring a resurgence of terrorism in the 1980s is the emasculation of all significant intelligence gathering agencies in the United States and the refusal of Interpol to monitor and exchange information on politically based crimes.

Recognising that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, the forces of law and order are caught between the Devil and the deep blue sea. The public has a right, however, to be protected from kidnap, extortion and political assassination whether committed in Belfast, Salisbury, Buenos Aires or Los Angeles, for any political or criminal reason, or by the mentally deranged.

The first line of defence against terrorism is a secure, coordinated intelligence system, properly funded and protected by the lawmakers from unwarranted and debilitating attacks (usually from the vociferous left) and backed by well-paid, trained, equipped and motivated security services—whether police or military, depending on the scale of the problem.

However, in the final analysis terrorism remains primarily a political problem. In the words of General Antonio de Spínola of Portugal "the military (and police) can merely cast a net which will stabilize the situation, thus enabling the politicians to find a solution."

The mechanics of protection against terrorism is well handled by Mr. Siljander, and this book is a valuable contribution to the contemporary security scene.

Brigadier-General Paul Roos

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

No single book can possibly be all embracing; therefore, the reader must be encouraged to read a wide variety of material addressing this topic as all writings have something of value to offer. Reading several authors will provide one with many different viewpoints and perspectives that have resulted from each person's own unique experiences in this field.

This book is intended to be reasonably broad and practical in nature, to provide an overview that will give the reader ideas that he may incorporate into his own frame of reference and use in variation according to his own specific needs.

This book reflects a blending of the author's security-investigations and law enforcement background as well as the background of those with whom the author has collaborated during the course of this writing. Many people have offered much assistance towards this effort, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank them.

Sincere thanks of appreciation are extended to Bob and Andrew Waggener; Chris and Sue Reed; W. Ron Olin, Lawrence, Kansas, Police Department; Jack Bjornstad, Southwest Safety & Supply, Inc., Phoenix, Arizona; Donald A. Rush, Private Investigator and owner of D. A. Rush Enterprises, Phoenix, Arizona; John Waaraniemi, Private Investigator; my brother Ken, who assisted by taking photographs and also assisted with the driving for the preparation of illustrations appearing in Chapter 5. Finally, I would like to offer a very special thanks to Lt. Howard Mitchell and Sgt. Gary Skeet of the University of Kansas Police Department, who have contributed so generously and significantly towards this endeavor. Their unselfish assistance has truly proven invaluable.

R.P.S.

Chap

Appo

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INTRODUCTION

Political terrorism is a technique that may be defined as *a violent criminal act designed to create fear in a community, or a segment of a community, for political purposes*. Note the three key elements in this definition:

1. "Violent criminal act."
2. "Create Fear" (extend the sphere of their influence).
3. "For political purposes."

Terrorism need not be politically motivated to be terrorism, however, since *terroristic techniques* may be employed to achieve other goals of a criminal nature rather than of a political nature.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; it has been used as a tool practically since the beginning of time. However, it appears that it is on a dangerous upswing that will not soon reverse itself. To date, the European countries have been much harder hit by terrorist attacks than has the United States. Whether terrorism, either imported or home grown, will strike out at America in the foreseeable future is a matter of speculation. There are many informed people who feel that America will feel its effects and that preparations should be made so that it can be dealt with in a reasonably effective manner, should the need arise.

If terrorism has not had as direct an impact upon the United States as it has had on many countries at the time of this writing, certainly there has been an effect upon America's multinational corporations and their executives living abroad. American businessmen in foreign countries do face a certain risk from terrorist attacks in the form of abductions, bombings and assassinations. The physical facilities, of course, are vulnerable as well.

This book is not intended to be a sociological analysis of international terrorism, but rather, it is intended to be a practical guide towards defending oneself or one's organization against a terrorist attack. Accordingly, this writing is more concerned with how a terrorist may strike and how those efforts can be prevented or thwarted. However, between the main text and the support material in the Appendices, the reader will acquire an understanding of both the terrorist problem and

applicable countermeasures.

A terrorist, or terrorist group, generally will launch an attack for one of the following four reasons:

1. *Revenge*. In response to a real or imagined wrong committed by the victim, the victim's followers or administration.

2. *Power*. To be achieved through the death of the victim or the destruction caused by the attack, or the fear generated by same, or the events set in motion as a result of the act.

3. *Security*. To be achieved by acquittal or release of prisoners.

4. *Reward*. Material gain such as in cases of extortion.

Studies have been conducted to analyze past assassinations, and assassination attempts, to determine the various methods of attack and the weapon types used. Although it is possible to obtain a rather precise breakdown of methods and weapons used to date, we will deal here with general trends only. Before going further, it may be said of terrorist attacks in the form of assassinations that as a general rule they are planned well in advance of the actual attempt. The place of attack is often one of the following:

1. Outside of a building as the victim is either arriving or leaving.

2. As the victim is entering or alighting from a motor vehicle.

3. At some point an attack may be launched upon the vehicle when its movement is, or can be, interrupted.

4. When the victim is attending a speaking engagement.

Many types of weapons have been employed by assassins to date. The following is a list of weapon types used; they are listed in the order of their frequency of use:

1. Handguns.

2. Explosives.

3. Rifles

4. Blades and impact type weapons.

5. Shotguns.

6. Machine Guns.

7. Poison.

The attacks, of course, are not always fatal. As one would expect, some weapon types tend to be more lethal, thus resulting in a higher percentage of deaths in relation to the number of attacks. The following is a list of weapon types in the order of their past success as lethal assassination instruments:

1. Poison.

2. Machine Guns.

3. Rifles.
4. Blades and Impact Type Weapons.
5. Shotguns.
6. Handguns.
7. Explosives.

In this book attacks of a political and criminal nature will be treated as one. For example, whether an attempt is made to kidnap an executive or member of his family by a criminal for ransom (personal gain), or by a politically motivated person or group for political purposes, the method of the abduction will bear marked similarities, and therefore, the preventative and defense measures will be similar. In essence, *any attack, whether criminally or politically motivated, is nothing other than a violent physical attack upon people or property*. Hence, this book is concerned with the physical protection of people and property.

For the most part, the defense methods against terrorist attacks are those things which any qualified police officer or security practitioner should know. The intended purpose of this book, therefore, will be to demonstrate how a background in security and law enforcement education and experience can be effectively applied towards satisfying specialized needs such as these.

This book does not delve into those things which can or should be done politically to cope with the rising threat of terrorism on an international level (except for a very brief overview in this introduction and some Appendix material), but rather, what individuals and corporations can do to reduce their vulnerability to a terrorist attack.

Although the terrorist of today tends to be better educated than those of earlier times, and therefore more sophisticated in his methods of attack and the equipment used, he tends not to be politically sophisticated. For this reason, providing a remedy for the cause he claims to support does not normally satisfy him. The terrorist tends to focus on some narrow issue while remaining oblivious to the larger issues and future perspectives.

There are basically five considerations necessary to combat terrorism on a national and international level:

1. Secure intelligence data.
2. Gain physical security of targets.
3. Eliminate the underlying causes of terrorism.
4. Formulate a policy regarding the payment of ransom.
5. Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries.

Intelligence data is extremely important to identify terrorist groups,

their membership and their plans and capabilities. Because terrorist groups do not possess the strength to launch a direct attack on what they perceive to be their adversary, they must, as a result of that weakness, rely on anonymity and utilize covert terror tactics to extend the sphere of their influence. Because they operate covertly, covert methods of investigation and intelligence gathering are necessary. Such methods include the use of electronic surveillance techniques, physical surveillance of suspects, infiltration of suspect groups by undercover agents, development of network of paid informants and establishment of computerized dossier systems of suspects and known terrorists.

Unfortunately, much of the intelligence-gathering activities are frustrated by restrictions that have resulted because of human rights advocates who seem to place a greater importance on the rights of criminals to terrorize than on the rights of law-abiding and productive citizens to live free from unwarranted criminal attacks of a most violent and destructive nature.

Physical security of possible targets of terrorist attacks is a vital part of any protective plan. Possible targets include persons, buildings and vehicles. It is important to remember that a terrorist attack is nothing other than a well-planned criminal attack. The same physical security methods that protect against a common criminal apply to the terrorist, at least in part. An overview of physical security methods and hardware will be discussed in a later section of this book for familiarization purposes.

The greatest security problem that the security director faces when developing and implementing an executive protection program is adequate protection during transit when the prospective victim becomes much more vulnerable to an attack than when in the confines of home or business. Security while staying in motels and hotels presents some unique problems and will also be discussed later in this book.

Eliminating the underlying causes is a long-term project that can be undertaken only on the national and international level. It has long been recognized that, when a nation is experiencing economic difficulties, the climate is more ripe for the civil disorders that are closely akin to terrorist activities. Eliminating the frustrations that fuel civil disorder will make it more difficult for terrorist groups to gain support from the populace. Because terrorists themselves do not normally view the overall issues but, rather, see things only in a very narrow and limited perspective, eliminating the underlying causes will not normally satisfy them or retard their efforts. However, it can tend to reduce the support they will ultimately receive.

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Formulating a no-ransom policy is something that will always be a controversial issue. Those who oppose it feel that human life is too precious to justify such a cold and unyielding position. Those who favor it do so feeling, at least in part, that terrorism feeds upon success and to yield to a demand only encourages further activity of a similar nature. They feel, therefore, that a greater number of lives would be lost on a long-term basis if a ransom were paid. Each person must form his own ideas on this issue *after* considering all aspects. This consideration will not be debated here. The important thing to bear in mind is that, although one can formulate a policy to either pay or not to pay, it is essential that the policy be formed *before* a situation arises.

Eliminating sanctuaries should tend to reduce the frequency of certain types of terrorist activities, because the terrorist, after committing an act, would have no place to go. To accomplish this would require a great deal of sincere cooperation on the international level. Unfortunately, to date many countries have been reluctant, for various reasons, to actively participate in such a strategy.

Having viewed the considerations that can be addressed on the national and international level, it is important to next examine what can be done on the corporate level to defend against a terrorist attack. There are basically three areas in which a corporation can prepare itself:

1. Maintain a low profile.
2. Gather pertinent intelligence data.
3. Maintain physical security.

A low profile is important because it is visibility that helps to make a person or firm a target. To maintain a low profile, the firm and its directors should be as unobtrusive as the smooth and profitable function of the business will permit. There have been instances where a top management official has appeared in a television commercial to promote a product. That presents a security problem because it helps to educate a would-be attacker by providing him/her with the knowledge of what the official looks like in addition to the name and capacity of that person. A great deal of information has thus been provided that is essential for a successful terrorist attack on that person, whether it be an assassination or abduction.

Intelligence information is important, because for a corporation to operate efficiently, management decisions must be based upon factual information. Accordingly, to properly assess the degree of threat presented to the corporation, one must have a sufficient amount of the proper information. For example, if one's firm is engaged in the manufacture of war materials, then certainly it is important to know

what groups are opposed to the product and also to know something about the history and capabilities of the group. If one's firm is operating in a foreign country, then it will be essential to develop sources of timely and reliable information regarding the political climate in that country and the sentiments of various groups towards the firm.

Internal intelligence is also desirable in many instances. What is meant by internal intelligence is having the company's work force infiltrated by industrial intelligence agents. Many company directors have an aversion to such tactics feeling that doing so is a betrayal of the rights and confidence of the workers. In that respect it is necessary to understand that a properly controlled intelligence operation hurts no one. If the purpose of the operation is to detect early signs of subversive activity and identify possible perpetrators so that appropriate corrective action can be taken, then the intelligence operation will benefit the work force.

Physical security is always important to protect the buildings, vehicles and personnel. Physical security measures must be applied at the executive's home, at his place of business and during his transit. Physical security measures cannot completely eliminate the possibility of a successful attack being launched, but they can reduce the number of opportunities and increase the chance of an attack's being unsuccessful. There is also an increased chance of apprehension of an attacker.

It is interesting to note that Walter Bremer, after shooting Alabama Governor George Wallace, reported having originally intended to assassinate (then) President Nixon but, after some effort, found that security measures made a successful attack too difficult. Bremer moved on to someone else and, when Governor Wallace stepped from his protective envelope of security agents, Bremer utilized the opportunity and launched an attack, seriously wounding and leaving the victim in a state of partial paralysis.

Chapter 2

PLANNING THE PROTECTIVE EFFORT

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The first thing that must be done when planning an executive protection program is to make a careful *threat assessment*. This is a very important phase of the protective effort because proper security measures cannot be implemented without fully understanding the threat from which one is to be protected. A threat assessment must answer the following questions whether the anticipated target (victim) is a person, property, or both.

1. Visibility of the target.
2. Value of the target.
3. Vulnerability of the target.
4. Who are the potential attackers; what are their motives; and what does their past history suggest are their capabilities?

Visibility is important because it has a tendency to attract attention, and it is easier for a terrorist to gather information and plan an attack upon a visible target than it is for a target of low profile. *Value* is important for the simple reason that there is little to be gained from attacking a low value target whether one's motives be criminal or political. *Vulnerability* is important and is not entirely unrelated to visibility. Visibility tends to increase vulnerability. Also, vulnerability greatly depends upon the security measures that have been implemented to protect the target.

When making the threat assessment, one must identify the potential attackers and their motives as closely as possible. These questions will be answered to some extent on the basis of who the prospective victim is. An American business firm doing business in a foreign country whose people feel hostility towards the United States over some political issue would be in a good position to assess whom a potential attacker would represent and what the possible or probable motives are.

During the planning phase, one will be concerned with the threat presented to stationary and moving targets. The protective programs

and systems appropriate for each will be dealt with in subsequent sections of this book.

After the threat assessment has been accomplished, one will engineer a protective plan that affords an acceptable level of protection within the limits of cost and convenience to the person or activities being protected, and of course, the extent of the program must be consistent with the severity of the threat. The essential concern is defining what the program is intended to accomplish and then implementing a plan accordingly. A security plan must offer an acceptably secure environment for the person or property without being overly restrictive.

In any executive protective effort, the best approach is to *avoid* a confrontation altogether. *Prevention* rather than *reaction*, therefore, is the best policy, and a great deal can be achieved towards that goal by maintaining a low public profile, by keeping travel plans private, and by altering departure times and routes frequently.

Many problems confront the security director during and after the planning phase of the program. An important consideration that must be addressed is the possible victim. It is understood that corporations, their executives and the executive's families are the targets of terrorist and criminal attacks. The more information the security department has pertaining to a possible victim, the better prepared it will be to *prevent* or *thwart* a terrorist attack. A *confidential personnel data file* can be a great aid with its usefulness increasing, the more detailed it becomes. However, the more detailed it is, the more difficult it becomes to obtain. Executives, not unlike most people, have a legitimate desire for a certain amount of personal privacy.

During the planning phase, consideration must also be given to the executive's attitude towards protection. Many object to the restrictions of a protective program, and the best way to deal with an objection will depend upon the specific circumstances. More often than not it becomes a selling job for the security director based upon the findings of the threat assessment.

Communication needs must also be considered during the planning stage, and when an assessment is made, the communication requirements that will exist during an emergency situation must be the criteria. Communications equipment and procedures appropriate for a routine situation may prove to be totally inadequate during an emergency situation. The results could be fatal.

Planning is essential because the protective program will almost always involve a *coordinated team effort*. The success or failure of any team effort depends largely upon the thoroughness and care with which

the planning has been conducted and the depth of understanding each member exhibits in carrying out his respective responsibilities. The planner, usually the director of security, must ensure that—

1. the chain of command, as it applies to the specific operation, is clearly understood by all concerned.

2. all participants clearly understand the scope of the entire protective operation, their specific function, and precisely how their function fits into the overall plan.

3. provisions must be made for modifications to the protective plan and under what circumstances such modifications, or variations thereof, may be implemented.

4. each member must have at his disposal the equipment necessary to properly perform his assigned task. Naturally, each member must also be properly trained in the use of any equipment he is to use. This must be considered when assigning personnel.

To properly plan the protective effort, various types of information, as stated, will be needed. The planner may endeavor to acquire the needed information himself or he may assign others to accomplish the task for him.

When the desired information has been obtained, the protective plan can then be developed. At that point the security director will describe in general terms the type of protection to be employed at various locations, such as the subject's residence, place of employment and transportation. Assignment will also be made as to who is to perform various functions. It will also be stated what modifications may be made to the plan and the circumstances under which such modifications may legitimately be made. Exactly how detailed and involved a plan will be depends upon many factors and is a value judgment to be made by the planner, depending upon the particular circumstances involved.

Following the planning stage, decisions must be made regarding support activities to enable the protective force to carry out its mission. Provisions must be made for the procurement and maintenance of equipment, transportation, meals, lodging and relief personnel to name only a few.

The final step in the planning process is to prepare a publication detailing the plan, a copy to be submitted to each team member (see Appendix C). The publication is, in a sense, a post order and should be provided to the team members during a briefing session. Doing so will ensure that everyone understands what is expected of him and how his task fits into the overall plan. The briefing session allows everyone the opportunity to ask questions to clarify anything that is not perfectly

clear to him. Security of the published orders (plan) is very important as its possession by an attacker would enable him to plan his attack to circumvent many of the protective measures, thus greatly increasing his chances for success.

The planning process is without question time-consuming, with the necessary time allotment increasing the more complex the protective operation becomes. Some plans are relatively simple, while others become quite complex. Regardless of this, however, planning is one of the most critical phases of any executive protection program.

Often during planning the ideal plan is recognized, but difficult circumstances force one to accept less desirable alternatives. When such a situation exists, one must simply make the best use of the resources at his disposal. Any plan is better than no plan, because nothing can better ensure an attacker's success than unpreparedness on the part of the victim and his protective force.

PROTECTIVE ZONES

When planning an executive protection program, the security director should assess the security needs by examining the situation as if he himself were to be the attacker and, then implement preventative measures accordingly. In high-threat situations, it may be desirable to have more than one person analyze how he would accomplish an attack so as to better ensure against overlooking something that should be considered when formulating the security plan.

Because nothing can be done to completely eliminate all possibilities of an attack, the protective program is calculated to *reduce* the possibility of an attack and to minimize the chances of an attack's being successful in the event that an attempt is made. The security director will try to accomplish that task as effectively as is possible within the limitations imposed by legal, sociological and practical constraints.

In planning the protective program, utilizing the concept of protective zones has been found to be effective in the majority of cases. Before going further, however, it would be desirable to take a moment to reflect on a typical physical security program of a manufacturing concern. It will be noted that their security is rarely dependent upon *one* zone only. At the perimeter is a fence that may or may not be tied into an intrusion alarm system. That fence and possibly closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, as well as warning signs, represent an outer zone of defense, and it serves to channel people through access points (gates) where the legitimacy of their visit may be scrutinized and their access controlled

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accordingly. Once the outer zone has been penetrated, there is usually an inner zone to further control personnel access and movement. The building itself may contain an intrusion alarm system of varying degrees of sophistication. In addition to an alarm, the inner zone can consist of a receptionist, a pass system for visitors and employee identification cards color coded according to areas of authorization and possibly an escort policy under certain circumstances. Also, master keying locks and issuing keys accordingly present a means of inner zone security as do internal CCTV cameras and alarms at critical sites, such as vaults and file cabinets containing sensitive information.

As can be seen, the manufacturing plant does not rely on one zone of defense but, rather, employs multiple zones of protection. The executive protection program should also provide zones of protection. The closer one gets to the executive, the closer he should be scrutinized. It is imperative that no protective zone be dependent upon another in order to function efficiently. That is important so that if one zone is compromised, the ability of the next zone to neutralize the attack is not impaired. There should be a minimum of two such protective zones that must be penetrated before an attacker must deal directly with the executive's bodyguards.

The area of each zone must be clearly defined so that all security agents know of what their area of responsibility does, and does not, consist. This prevents confusion and the possibility of an area being neglected because everyone involved thought it was someone else's area. Additionally, it is desirable that the zones overlap visually so that in the event a guard is eliminated for some reason, the area does not go unsurveilled. However, area of responsibility should not overlap. Zone boundaries may include, but are not limited to, such things as walls, fences and walkways.

Outer zones typically are to screen all persons attempting to gain entry to the general area and consist of such things as the following:

1. Surveillance of rooftops.
2. Visual surveillance of public areas.
3. Guards protecting doors and windows.
4. Roving guard patrols in addition to stationary guard posts.

Inner zones represent a second screening process of persons attempting to reach areas in close proximity to the executive. Only essential personnel and those whose presence is desired by the executive should be permitted into the inner zone. Security personnel must carefully scrutinize all persons and *never* assume their presence is legitimate, believing them to have been adequately screened by the outer zone. It is

possible that they are unauthorized and have managed by some means to circumvent the outer zone. Also, careful scrutinization by inner zone personnel is essential because, once an attacker has successfully passed through the inner zone undetected, only the bodyguards remain to thwart the attack. They alone represent a weak level of security against an armed, prepared and determined attacker(s).

After the security plan has been devised and implemented, it is important to frequently assess its effectiveness. Again, one must think as an attacker would. When weaknesses are detected, modification of the plan is in order. The adequacy of the program must always be assessed. A good rule is simply *if it's worth doing, audit it!*

CONSIDERATIONS FOR GUARD POSTS

The precise placement of any guard post will be dependent upon the specific factors involved. However, the following general considerations should at least be made:

1. Proper arrangement of security lighting to benefit security agents while at the same time to serve as a deterrent to would-be intruders.
2. All posts should be mutually supporting so that if one is eliminated, posts from adjoining areas can observe the area and perform any necessary functions.
3. Furniture and other fixtures should be arranged to obstruct intruders but not the security agents.
4. Barriers should be arranged to channel intruders into killing zones where adequate cover for them does not exist. Cover for the guards, however, is important.
5. Issuance of appropriate weapons along with adequate training.
6. On post time duration should not be excessive as that tends to reduce alertness. Recommend two-hour post rotations.

THE PLANNING OF AN ATTACK

Protective services personnel, to adequately plan for and provide executive protection, should have a basic understanding of the general procedure used by an attacker in planning his attack. Such an understanding will enable one to better implement procedures that will help to frustrate the efforts of an attacker. While it is evident that one cannot completely eliminate the chances of an attack, the number of opportunities for an attack can be reduced. Efforts can also be made to

reduce the amount of information available to an attacker for planning purposes.

Before an attempt is actually made to abduct or assassinate a person, a detailed study of that person and his daily activities must be made. The information derived from the study will be used to engineer the attack.

The planning of a terrorist attack typically consists of three phases, whether the attack is to be in the form of an abduction or assassination:

1. Study of the intended victim.
2. Vulnerability analysis.
3. Development of an operational plan.

Study of the intended victim is accomplished in many ways. The study typically will include the gathering of intelligence data about the intended victim from any available source that is believed may provide useful data. The study also requires that a physical surveillance of the intended victim be done to determine his daily activities and movements.

The extent and thoroughness of the study of the intended victim depends to a large degree upon who will be executing the attack and on whose behalf. A high echelon mercenary representing a governmental body will usually enjoy the benefit of a much more detailed study of the intended victim than will a lower echelon mercenary. The former has at his disposal the resources of the government he represents. The lower echelon mercenary operates and plans in much the same sequential manner but often to not quite the detailed extent.

Vulnerability analysis can be undertaken only after the first phase, study of the intended victim, has been completed. While the second phase gets under way, however, surveillance of the intended victim continues, thus remaining abreast of his current activities and aware of any significant changes that may be made in his daily routine.

The vulnerability analysis utilizes the information gathered during the first phase to determine at what times and places the intended victim will be vulnerable to the attack under consideration. When vulnerable points have been identified, each will be examined in greater detail to assess the merits and weaknesses of each, in accordance with the desired results of the attack. The need for continual inconsistency on the part of the victim should be apparent.

Developing an operational plan is done after the second phase, vulnerability analysis, has been completed. At that point it has been determined what time and location will afford the greatest likelihood of a successful attack and subsequent escape. The development of an operational plan is simply determining how best to actually make the

attack. Such questions will be determined on the basis of how many attackers and support personnel will be needed to perform necessary functions. Considerations of equipment needs will also be addressed. It will be considered at that time whether to have intercept vehicles strategically placed along escape routes to intercept anyone who may pursue the assassin after committing the attack.

Protective services personnel, when conducting any analysis to discern where the executive may be most vulnerable, must think as the attacker and try to identify all times and places at which the level of vulnerability is high. However, at the same time it is important to not overlook the fact that a terrorist assassin, seeking maximum publicity for his attack, may launch the attack at a less opportune time and place in favor of a situation that will provide better publicity and propaganda. All such locations must be considered by protective personnel. Understanding the prospective attackers and their history and capabilities will aid significantly in this respect.

Unlike fiction that portrays the assassin who works alone, real-life assassinations generally involve many persons besides the assassin who actually makes the physical attack.

ADVANCE SURVEY WORK

When an executive will be traveling out of town, it is important that security personnel make proper advance preparations. Advance work involves an *advance team* making appropriate security surveys and also preparing for matters such as transportation and lodging. Appendix C is the result of an advance team's efforts. In this discussion we will be concerned primarily with two categories of advance surveys:

1. Advance surveys with reference to protection during movement, whatever method of transportation is employed.
2. Advance surveys with reference to protection at fixed locations such as at a motel or business engagement.

The advance survey should assess any and all threats or danger zones that may exist and should identify procedures and resources that will be required to either eliminate or reduce the threat level. When considering routes of travel, all routes should be traveled by advance personnel during the hours that it is expected that the executive will travel these same routes. Alternative routes should also be identified and studied. All routes should be clearly highlighted on a map with indications identifying all danger zones where an attack could occur and possible ways to avoid or circumvent those areas should that become necessary.

The findings should be put into report form, the specific format of which is not important.

Safe havens should also be established at strategic locations along the route and identified on the map. Safe havens are important so that there are nearby places of refuge should a threatening situation develop or appear to be developing. Safe havens worth consideration include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Police stations.
2. Fire stations.
3. Hospitals.
4. Military bases.

When doing advance survey work in reference to fixed locations, it is important to consider all possible access and entry routes and measures that will be necessary to adequately secure those routes. Means must also be taken to ensure that the area is safe from explosive devices and that the opportunity for some to be concealed *after* the initial survey is eliminated or, at least, reduced. Consider the surveillance requirements to ensure this needed security. When an executive will be staying at a hotel, the manager should be contacted and an effort made to determine what other activities are scheduled to take place at that hotel and who else is to be staying there during the time period in question. Special attention must be given to those rooms adjoining the executive's suite as well as rooms above and below. This is important to prevent an explosive charge from being placed against the walls, ceiling or floor from another room.

It is desirable to have a reasonably scaled drawing of the floor plan of all places the executive plans to visit. At locations such as hotels, all alternative methods of entering and leaving the building should be determined and identified on a drawing.

Surveillance requirements, if any, must be determined when the advance survey is done. It stands to reason that simply because a premises may be safe at the time of the survey does not mean that it will remain so. When considering surveillance requirements, necessary visual aids also must be considered.

When conducting advance surveys, it is desirable to take photographs and, in many instances, motion pictures. Photographic documentation is helpful for later analysis and also for the briefing of protective personnel who have not had the opportunity to visit all locations concerned. One's own judgment will best indicate when photographs

will be helpful and precisely what should be photographically documented.

COUNTERSNIPER SURVEY

From inside and just outside the executive's residence, hotel, or place of employment, a trained and experienced rifleman should identify points from which a sniper could direct rifle fire with *kill probability*. A distance of no less than 500-600 yards should be considered. All areas such as rooftops, the top of a knoll or shrubbery in line of sight present possible vantage points for a sniper.

As each point of concern is identified, its position should be noted on a map using compass bearings. The distance should also be noted and can be determined quickly by using an optical rangefinder. When all possible danger points have been identified and noted on the map, each location should be visited during the times of day that the executive will be in the vicinity. That may include both day and night hours. Visiting each location during appropriate hours will enable one to assess what a sniper could see and which appropriate countermeasures should be subsequently implemented. If windows are exposed to a possible sniper position, it is recommended that opaque shades or draperies be provided to obstruct outside view into the building at night. In high threat situations, it may be desirable and cost effective to place possible sniper locations under surveillance.

Security lights directed outward from a building have a tendency to impair an outsider's visibility of activity occurring in and around the premises, thus reducing a sniper's effectiveness. Such a lighting technique also causes a great deal of internal light reflections and flare when attempting to view the area through a rifle's telescopic sight. This would increase the chance of an unsuccessful shot, were it attempted.

The following is a short checklist of things that should be taken into consideration when conducting a countersniper advance survey. Other considerations will undoubtedly manifest themselves according to specific circumstances. When making the survey, it is helpful to place oneself in the position of the sniper and question how one would accomplish the task were he to pull the trigger himself.

1. Prepare a map showing target position such as residence or hotel with possible sniper positions within 500-600 yards depicted by compass bearings and distance.
2. Indicate elevation of all such points as high or low.
3. Take photographs of the sniper positions from the target loca-

tion and also take photographs of the target location from the sniper positions.

4. Note the position of the sun relative to the target location and the sniper positions at various times of the day. It is very difficult to look towards the sun, which can help or cause problems.
5. Note lighting of victim's area and of sniper positions at night.
6. Identify escape routes from each possible sniper position.
7. Identify security precautions to take regarding each possible sniper position. Consider modifying travel routes and/or times into the area so as to minimize the number of danger zones.
8. Assess physical surveillance requirements of the area to detect unusual and threatening activity or developments.
9. Assess the personnel and equipment requirements necessary for an effective countersniper operation.

For a more detailed analysis of sniper capabilities and threat potential, refer to Chapter 7 entitled "The Sniper Threat."

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THE BODYGUARD FUNCTION

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The bodyguard is a very essential element of the total (overall) protective program and represents the innermost protective zone. It is the bodyguard who must engage an attacker who has managed to circumvent the outer security zones and usher the victim to safety and/or render emergency first aid treatment. In this respect there are many important qualities and skills the bodyguard should possess in order to offer an acceptably high degree of protection.

Unfortunately, the bodyguard is the *most often misused* element of a personnel protection effort. In all too many instances, when the need for executive protection is recognized, the need for a well-analyzed and well-planned *team effort* is not recognized or accepted, and the decision is made to try to achieve the desired level of protection using only one or two bodyguards. That, unfortunately, will rarely produce the desired level of protection. In other instances where a high level of threat is initially recognized, a great deal of emphasis is placed on a well-planned and well-coordinated program, but as time passes and no attack occurs, there is a tendency to relax one's vigilance, and often for reasons of cost and/or convenience, the well-implemented protective team is reduced to little more than one or two bodyguards. This can be a fatal mistake because it is a well-known fact that a potential attacker almost always engages in considerable study and surveillance of an intended victim, for planning purposes, prior to making the attack. A significant and sudden reduction in the level of protection would most likely not go unnoticed.

The task of a bodyguard is a challenging one, as is the total protective effort at all levels. The very nature of the job is challenging because an effort must be made to accompany the person being protected, and provide protection, while maintaining as low a profile as possible and causing a minimum degree of interruption to the life-style of the person being protected. This task is often complicated as a result of varying

degrees of uncooperativeness on the part of the person being protected. It would behoove anyone needing protection to cooperate fully with the protective force. It is poor judgment to retain protective services and then fail to abide by the recommendations made by them on the basis of their analysis of the threat and their specialized knowledge, training and experience. Similarly, it is important that any recommendations made, especially those that cost money and cause a degree of inconvenience for those being protected, be valid. To make recommendations that have little or no reasonable basis will cause the security personnel to lose their credibility in the eyes of those they are trying to protect. The result will most likely be an increased reluctance to cooperate, and invalid protective measures not only fail to provide the necessary security and protection, they can be counterproductive. Anything that serves to lower the acceptable level of protection places all persons concerned in added and unnecessary danger.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

A bodyguard's function is such that good physical condition is important. The practitioner must not be overweight or suffer from high blood pressure or any respiratory ailments that would prohibit prolonged physical exertion. Hearing must be normal because it is this sense that will often warn of danger, whether it be footsteps rapidly approaching or the subtle click of a firearm being prepared for use. Eyesight must be correctable to 20/20. Finally, because a bodyguard is often required to be on his feet for prolonged periods of time, good feet with properly fitted shoes are essential.

Often when one thinks of a bodyguard they think in terms of a tall, massive individual. Such a physical feature, however, is not only unnecessary, but often undesirable. Experience has shown that anyone within a *normal* range as far as physical size goes can be an effective bodyguard, because it is knowledge coupled with speed and utilization of proper technique that makes a smaller person as effective as a large person in a physical confrontation. This is why training in martial arts such as Judo or Karate is desirable.

It has been learned through experience that anyone in the approximate size range of 5'6" to somewhat over 6'3" can perform well as a bodyguard. Men of smaller stature can move through crowds more easily than can large men, but large men have the advantage of being able to look out over a crowd. Each size has certain advantages as long as the size is not extreme one way or the other. A desirable and effective

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protective team would seem to be one comprised of individuals of varying sizes.

An important point to keep in mind when hiring and/or assigning bodyguards is the fact that one of the best preventative measures against an attack is to keep a low profile. An individual surrounded by several unusually large men will lose much of the benefit offered by a low profile. Furthermore, should at some time such a protective force for some reason be reduced in numbers, that fact would be more readily noticed were the team comprised only of very large individuals.

There is no limited age range because age does not appear to be a limiting factor. The only real precaution would be to guard against the inexperienced or the very young, lacking experience and maturity, and assign their positions accordingly. Older men who are trained, experienced and in proper physical condition and who have learned to operate within their limitations and pace themselves offer excellent protection.

MENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

The bodyguard must be mentally healthy with proper attitudes about himself, his function as a bodyguard, and his relationship to those around him. He must not be lazy, lacking in alertness and perseverance, or slow to respond in a positive manner when a threatening situation arises. Conversely, he must not be quickly angered or overly aggressive.

DESIRABLE SKILLS

Although it is not essential that the bodyguard have had law enforcement training and experience, such a background is highly desirable. Such a background almost always produces an individual with considerable training and experience in techniques and skills of apprehension.

Related to and overlapping with apprehension skills is specialized training followed by considerable practice in *disarming techniques* that are applicable for weapons such as handguns, rifles, blades or blunt objects such as clubs. Such techniques must be practiced on a regular basis because a person tends to lose effectiveness quickly when a long period without practice elapses. The three most important points to remember about disarming a person are to (1) know the proper technique to use depending upon the circumstances; and to (2) employ such technique with polished skill and speed. Finally, when a weapon is being used during the attack, and disarming is being attempted, (3)

attack the weapon, not the person wielding it.

Directly related to skills of disarming and apprehension techniques is the desirability for competent training in unarmed methods of combat such as judo or karate. Such training also tends to keep a person in good physical condition because of the exercise it affords. Further, it can serve as a form of recreation and therefore has a good mental health aspect. Frequent participation in such activity also keeps a person's reflexes honed. When considering such training, one will find a host of schools in the telephone directory offering a variety of styles originating from many different countries. Training is also often available through the Y.M.C.A.

Contrary to what many practitioners of the martial arts may claim, *there is no one true style superior to all others* (the one they themselves practice). Some arts place greater emphasis on hand techniques while others emphasize use of the feet. Some utilize, for the most part, all on an equal basis. In contrast to Karate which utilizes striking and blocking techniques, Judo emphasises grappling and throwing techniques (it is a regulated sport). The art that will best suit a given individual will depend upon the preference of that person as it is a very individual matter. Perhaps this could be summed up by stating simply that the art does not make the man, but rather, the man makes the art. *All styles offer valuable training.*

It is extremely important that the bodyguard be an *expert combat marksman*. Dispersing bullets during an attack without striking the attacker accomplishes nothing more than endangering innocent people in the area, unnecessarily depleting the ammunition supply and, at best, serves to make the attacker a little less effective due to the stress and threat presented by the return fire. The choice of weapon and caliber will depend upon the nature of the threat and the training of the bodyguards and other team members. Generally, however, fully automatic weapons should be discouraged unless the persons using them are highly trained and experienced in the proper use of the particular weapon.

In a protective effort involving coordinated teamwork, communications is a very important consideration. It is essential, therefore, that each team member be fully trained and proficient in the use of the communications equipment that will be used. It is equally important to understand the limitations of such equipment.

A skill that should be mandatory for all protective personnel is emergency first aid treatment. About 50 percent of the assassination attempts are successful, leaving the victim dead. The other 50 percent

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leave the victim either unharmed or wounded. A protective team trained in emergency first aid treatment, with supplies available, can in many instances save a life. In many instances members of the protective team are also injured or killed during the attack.

BODYGUARD POSITIONING WHILE WALKING

When two or more bodyguards work as a team to provide protection for the executive, there are methods of positioning themselves in relation to each other and to the executive that have proven to offer the best level of protection. Naturally, the positions illustrated and discussed here should be regarded as ideas only and then modified according to individual needs and circumstances.

The minimum number of bodyguards that should ever be assigned to a threatened individual is two. However, should only one guard for some reason be available, the best position will depend upon where the greatest threat lies. The guard must be in a position that will best enable him to ward off an attacker and, he should always be within an arms reach of the person being protected. Again, however, one guard is not recommended because all an attacker must do is dispatch the one guard and the victim is left without protection.

When two bodyguards are employed, normal circumstances call for one guard to be positioned to the left and slightly to the rear of the person being protected, while the other should be on the right and slightly ahead, viewing the person by peripheral vision. This is called a *Wedge Formation* (see Figure 1a). Three bodyguards will usually position themselves in what is called a *Modified Wedge Formation*. (This is illustrated in Figure 1b.) Note that two guards are positioned slightly ahead of and to the right and left of the executive. The third is to the left rear. Four bodyguards will position themselves in a *Box Formation* with two guards ahead on the right and left and two to the rear right and left (see Figure 1c). Five bodyguards will utilize a *Box-Wedge Formation* with their positioning just as it was with the *box formation* except that the fifth guard will lead in a position center and ahead of the two forward bodyguards (as illustrated in Figure 1d).

When the person is scheduled to meet a large gathering of people, it is desirable to have a crowd barrier erected to contain those people where necessary. Two bodyguards should position themselves at each side of the executive with a third guard positioned to his rear. He then has a guard protecting three sides leaving only his front exposed. A guard naturally cannot be positioned in front without interfering with the




Figure 1. Bodyguard positioning while walking. (a) Wedge Formation. (b) Modified Wedge Formation. (c) Box Formation. (d) Box-Wedge Formation.

meeting. As the group moves along the crowd the bodyguard in the lead should be very alert to the positioning and movement of the hands of those in the crowd. *Special attention should be given to the second row of people*, because an attacker will often choose the second row and launch the attack from there by reaching over the first row of people to shoot the victim, a handgun often being the choice of weapon. A slight variation of this situation is what occurred in the shooting of Alabama Governor George Wallace. *Remember, when an attack occurs, attack the weapon, not the man. If the attacker is too far away, throw something, even a coat, to obstruct his line of vision.*

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR BODYGUARDS

1. Always remain *alert*, *anticipate* possible threats and, have some type of *plan* in mind as to how a threat will be handled in the event that

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it should occur. *Stay alert, anticipate and plan.*

2. Just as a traffic officer closely watches the hands of the occupants of a vehicle he has stopped and is approaching, so must the bodyguard *watch the hands* of anyone in close proximity to the executive. It is the hands that will wield a weapon and anyone whose hands are hidden from view should be regarded with suspicion and watched closely. Also, a defense plan should be formulated in such a situation. Planning can greatly minimize reaction time should an attack occur.

3. In the event that an attacker with a weapon approaches the executive, *attack the weapon, not the person*. Grappling with the person leaves the gun hand (if it is a gun being used) free and the danger persists. Attacking the weapon renders it much less effective much sooner.

4. When an individual is for some reason suspect, do not look directly at him/her as so doing may alert them to the fact that they are suspect. Although realizing they are suspect may discourage the attack, it also may cause them to launch the attack prematurely and from a greater distance, a distance that precludes proper intervention and neutralization of the weapon.

5. It is always better to avoid an attack than to attempt neutralizing it once it occurs. Accordingly, if a threatening situation appears to be developing, bodyguards should quickly remove the executive from the area.

6. If there are at least two bodyguards with the executive, which there should be, and an attack occurs, one guard should intercept the attacker while the other escorts the executive from the area.

7. When an attack occurs and the target is removed from the area, it is best to retreat rather than proceed in the same general direction. The reason for this is the fact that there is sometimes more than one attacker involved with a second or third positioned further along the victim's intended route.

8. Diversions are sometimes used to distract and confuse protective personnel to make them less effective in perceiving and countering a pending attack. Anything that could be construed as a diversionary tactic should serve to make the bodyguards extra alert. In some instances, depending upon the circumstances, it may be advisable to quickly leave the area.

9. While walking, the bodyguards should provide the executive with a protective envelope by proper positioning of themselves in relation to him. However, every effort must be made to accomplish the

task without unnecessarily restricting the mobility of that person or unnecessarily offending the public. For example, while a protective envelope *could* easily utilize the full width of a public walkway, thus violating the rightful movement of other people, the positioning of the bodyguards should be modified so as to prevent such violations while at the same time not reducing the protection below an acceptable level.

10. When a member of the protective team observes potential danger, it is important that the other members be made aware without unnecessary loss of time. This is usually best accomplished through voice signals using the *clock system*, indicating the direction of danger as if one were on the face of a clock. For example, if danger was observed at ninety degrees to one's right, he would report the danger as being at 3:00 and also indicate whether it was high or low such as on a building or in an exterior stair well.

11. When an attack occurs, if the weapon cannot be attacked, anything shoved or thrown to obstruct the line of vision of the attacker will help to reduce the severity of the attack (for example the coat thrown by a U.S. Secret Service Agent during the shooting of Alabama Governor George Wallace).

12. When entering a room or hallway, the executive should be preceded by a security agent who will ascertain that the area is safe.

FIREARMS SELECTION AND TRAINING

Because the terrorist operates from a position of weakness, he makes use of the advantages afforded by surprise and speed. A terrorist attack is characterized by military style precision timing. Because the terrorist attack occurs very suddenly, the protective service team will be operating under a tremendous degree of stress when countering the attack. The problem is sometimes compounded by the fact that stray bullets fired by the protective team may injure or kill innocent persons in the area, a factor that concerns the executive and his guards, but not the terrorists. Such circumstances as these make it essential that any protective service agents who may be required to use a weapon be very well-trained and proficient in its use. The agent must be capable of returning fire rapidly under severe stress and yet deliver his shots with accuracy.

Training aids such as that illustrated in Figure 2 are a useful tool because they will, when properly used, provide the kind of weapons training that makes the agent very comfortable with his weapon so that

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its use becomes second nature. It also improves the agent's ability to appraise the adversary and think about what he is shooting. This equipment, therefore, incorporates the element of stress by imposing not only time constraints on the shooter, but forces the additional factor of decision-making under stress. With this method of training, the shooter must not only hit what he shoots at, but he must also analyse the situation so that he shoots only when appropriate.

As for the weapons choice of a protective team or its various elements, there are no *best* choices. The choice will depend upon a number of factors such as whether the team is comprised of governmental agents or private citizens. The weapons of the particular country in question will also be an important issue to consider.

Sgt. Gary Skeet, Firearms Instructor for the University of Kansas Police Department, was queried regarding his thoughts on such a matter. He gave the following response, which, although brief, serves to illustrate those factors he takes into consideration and the reasons for them.




Figure 2. The Duelatron® Electronic Target System is a combat shooting range featuring turning or pop up targets. The shooter must decide if the target represents friend or foe before shooting. This system is portable but also may be used as a permanent installation (Courtesy of Advanced Training Systems).

**FIREARMS SELECTION AND USE
BY A PROTECTIVE SERVICE GROUP
SGT. GARY SKEET**

One should recognize that expense and availability are factors that must always be considered, but this will be a brief examination of those considerations upon which to base a decision as to equipment for specific needs of various groups within the protective force.

(1) The bodyguard unit, four to six persons, properly trained and armed with the .45 Colt Automatic pistol or the option of the 9mm. Smith & Wesson Model 59 or Browning P35 automatic pistol. If conditions and clothing allow, and the threat level is high, one should consider a small compact submachine gun such as the Uzi, MAC 10, or Ruger. The use of high quality soft armor vests is of great importance.

(2) The inner circle, or first protective ring, can range from six persons to as many needed for the various situations that may be handled. Again, the need is for fire power so the plainclothes personnel may consider arms similar to the bodyguard unit, with possible additions of semiautomatic or selective fire assault carbines, such as the Colt CAR 15, Ruger Mini 14, AR-180 Armalite, in the .223 caliber. These weapon types will offer the advantage of rapid but controlled and accurate fire against a selected attacker or attackers.

(3) The outer protective ring will often be composed of uniformed officers, or otherwise be obvious to all persons concerned and, therefore, the choice of arms may be limited to standard duty weapons, at least in a visible sense. If the threat is great, then back-up weapons such as the Colt .45, or the 9mm. Smith & Wesson or Browning might be considered to be carried concealed if the officer or agent is proficient with the arm selected. Again, soft body armor is important.

(4) The intelligence team, two or three people, must be highly mobile yet they need fire power on their persons, such as the .45 Colt or above-mentioned 9mm. automatics.

(5) The bomb unit, often consisting of the Officer in Charge and the Technician, may consider similar arms. If the personnel are not proficient with automatic pistols, then the decision *must* be made to use high quality revolvers by Colt, Smith & Wesson or Ruger, and the caliber will be dictated by many variable conditions.

(6) The Muscle Car or Fire Power Unit, which is an *escort vehicle* containing armed guards, will often contain a specially trained driver and three gunners. Due to the recognition of the ever increasing threat of an organized group attack on a protective motorcade, the need for an immediate counterfire force is one of the utmost concerns. Their arms must produce a high volume of fire as well as accurate fire when needed.

The selective fire assault rifles and carbines should be considered.

Some possibilities include the Colt CAR XM177, Ruger assault carbine, AR-180 as well as the submachine guns of 9mm. and .45 caliber. In some cases it might be possible to use a high capacity shotgun such as the semiautomatic Remington 870P with a magazine extension. In crowds it would be impossible to select a target so its use would be limited in that respect. If possible, it would be wise to consider carrying an automatic pistol of the same caliber if the agent is using a submachine gun.

(7) The countersniper or long-range cover unit typically consists of a rifleman and observer team. In some cases it may be wise to have a marksman in position around or above a location that may be targeted by the enemy.

Quality binoculars are important to the observer. High quality 7×50 or 10×50 should be considered. The rifleman should have the option of either the .223 caliber or .308 caliber rifle, depending on the situation such as location, distance, and weather. The Remington 700 Heavy Barreled Varmit Model is an excellent choice. Similar bolt action rifles by Ruger and Winchester may also be considered. The two calibers (.223 and .308) are chosen for purposes of standardization and ammunition supply for training as well as resupply, both being military calibers.

Scopes (telescopic sights) of variable magnification such as the Redfield, Lyman or Leupold offer good vision and reliability. Special scopes for additional advantages such as a built-in range finder offer advantages. The scope mounts are of great importance. Redfield mounts seem to be one of the finest.

BODY ARMOR

There was a time when body armor, often referred to a bullet-proof vests, was bulky and heavy, uncomfortable to wear and could not be worn in an inconspicuous manner because of their bulk. However, recent years have brought about improved materials, *soft body armor*, which offer reasonable protection against common handgun ammunition and yet is lightweight enough to be worn under street clothing in a reasonably comfortable and inconspicuous manner.

During 1977 the Aerospace Corporation, for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, conducted and directed a field test program of various fabrics used in the manufacture of soft body armor to determine the suitability of each for that use. Among the materials tested were Nylon, rayon, Dacron™ and Kevlar™. They were tested according to their degree of bullet resistance, their suitability for tailoring, availability of the material, wearability and comfort of the resulting garment and the expected life duration of a garment made

from the material in question. Tests were also conducted to determine the physiological and medical effects prevalent when a person wearing such a garment was shot. This generally is referred to as *blunt trauma* and will be discussed.

The *two most important considerations* in selecting a material was (1) its bullet resistance and (2) the garments comfort for wear. The material selected as being best suited for this use was Kevlar, a synthetic fabric manufactured by DuPont Corporation.

After Kevlar was chosen, tests were conducted to determine the number of plies that would be necessary to offer various levels of protection. The levels of protection (threat level) are classified numerically from 1—6. Each level offers protection up to and including a given caliber bullet with a specified bullet weight and velocity. Various other tests were then conducted to determine the physiological and medical aspects of soft body armor manufactured with Kevlar.

Considering the *threat level vs. comfort* is important because, although a heavier garment will protect against higher energy weapons, the increased discomfort of a heavy garment discourages its use. The most logical way to choose a garment is to assess the level of the threat and then make a selection accordingly.

Most firearm assaults occur with a handgun, with rifles being the next frequently used. Rifle assaults are followed by shotgun assaults which are in turn followed by assaults with submachine guns. Submachine guns use pistol size ammunition but, because of longer barrels, often have a slightly higher bullet velocity and, therefore, greater energy and penetration.

In the United States *most* handgun assaults are committed with a caliber of .38 Special or less. Higher energy handguns are not frequently used. A garment with a *threat level 1* will protect against such weapon sizes. However, those fearing a terrorist attack, especially in foreign countries, would do well to select a vest whose threat level includes the 9mm automatic round (threat level 3).

Naturally, body armor does not protect the head of the wearer. However, case studies have shown that more fatal wounds are inflicted in the area of the upper torso than to the head area. Furthermore, police officers tend to be shot in the head more often than do political or civilian victims. While a vest cannot protect against head wounds, it certainly can protect against wounds inflicted in the area of the upper torso and thus greatly enhance one's chance of surviving an attack.

Figure 3 illustrates a soft vest being worn over a T-shirt. This vest has the desirable feature of having a washable outershell with removable

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ballistic pouches. This enables one to switch the ballistic pouches from one outershell to another for wear while the soiled one is laundered. This vest also features side and back protection, in addition to front protection. Some vests also offer protection panels for the lower abdomen.




Figure 3. Lightweight concealable Kevlar vest offers front, back and side protection. Features washable outer shell with removable ballistic pouch (Courtesy of International Protectors, Inc.).

Blunt trauma, previously mentioned, is the damage and injury to the wearer caused by the energy of a bullet when it strikes the armor which, because it is soft, is very flexible, thus allowing rear surface deformation (see Figure 4). The effect of blunt trauma depends upon the energy of the bullet (determined by bullet weight and velocity), the number of plies in the vest, and the location of the hit upon one's body. Conceivably the impact *could* be fatal but almost never is. There has been, in the past, some controversy as to the actual effects of blunt trauma so, finally, a knowledgeable police officer did the most logical thing. He interviewed large numbers of people who had been shot while wearing soft body armor.*

*M.F. Ayoob, "The Blunt Truth About Blunt Trauma," *Law & Order Magazine*, (August, 1978), 14-19.




Figure 4. Characteristic of soft body armor is the *blunt trauma effect* resulting from rear face deformation of the vest upon bullet impact. (a) Bullet about to strike armor. (b) Bullet impact deforming the armor.

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Most of the people interviewed reportedly equated the impact of the bullet (.38 Special and .357 Mag.) to that of a strong man's punch. While a strong man's punch *can* be fatal, it normally is not. Although soft body armor does allow the bullet to impart a great deal of its energy to the victim, the bullet is not permitted to pass into the victim, tearing the hole that causes the hemorrhaging which is the cause for most bullet fatalities.

Figure 5a illustrates a 38 Special semi-wad cutter bullet that has impacted eight plies of Kevlar. Figure 5b shows the face of the bullet and the imprint of the fabric on its face. Also note that there was no penetration. In Figure 6 is a jacketed .32 caliber bullet that was fired into eight plies of Kevlar. Three layers were penetrated.




Figure 5. (a) 38 special semi-wad cutter bullet that has impacted eight plies of Kevlar. (b) Note the imprint of the fabric on the bullet's face.




Figure 6. A jacketed .32 caliber bullet fired into eight plies of Kevlar penetrated three layers.

Soft body armor made from Kevlar is *highly resistant to knife slashes* but cannot be relied upon to stop the thrust and penetration of sharp pointed instruments such as an ice pick or letter opener (see Figure 7). The problem presented by pointed instruments is their ability to slip between the threads even though the weave is very tight. However, although such instruments may slip between the threads, the fabric does tend to limit the depth of the penetration and offers some margin of protection.

Proper fit is important because an improper fit results in a reluctance to wear the garment; lack of comfort being a frequent reason for not wearing a vest. Body armor for women is generally more expensive because of greater problems of fit. In addition to body armor availability in standard sizes and styles, there are firms that manufacture custom armor according to an individual's size and need. Such armor can be fitted to the lining of jackets and coats and may even be obtained as a dress vest among other things. A dress vest does, however, leave a portion of one's front unprotected. An individual's specific needs will determine if standard or custom armor should be selected.

Although soft armor that is comfortable to wear and that can be worn inconspicuously does not offer protection against high-powered rifle fire, the garment does offer better than no protection in those instances




Figure 7. A pointed instrument such as an ice pick or letter opener has a tendency to slip between the threads of the Kevlar.

where a rifle bullet passes through a car body and is perhaps in fragments once reaching the vehicle's interior. A garment would also offer better than no protection against bomb fragments. And, should a round or fragment successfully penetrate the vest, the velocity of the projectile will certainly have been reduced thus possibly minimizing physiological damage and improving one's chances for survival, even though perhaps only slightly.

There are many things such as dampness and ultraviolet radiation from the sun that will greatly reduce Kevlar's effectiveness. Accordingly, it is extremely important to follow the manufacturer's instructions, especially laundering instructions that are provided on the label. One should not deviate from those instructions in any way whatever or the reliability of the garment may be reduced below an acceptable level.

In addition to, or in lieu of, traditional-type body armor, an executive may elect to use a *briefcase insert* so that the briefcase itself may be used to shield against a firearm attack, whether it be while walking or riding in a vehicle. A briefcase insert is light in weight, being constructed of the same material as body armor, and requires little space.

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Chapter 4

COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Fast and efficient communications are of utmost importance for an executive protective team; without it, the element of speed and surprise relied so heavily upon by the attacking terrorist will have the devastating effect intended and expected. In this brief chapter consideration will be given to telephone and radio systems.

When provisions for communications are made, the most important consideration to be addressed is the communication need that will exist during an emergency situation. A communication network that is adequate during a nonemergency situation can prove to be totally inadequate during an attack. This must be taken into consideration during the planning stage. The feasibility for a back-up system should also be considered.

TELEPHONE SYSTEMS

Telephone systems will satisfy the needed communications in certain instances, either in whole or in part. When the telephone's use is anticipated, it is necessary that all persons involved have in their possession all applicable telephone numbers. When use of a public pay phone is anticipated, an ample supply of coins must be available.

When using the telephone, it is important to speak distinctly and at a moderate rate of speed, yet varying the tone of the voice somewhat. One should also speak into the mouthpiece; to do otherwise makes it more difficult for the other person to understand the message. It is important that anyone in a position to receive important telephone calls answer the phone promptly and, where appropriate, immediately identify themselves. The aforementioned considerations pertaining to method of speaking apply here as well. If the telephone system necessary to accommodate the security needs is at all complex, one should consult with the telephone company.

RADIO SYSTEMS

Radio systems are doubtlessly the greatest single technological advancement to benefit law enforcement and protective agencies to date. Radio systems, when properly used, provide a communications network that would otherwise be impossible.

Because of the complexity of radio communications systems, only a brief overview will be provided here. It is important that representatives of the communications firm one anticipates doing business with be contacted and their assistance in setting up an appropriate system be solicited. They can provide the indepth and specialized knowledge necessary for implementation of a communications system that is compatible with one's security needs.

The three basic types of radios to be concerned with will be the following:

1. Base stations.
2. Vehicle radios.
3. Portable radios (walkie-talkies).

Base stations are most commonly at a location manned by security personnel such as at the company's security headquarters. The base radio generally has a much higher output than do the vehicle and portable radios and, therefore, a much greater broadcasting range.

Vehicle radios do not have as great an output as do base stations, but do have a good transmitting range nonetheless. Typical output varies from around 15 to over 100 watts. Vehicle radios can suffice as an alternate command post during an emergency. Modern solid state construction allows the radio to remain on standby to receive incoming calls without an unnecessarily high amount of battery drain.

Portable transceivers (walkie-talkies) are small units, easily carried on one's person in the field and vary between one-half to five watts (see Figure 8). Many are available that can be carried in a harness under one's clothing, which ensures privacy and discretion with monitoring accomplished via an earphone and transmitting done with an external microphone. (see Figure 9).

Although there are many companies that manufacture and market high quality radio systems, it will be found that the following three companies market most of the equipment (perhaps 90%) in use today by police agencies. Presented in the order of their sales they are as follows:

1. Motorola Communications and Electronics.
2. General Electric.
3. RCA (Radio Corporation of America).

Figure 8. Motorola
Radio (Courtesy)

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


Figure 8. Motorola's MT-500 Series Handi-Talkie Portable FM Two-Way Radio (Courtesy of Motorola).

When considering the purchase of radio equipment, it is important to consider not only the reputation of the manufacturer and the applicability of the system relative to one's needs but the availability and quality of servicing in one's area.

When transmitting with a radio, the following considerations should be borne in mind:

1. Hold the microphone about one inch from the lips and speak directly into it.
2. Speak loudly and clearly but do not shout. Shouting tends to cause distortion.




Figure 9. Bodyguards and other protective personnel can wear the radio over or under the clothing using an earphone and external microphone (Courtesy of Motorola).

3. Listen for several seconds before beginning to transmit to ensure against interrupting other's transmissions.
4. Depress the transmit button firmly and pause to allow the transmitter time to achieve peak power.
5. Properly identify oneself and the party being contacted.
6. Lengthy but nonemergency messages should be given in segments to allow for clarifications and to permit emergency messages to be heard should they arise.

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A for H

B for D-E-S

C for G-O-

D for O-Q-

E for F-H-

F for E-H-

G for C-O-

H for E-F-

J for O-Q-

K for E-F-

L for E-T

M for N-V-

N for H-M-

O for C-D-

P for F-R-

Q for C-D-

R for F-H-

S for B-8

T for E-F-

U for D-J-

V for M-N-

W for M-N-

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Z for E-K-

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7. Times, when appropriate, should be given in a manner that ensures against unnecessary misunderstandings. The 24-hour (military) times will alleviate such problems.

8. Phonetic alphabet, when properly used, can ensure against unnecessary misunderstandings. Important names, for example, should be given phonetically.

For example, in transmitting the name Browdy, the name would first be stated and then followed by the spelling saying first each letter followed by its phonetic equivalent: Browdy...B-Boy, R-Robert, O-Ocean, W-William, D-David, Y-Yellow.

Often the protective force will find it necessary to transmit vehicle registration numbers. Unfortunately, registration numbers are often incorrectly read, or if correctly read, they are often misunderstood by the receiving party and thus recorded incorrectly. The list provided below should help in that it depicts the numbers and letters most commonly mistaken for another both visually and verbally.

BY OBSERVATION:

A for H
B for D—E—S—H—8
C for G—O—Q
D for O—Q—P—U
E for F—H—K—P—R—T
F for E—H—K—P—R—T
G for C—O—Q
H for E—F—K—R—N—B
J for O—Q—U
K for E—F—H—N—P—R—Y
L for E—T
M for N—V—W—X
N for H—M—V—W—X
O for C—D—G—Q—U
P for F—R—T
Q for C—D—G—O—U
R for F—H—K—P
S for B—8
T for E—F—P
U for D—J—O—Q
V for M—N—U—W—X—Y
W for M—N—V—X—Y
X for K—V—Y
Y for K—V—X
Y for K—V—X
Z for E—K—S—X
1 for 7
2 for 5, 7

3 for 5, 6, 8

4 for 1

5 for 2, 3

6 for 0, 8

7 for 1, 2

8 for 3, 6, 9

9 for 0, 8

BY SOUND:

A for H—J—K
B for C—D—E—G—P—T—V—Z
C for B—D—E—G—P—T—V—Z
D for B—C—E—G—P—T—V—Z
E for B—C—E—G—P—T—V—Z
F for N—X—S
G for B—C—D—E—P—T—V—Z
H for A—J—K
J for A—H—K
K for A—H—J
M for F—N
N for F—M
P for B—C—D—E—G—T—V—Z
Q for U
S for F—N—X
T for B—C—D—E—G—P—V—Z
U for Q
V for B—C—D—E—G—P—T—Z
X for F—S
Z for B—C—D—E—G—P—T—V

Standard descriptions of persons and vehicles are useful to help prevent omissions. Following are examples of the order in which a person's description may be given and also that of a vehicle.

PERSON:

1. Name-correctly spelled phonetically.
2. Sex.
3. Race.
4. Age.
5. Height.
6. Weight.
7. Hair color, length and style.
8. Eye color.
9. Complexion.
10. Other identifying features.
11. Clothing-description from head to foot.
 - A. Hat.
 - B. Shirt.
 - C. Tie.
 - D. Coat.
 - E. Trousers.
 - F. Socks.
 - G. Shoes.

VEHICLE: (CYMBAL is a useful guide).

1. C-Color.
2. Y-Year.
3. M-Make.
4. B-Body Style.
5. A-Accessories.
6. L-License Number.

The possibility always exists that undesirable elements will have the capability of monitoring radio transmissions of the security force. The possibility also exists that they will possess the capability of providing misinformation that is calculated to disrupt the protective effort. Scramblers offer a certain amount of communications privacy and security by making the transmissions unintelligible to anyone without an appropriate scrambler unit. Scramblers are available for both radio and telephone use. Simple codes such as that shown below also offer

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security in that the caller can be requested to identify what number would be appropriate for a given combination. For example, the correct response for 2-B would be 2475. *Only* authorized members of the protective team would be capable of providing the correct answer. New codes can easily be devised in the field on a daily basis.

	A	B	C	D
1	2576	3869	5197	3860
2	6925	2475	2785	5268
3	8537	5782	8595	6575
4	9753	3595	8495	4696
5	0736	5799	7490	2957

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DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE DRIVING

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although the executive typically spends only about 17 percent (4 hours) of each day in transit, it is during that period of time that many kidnap and assassination attempts occur (see Figure 10). The attacks frequently occur as the victim is entering or alighting a vehicle, or while the victim is in the vehicle enroute somewhere. The reason for this results, to a large degree, from the fact that it is more difficult to adequately protect against an attack while in transit. There are,




Figure 10. Although only about four hours, or 17 percent, of each day is spent in transit, it is during that period of time that the executive's vulnerability to a criminal or terrorist attack will be greatest.

however, many things that can be done to minimize the chance of an attack, or to minimize the severity of an attack, should it occur.

The motor vehicle is a tremendously powerful weapon when properly used. The fact that an attacker does not normally expect that it will be used as a weapon tends to make its use even more effective. In the majority of cases the attacker will have decided in his own mind how the victim is going to react to the attack and, when the victim fails to react accordingly, the effectiveness of the attacker diminishes.

This chapter will acquaint the reader with those factors which will increase one's chances of surviving a terrorist attack directed upon the automobile. An examination will be made of various driving techniques that may be employed and some modifications that can be made to a vehicle to increase its effectiveness as a protective device as well as an offensive weapon.

DRIVING EXERCISES

Although various driving techniques and methods will be discussed, nothing can replace behind-the-wheel instruction from a qualified instructor. In spite of that fact, however, those who do not have the opportunity for specialized and personalized instruction can benefit by practicing various exercises under controlled conditions to gain a feel for a vehicle and its forces under various circumstances.

A *skid pan* is commonly used to enable the driving student to become well acquainted with a vehicle's handling characteristics and skid control at safely reduced speeds. A skid pan is a blacktopped area, similar to a parking lot, whose surface contains a coating of oil to reduce the coefficient of friction. Such a setting enables a student to develop a *feel* for a vehicle at safely reduced speeds. All the forces that affect a vehicle skid at low speeds on the skid pan, and the appropriate corrective maneuvers, are essentially the same as they would be at higher speeds on a dry surface. They only appreciable difference is the speed at which one is traveling.

Weaving between cones on a straight course at progressively greater speeds is a worthwhile exercise (see Figure 11). It is possible to weave a vehicle through a series of cones, spaced about 95 feet apart, at speeds well in excess of 50 miles per hour. When going into the exercise, the driver should brake lightly to stabilize the vehicle, just as when going into a turn. The remainder of the exercise should be done applying light and even acceleration to prevent excessive build-up of spring loading. (Spring loading will be discussed.) When traveling rapidly



Figure 11. Weaving exercise in proper spring loading th

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


Figure 11. Weaving between cones at progressively greater speeds is a good exercise in proper use of steering and in proper control of weight transfer and spring loading through use of brakes and acceleration.

between the cones, quick and snappy steering action is necessary. That requires practice.

Backing exercises through a course is also a valuable exercise and quickly develops skill and confidence. It is surprising the tremendous speed at which a vehicle may be drive in reverse—45 miles per hour not being excessive in instances where no sharp turns must be negotiated. That speed is not recommended for a normal backing exercise, however. The main hazard associated with high speed driving in reverse is turning too quickly and having the front end of the vehicle swing around as occurs when executing the reverse 180-degree turn, a precision maneuver that will be discussed in this chapter. When driving in reverse and making a necessary turn, it is important to maneuver the vehicle in such a manner that the wide arcing of the front is accounted for.

PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE AND PRE-TRIP INSPECTIONS

Preventative maintenance and pre-trip inspections are important to ensure that the vehicle is always in safe operating condition. A problem that is only minor during normal driving can rapidly develop into

serious trouble when driving extremely hard in an effort to thwart the efforts of an attacker. The following is a list of those things which one should do and consider:

1. When first approaching the vehicle, give it a casual visual inspection for anything unusual.
2. Check the shock absorbers. Push down the vehicle and then release it to see if there is excessive bounce.
3. Look under the car for anything unusual.
4. Examine the tires. Look for excessive or uneven wear and for stress marks on the sidewalls. Ensure even pressure from side to side. Check rims for cracks.
5. Check all lighting to ensure proper operation.
6. Ensure that wipers and windshield washers function properly.
7. Ensure that the parking brake (emergency brake) is always properly adjusted and in good working order. This will pay off should a forward 180-degree turn become necessary.
8. Safety belts must be working properly. Manual belts tend to be better than the inertia reel type, since they allow for greater mobility without removing the belt.
9. Engine must be well tuned with adequate oil, coolant and battery water at the recommended level.
10. Fuel supply must always be adequate; never below one-half tank. Hard driving, if it becomes necessary, consumes large amounts of fuel. Running out of fuel could be fatal.
11. Check the wheel lug nuts oneself any time the wheels are removed for any reason. Do not over torque.
12. Check the belts and hoses. Carrying extras as well as the necessary tools for installation is advisable.
13. Communications equipment in proper working order.
14. Weapons, if any, must be in working order and accessible.
15. Check miscellaneous emergency equipment:
 - a. Supplementary lighting.
 - b. Flares or reflectors (flares can accidentally ignite gasoline spilled at an accident).
 - c. First aid kit; driver trained in first aid.
 - d. Sand mats.
 - e. Knife.
 - f. Shovel.
 - g. Fire extinguisher in the driver's area.
 - h. Spare tire and jack.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR NORMAL DRIVING

During periods of normal driving, the potential target of a terrorist attack would do well to remain ever alert and keep the following considerations foremost in mind:

1. Have all mirrors properly adjusted for maximum effectiveness of rear vision.
2. Be properly seated in the vehicle. Do not sit too close or too far from the steering wheel and do not slouch in the seat. Hands should be properly placed on the wheel for minimum time loss, and maximum control, if quick steering becomes necessary.
3. Never pull up too close behind another vehicle at a traffic signal. Leave enough room to maneuver out if necessary. If one remains far enough back to see both rear wheels of the car ahead, there will usually be sufficient room to maneuver out if necessary.
4. Whenever positioning the vehicle, always leave an out. Avoid becoming boxed in.
5. Watch for the development of any unusual situations. Be safe, evade them.
6. Avoid construction areas. One could end up in a trap from which there is no escape. Be wary also of detour signs.
7. Keep doors locked and windows closed. In hot weather, use the air conditioner or roll windows down not more than 2 inches.
8. Remain alert at all times for indications of being followed.
9. An automatic garage door opener is useful, since it eliminates the need to alight from the vehicle and expose oneself to an attack.

HIGH SPEED DRIVING

High speed driving is a multiple task performance that allows for little error on the part of a vehicle or its driver. The kinetic energy of a vehicle in motion is awesome and quadruples when the speed of the vehicle doubles.

The dangers inherent in high speed driving become increasingly greater the faster one goes. There are several reasons for that fact. First, as noted, the kinetic energy increases significantly, thus maximizing the destructive forces to which one will be subjected should a mishap occur. Second, the coefficient of friction between the road surface and tires reduces with increased speed, thus minimizing the ability of the vehicle to remain under control. Third, when at high speeds, even on a straight course, braking efficiency is reduced considerably. To illustrate, con-

sider the fact that it requires as much braking energy to slow a vehicle from 99 miles per hour to 70 miles per hour, a reduction of only 29 miles per hour, as is required to reduce the vehicle's speed from 70 miles per hour to a complete stop. Fourth, increased speed has a tendency to narrow the driver's field of vision producing what is referred to as *tunnel vision*. That can result in hazards approaching from the sides not being observed. Fifth, *velocitation* tends to occur, which is simply the drivers tendency to become accustomed to the high rate of speed so that it no longer *feels* as fast. There are two dangers that can result from that phenomenon. The first results from the driver's tendency to continue increasing the speed even though he may not realize he is doing so, increasing the speed so that it continues to *feel* the same. The second danger is a tendency to attempt negotiating a curve or turn too fast feeling that a slow enough speed has been attained, a speed that feels slower than it really is because of velocitation. A glance at the speedometer is recommended.

It was stated that the coefficient of friction decreases with increased speed. That regrettable fact cannot be controlled to any significant degree by the driver. A factor that can be controlled by the driver, however, at least partially so, is the weight distribution of the vehicle. Every effort should be made to minimize weight transfer to keep the vehicle balanced and stable. Braking, even though slight, tends to lower the vehicle and thus its center of gravity. Releasing the brakes should be done smoothly to allow the compressed springs to raise the vehicle to a natural position without causing it to *jump* beyond a natural position, extending the springs, and then settling back down. In a high speed maneuver that can interfere with proper vehicle control, smooth braking and acceleration are important.

Controlling weight transfer, both to the front and rear and to the sides, is important during a high speed turn and becomes especially important when a series of turns are made in rapid succession. Proper control of weight transfer during turns can minimize the effects of spring loading. Spring loading results when a vehicle is negotiating a hard turn and therefore leans to the side. While the vehicle is leaning, the springs on one side are compressed while those on the opposite side are extended. If the driver suddenly changes the vehicle's course and thus quickly transfers its weight to the opposite side, the loaded springs, which are those compressed, have a tendency to snap the vehicle the other way, causing a spinout. The undesirable effects of this kind of spring loading can be minimized by the driver's braking before the turn to slow the vehicle to a safe speed and to stabilize it, and then applying

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even acceleration during the turns. Acceleration tends to transfer the weight of vehicle to the rear, thus lowering it and minimizing spring loading. The fact that the acceleration does transfer the vehicle's weight to the rear can result in some degree of understeer. Should the understeer cause difficulty in making the vehicle follow the desired path (line) through the turn, all one need do is withdraw the foot from the accelerator to eliminate acceleration and thus transfer some vehicle weight forward. Weight transfer to the front tends to cause oversteer and the problem of understeering should correct itself.

Attempting a turn at too great a speed, and improper control of weight transfer, can cause a vehicle to begin spinning out. If the vehicle is permitted to spin off its axis more than 28 degrees, recovery is no longer possible by conventional countersteering and the vehicle will be out of control. The recommended procedure for correcting a spinout, provided that the vehicle has not spun too far, is to withdraw the foot from the accelerator and turn into the spin. When the vehicle *begins* to straighten itself, one should begin countersteering in the opposite direction. If one does not begin the countersteer soon enough, the vehicle will tend to spin out in the opposite direction.

During a chase it can be necessary to negotiate turns and curves at high speeds. In addition to properly controlling the weight transfer through the use of braking and acceleration, it is important to take a proper line through the curve. The line is the path the vehicle will, or should, follow. This is best learned behind the wheel under controlled conditions, under the supervision of a qualified instructor.

When attempting to cover the maximum distance in the minimum amount of time, the speed at which one exits a turn is usually more important than the speed at which one actually negotiates the turn. The reason for that is simply that the faster one exits the curve, the less time and space it takes to attain maximum speed. *Terminal velocity therefore is the key.* Figure 12 depicts a typical line through a 180-degree curve. The radius of the turn the vehicle must negotiate between points "A" and "B" is the same as the radius of turn should one hug the inside of the curve all the way through. But, in this instance, the vehicle is required to slow down sufficiently to negotiate that turning radius for about one-third to one-half the distance. Following this particular line has increased the turning radius by about one-third. Consider the effect that will have on the speed at which the vehicle may exit the curve. If, in this example, the vehicle could maintain a maximum speed of 60 miles per hour while holding to the innermost side of the turn, then it will leave the turn at about that speed. While utilizing the proper line, however, it

will be necessary to reduce speed to 60 miles per hour *only* between points "A" and "B." After that, by increasing the turning radius by about one-third (33%) the remainder of the curve may be negotiated at a 33 percent greater speed, which is close to 80 miles per hour. Although driving the proper line does mean that the vehicle is traveling a bit further, it is also traveling much faster, and more importantly, it is exiting the curve at a much greater speed. It will take this vehicle much less time and space to attain a maximum speed than will be required for a pursuer whom we will presume has unwittingly held to the inner side of the turn. It must also be presumed here that both vehicles involved




Figure 12. Proper line (path) through a turn or curve allows greater vehicle control and a higher exit speed. Heavy braking between points 1 and 2 to stabilize and slow the vehicle. Ease up on brakes between points 2 and 3. Feather and release brakes between points 3 and 4. Mild acceleration between points 4 and 5. Heavy acceleration from point 5. Radius of turn between points "A" and "B" is the same as would be were the inner portion of the turn followed between points 2 and 5.

have the same concern. In the pursuer's, but disadvantage of an accomplishment.

It has already reduced at high speed should employ a technique is simply wheels stop rotating locked up when the road surface between the tire wheel to rotate contact with the loudly even the enhance stopping.

When driving a driver should be pending danger or an innocent higher than the rate at which the oncoming most appropriate.

Emergency vehicle's maximum example, at a distance of 45 that distance.

When a roadway to possible motion as controlled appraising route. If strict made to strict. When a collision vehicle at the vehicle' because of the

have the same capability as far as acceleration and maximum speed are concerned. In the event that the victim's vehicle is a little slower than the pursuer's, but the victim is a better driver, skill may offset the disadvantage of a slower vehicle. Conversely, however, if the attacker is an accomplished driver with a fast vehicle, he presents a grave danger.

It has already been mentioned that a vehicle's braking efficiency is reduced at high speeds. When emergency braking at high speeds, one should employ what is called *threshold braking*. This braking technique is simply applying braking pressure to that point just before the wheels stop rotating and begin sliding. The braking efficiency of a locked up wheel decreases because, as the portion of tire in contact with the road surface heats up and melts, it creates small particles of rubber between the tire and road surface that act as bearings. By allowing the wheel to rotate, that condition is avoided by keeping cool rubber in contact with the road surface. In threshold braking the tires will squeal loudly even though rotating somewhat. Pumping the brakes will not enhance stopping ability except on surfaces such as ice and snow.

When driving at higher than normal speeds becomes necessary, the driver should visually drive as far ahead as possible and anticipate pending danger, whether such danger be presented by another attacker or an innocent motorist. It is important to realize that when traveling at higher than normal speeds, other motorists will often fail to realize the rate at which one is approaching and unwittingly pull out in front of the oncoming vehicle. Accordingly, one must continually consider the most appropriate response.

Emergency evasive maneuvers often work better if one uses the vehicle's maneuvering ability rather than its stopping ability. For example, at 35 miles per hour one cannot stop a vehicle within a distance of 45 feet, but a vehicle can be swerved into the next lane within that distance.

When a situation arises wherein it will be necessary to leave the roadway to avoid a collision, the driver should brake hard to the last possible moment and then release the brake and steer off the roadway in as controlled a manner as possible. While braking the driver should be appraising the situation and planning the most appropriate escape route. If striking some object cannot be avoided, then an effort should be made to strike the object that will have the least effect on one's speed. When a collision with another vehicle cannot be avoided, strike the vehicle at either end, if possible, so as to spin it rather than impacting the vehicle's total weight. Impacting the rear is preferable to the front because of the weight of the engine. However, one will not always have a

choice. The section discussing the ramming of stationary vehicle roadblocks would be worth referring to.

In the event that one should experience a tire blowout at high speeds, it is essential to *stay off the brake*. Braking under such circumstances can cause loss of vehicle control. The best procedure is to take the foot from the accelerator and grip the steering wheel firmly until the vehicle has slowed to 20-30 miles per hour. At that point one can gently steer the vehicle to the side of the road and brake gently to a stop. In a chase situation, however, one will have no alternative but to continue driving as fast as possible without losing control.

COUNTERING A MOVING VEHICLE ATTACK

Very often, when being pursued by an attacker, technique rather than high speed is the better choice. The reason for this is because as one drives faster, so will the attacker drive faster. Better vehicle control can be maintained at lower speeds of perhaps 60 miles per hour or less, and one's chances of using the vehicle to eliminate the attacker, or simply make a quick turn to elude him, will be better. Furthermore, high speeds increase the chance of a serious or fatal accident. Maneuvers such as swerving can prevent an attacker from getting alongside one where he can direct gunfire into the vehicle. Once a sudden evasive maneuver has succeeded in breaking contact (Figures 13 through 19), speed should be employed to gain as great a lead as possible and also to break visual contact as quickly as conditions permit.

A common method of committing an assassination while the victim is enroute is for the attackers to pull alongside the victim's vehicle and direct their gunfire into the vehicle as they pass it. When a vehicle is used it is common to have two gunmen; one in the front passenger's seat, with a second gunman in the back seat. They will begin firing when in the proximity of the victim driver's blind spot and will continue firing until passed to the point where too great an angle exists to continue firing. Normally, each gunman will fire between 15-20 rounds with the time duration of the attack being 10-15 seconds. A variation of this technique is to have a first vehicle, often driven by a female, pass the victim's vehicle to slow it for the convenience of the second vehicle containing the gunmen. Another variation often used in the Far Eastern and European countries is for the attack to be made by two people on a motorcycle as depicted in Figures 20a through 20c. The maneuverability of a motorcycle makes such an assassination team highly

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Figure 13. Wh
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effective and very dangerous. After the assault the attackers commonly escape down a perpendicular side street.




Figure 13. When being pursued and the roadway is blocked by traffic at a red traffic light, one may consider using the lane designated for oncoming traffic if conditions permit.




Figure 14. Curb jumping can make it possible to bypass traffic congestion. It is important to strike the curb at an angle between 30-45 degrees.

Figure 15. If a circumstances,




Figure 15. If a last moment turn is made, either right or left depending upon circumstances, it is unlikely that the attacker will be able to follow.




Figure 16. Driving into or across traffic using last moment timing can make it difficult for a pursuer to follow.



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


Figure 17. A sudden right or left turn under such circumstances could end the chase. A left turn would be best.




Figure 18. A sudden right or left turn under such circumstances could end the chase. A right turn would be best.

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


Figure 19. Suddenly exiting the freeway from an inner lane under such circumstances would make it very difficult to be followed.




Figure 20. (a) Assassins on a motorcycle pull up behind the intended victim. (b) As the motorcycle passes, the passenger fires upon the victim. (c) Escape is often made down a perpendicular side street.

A few possibilities exist. In the event that the vehicle will normally stop, they will normally stop. If they do not stop, they will overshoot the vehicle, and it will also overshoot the vehicle, or reverse 180 degrees, and one's vehicle must pass on the other side of the power by 50 percent. It will be in position.

Situations of driving over a road can be negotiated at 100 miles per hour. It is important that the angle between the vehicle and the degrees will result in a directly than the vehicle. It illustrates a vehicle with sufficient clearance. The vehicle is only 5 1/4 inches from the ground. If seen, there is a possibility of a vehicle.

High quality driving is better than driving. In addition to driving, it should be, even at 100 miles per hour. Driving can be traveling at a speed.

Anytime a vehicle is on a curb, the vehicle will crack both sides of the vehicle. It is for this inspection.

A few possibilities present themselves for countering such an attack. In the event that the attackers are on a motorcycle, a quick swerve into them will normally neutralize them quickly. In the event that they are in a vehicle, they can be pushed off the road or into a stationary object as depicted in Figures 38 and 39 in the section entitled Vehicle Elimination. Perhaps the safest counter, depending of course upon specific circumstances, is simply to make a sudden *panic* stop causing them to overshoot the vehicle, thus greatly reducing the time they have to shoot, and it will also tend to make the aim of their few shots erratic. A forward or reverse 180-degree turn may then be appropriate. Finally, positioning one's vehicle upon the roadway, when possible, so that the attackers must pass on the right (left in some countries) will reduce their fire power by 50 percent. The gunman in the front passenger's seat will not be in position to fire.

DRIVING OVER CURBS

Situations can arise wherein the only available escape route requires driving over some obstruction, such as a curb. If properly done, a curb can be negotiated at reasonably high speeds, speeds in the vicinity of 30 miles per hour not being excessive in many instances. The most important thing to consider when driving over a curb is to strike it at an angle between about 30-45 degrees. Striking the curb at less than 30 degrees will result in losing control of the steering wheel. Striking more directly than about 45 degrees can result in a flat tire. Figure 21 illustrates a vehicle driving over a curb. Figure 22 depicts the more than sufficient clearance even a low vehicle has when driving over a curb. The vehicle shown, when sitting on level ground, has a clearance of only 5¼ inches. The curb in this illustration is 7 inches high. As can be seen, there is ample clearance.

High quality steel belted radial tires tend to withstand physical abuse better than do other tire types; therefore, they should be considered. If, in addition to driving over curbs, high speed driving is anticipated, and it should be, ensure that the tire selected is rated for speeds well in excess of 100 miles per hour. Tires not designed and manufactured for high speed driving *can* heat up and blowout in as little as three minutes when traveling at speeds of 100 miles per hour or more.

Anytime an abusive maneuver has been made, such as driving over a curb, the wheels should be removed and the rims carefully inspected for cracks both inside and out. The tire need not be removed from the rim for this inspection. This inspection is important and should be done at



Figure 21. When driving over a curb, it should be struck at an angle between approximately 30-45 degrees. A speed of 30 miles per hour is often not excessive. (Photo by Ken Siljander).



Figure 22. This vehicle has a clearance of 5¼ inches when sitting on level ground. Note the ample clearance when on a 7-inch curb (Photo by Ken Siljander).

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


Figure 23. Cor
(a) Bootleg Tu

first opportunity. The condition of the tires should also be examined at that time.

180-DEGREE TURNS

A common method by which an assassination or abduction attempt is made is to establish a roadblock, often using one or more stationary vehicles; when the victim's vehicle comes to a stop, the attack is made. When the driver discovers that a roadblock is being approached, circumstances will often suggest the most appropriate response. If the roadblock is a reasonably great distance ahead a conventional turn may be made such as depicted in Figure 23a, b or c. All three methods, although appropriate under many circumstances, are passive and do require a certain degree of time and space to execute.

In extreme emergency situations where it is essential to retreat in the opposite direction as rapidly as possible, and where there is limited road width, there are two alternative turning maneuvers that may be employed. These may be referred to as the *forward 180-degree turn* and the *reverse 180-degree turn*. Both turning techniques are *precision*




Figure 23. Conventional methods of turning a vehicle around in the roadway. (a) Bootleg Turn. (b) "Y" Turn. (c) "U" Turn.

maneuvers and are accomplished while the vehicle is in motion. The driver's sequential timing at the vehicle's controls is critical when executing these maneuvers, especially with the Forward 180. In Figure 24 is depicted a staged attack in which either a forward or reverse 180-degree turn may be appropriate. The vehicle illustrated is just beginning a forward 180-degree turn.

Forward 180-degree turns require greater driver expertise than do reverse 180-degree turns; a great deal more can go wrong when executing the maneuver. Figures 25a through 25e illustrate a vehicle executing the forward 180-degree turn at a roadblock. Figures 26a through 26d illustrate a vehicle executing a forward 180-degree turn in an attempt to elude a pursuer. The speed necessary to execute this maneuver will depend upon the vehicle and the road surface. The vehicles illustrated were traveling about 40 miles per hour when the maneuver was begun. In Figure 25a the driver realizes that there is a probable attack ahead (stationary vehicle roadblock) and puts the vehicle into neutral gear. In Figure 25b the driver has turned very quickly and sharply to the left and, at *almost* that same instant, has applied the emergency brake very hard, thus causing the rear wheels to lock up and stop rotating. The significance here is the fact that the locked wheels have a tendency to lead. Turning the steering wheel



Figure 24. Staged attack. Although the victim has several evasive options available to him, he has decided upon executing a forward 180-degree turn and retreating. The turn has just begun (Photo by Chris Reed).



Figure 25. (a) Victim car in neutral gear. (b) Driver snapped the steering wheel to the left and the rear wheels turned quickly into low speed. (c) Full 180 degrees. (d) Required to accomplish the maneuver.




Figure 25. (a) Victim approaching a stationary vehicle roadblock has placed the car in neutral gear and adjusted speed to about 40 miles per hour. (b) Driver has snapped the steering wheel to the left and applied the emergency brake to cause the rear wheels to stop rotating. (c) Driver releases the emergency brake, goes quickly into low gear and applies full engine power. (d) Vehicle has rotated a full 180 degrees. (e) Driver accelerates out of the kill zone. Three seconds were required to accomplish this turn around (Photos by Ken Siljander).




Figure 27. (a) Vehicle comes to an abrupt stop because of roadblock and goes into reverse gear. (b) Attaining the desired reverse speed the driver takes his foot from the accelerator and snaps the steering to the left. (c) Driver is now in low forward gear with full engine power applied. (d) Driver accelerating out of the kill zone. Two seconds were required to turn the vehicle around once sufficient reverse speed was attained (Photos by Ken Siljander).

sharply just a fraction of a second before applying the emergency brake causes the vehicle to begin a rotating attitude and the rear wheels assume a leading position much quicker. In Figure 25c the vehicle has rotated about 90 degrees so that it is sliding broadside in the roadway and still rotating. At that point, the driver releases the emergency brake and, at the same time, very quickly places the vehicle into low gear and applies full engine power. Full power is essential to prevent the engine from stalling. By the time the driver has completed all these maneuvers, the vehicle will have rotated a full 180 degrees and be going back in the direction from which it came. As will be noted, very little road width is required when this technique is properly executed. The total time necessary to accomplish this turnaround is only about three seconds. Compare that with the time necessary to complete a more conventional turnaround, especially on the roadway too narrow for a conventional "U" turn.

The procedure for the forward 180-degree turn in outline form would appear as follows:

1. Check and adjust speed according to road conditions.
2. Put transmission into neutral gear (automatic transmission).
3. Turn steering wheel sharply in the desired direction and immediately apply the emergency brake with sufficient force to lock up the rear wheels.
4. When the vehicle has rotated *about* 90 degrees, release the emergency brake, go into low gear and apply full engine power.

The forward 180-degree turn is not without its weaknesses, however, first, a great deal of driver skill is required. Second, should the emergency brake be weak and fail to lock up the rear wheels, the vehicle will likely leave the roadway, out of control. Third, if tire inflation is not sufficiently high, too much roll under of the tire may allow the rim to make contact with the road surface, causing the vehicle to roll over, or the tire and rim seal may break, causing sudden deflation of the tire and, again, a roll over can occur. Note the force placed upon the tires as evident in the attitude of the vehicle just beginning a forward 180-degree turn in Figure 26a.

Reverse 180-degree turns require less driver expertise and are less demanding on the vehicle than are the forward turns. In Figure 27a through 27d is illustrated a vehicle executing the reverse 180-degree turn. In "A" the driver has stopped because of a stationary vehicle roadblock and has placed the vehicle in reverse and begun backing, accelerating as rapidly as possible. In "B" the driver has achieved a

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speed in the vicinity of 20-30 miles per hour and then quickly removed the foot from the accelerator and snapped the steering wheel to the left as suddenly as possible, causing the front of the vehicle to swing around very quickly. When the vehicle has rotated about 90 degrees and is still turning, the driver goes into low gear and applies full engine power. In "C" the driver is already in low gear and has full engine power applied. In "D" the vehicle is moving ahead and the driver has corrected the steering as necessary. The total time necessary to complete this maneuver is only about two seconds once sufficient backward speed has been achieved. Technique rather than speed is the most important consideration. Note that the vehicle illustrated is still in the original traffic lane. It is not difficult to accomplish this maneuver so as to end up the in opposite lane if that is desired. One will then be in the proper lane for the direction then traveling.

The procedure for the reverse 180-degree turn in outline form appears as follows

1. Stop the vehicle as quickly as possible.
2. Go into reverse gear and attain a backing speed of between 15-30 miles per hour.
3. Remove the foot from the accelerator and turn the steering wheel very sharply in the opposite direction of the desired turn.
4. When the vehicle has turned about 90 degrees, go into low gear and immediately apply full power to prevent the engine from stalling.
5. One has now turned 180 degrees; accelerate and adjust steering as necessary.

Removing the foot from the accelerator just prior to turning the steering wheel is very important to transfer the vehicle's weight to the rear, thus lightening the front end, causing the front of the vehicle to swing around more readily.

ROADBLOCKS

When the driver is faced with a stationary vehicle roadblock but the circumstances are such that one of the 180 degree turn maneuvers is not feasible, one may be forced to consider driving around or ramming through the roadblock. When driving around or through a roadblock, every effort should be made to neutralize as many attackers as possible. If the attackers are a distance from the vehicle, then a maneuver such as that depicted in Figure 28a through 28c should be considered. If there are two or more gunmen at each end of the vehicle, then an effort should be made to eliminate the one whose weapon presents the greatest threat.




Figure 28. (a) Driver approaching a stationary vehicle roadblock (that has an attacker beside the vehicle) and slowing as if to stop. All appears normal to the attacker thus far. (b) Driver *suddenly* swerves hard towards the attacker at about 30 miles per hour. (c) Attacker is eliminated. The move was unexpected and too sudden for the attacker to employ proper evasive action. Time between initial swerve until impact was only about one second (Photos by Chris Reed).

For example, if one uses a shotgun or submachine gun, the latter.

When one must use force to stop vehicles, out of sight is enough to briskly force that one disposes of a vehicle can use force, at least with a broken rear

As noted, when one may choose between ramming through Figures 30a or 30b, attackers free to do so. vehicle approach. instance, it would be the impact of which is behind them, they would have a tremendous impact disrupting his fire.

When preparing to ram, one must appraise the target's ramming point. The rear fender or rear wheel. Of these points, the rear wheel is lighter. The weight of the engine, the weight of the transmission, the weight of the damage to one's vehicle being destroyed is a consideration.

The general procedure is as follows:

1. Begin slowing down as if to stop.
2. When a vehicle is reasonably hard to stop.
3. Pick a point to ram towards it. One

For example, if one attacker has a handgun, while another has either a shotgun or submachine gun, then one would attempt to eliminate the latter.

When one must use his vehicle to physically force a stationary vehicle, or vehicles, out of the way, it is important to strike the vehicle(s) hard enough to briskly move it aside, yet avoid impacting with such great force that one disables his own vehicle. It is worth noting, however, that a vehicle can usually sustain considerable damage and still remain operable, at least operable for several miles, such as would be the case with a broken radiator.

As noted, when the decision is made to overrun the roadblock, one may choose between maneuvering around the obstruction, or actually ramming through it. If faced with a situation such as that depicted in Figures 30a or 31a, maneuvering around the roadblock leaves the attackers free to dispense a concentrated volley of gunfire, not only as the vehicle approaches, but also as it passes by and travels away. In such an instance, it would generally be better to actually strike the vehicle(s), the impact of which would neutralize anyone seeking protective cover behind them, thus eliminating their firepower. The impact will also have a tremendously upsetting effect upon anyone in the vehicle, disrupting his firepower as well.

When preparing to ram through a stationary vehicle roadblock, one must appraise the positioning of the vehicle, or vehicles, and pick a ramming point. The best striking or ramming point is in the area of the rear fender or rear wheel, or in the area of the front fender (see Figure 29). Of these points, the rear is preferable because the rear of a front engine vehicle is lighter, thus making it easier to spin the vehicle around the weight of the engine. That requires less energy than attempting to move the weight of the engine as well and usually results in less physical damage to one's own vehicle and, of course, minimizes the chance of the vehicle being disabled. Reinforced front frame and bumpers are worth consideration.

The general procedure for ramming a stationary vehicle roadblock is as follows:

1. Begin slowing down. The attackers will tend to think you are stopping as desired.
2. When about 30-50 feet from the roadblock, brake suddenly and reasonably hard, as that unexpected act will often confuse the attackers.
3. Pick a ramming point, go into low gear, and accelerate hard towards it. One should attain a speed of 15-20 miles per hour before




Figure 29. Most desirable ramming point when striking a stationary vehicle roadblock is the area of the front wheel or, better, the area of the rear wheel or fender.

making contact with the roadblock. *Keep the accelerator fully depressed while ramming through and depressed after the breakthrough has been made. Failing to do so can result in the engine stalling.*

After one has successfully rammed through a roadblock, it is advisable to proceed on and break visual contact as quickly as possible. Figures 30a through 30d and 31a through 31c depict some roadblock situations one may encounter and how they may be compromised. When a stationary vehicle roadblock is struck, the impact is not felt as severely as would be expected. The impact will not affect the executive nearly so great as it will anyone in the vehicle that is struck. Mass in motion tends to stay in motion.

VEHICLE ELIMINATION General Considerations

Vehicle elimination is the forcing of another vehicle either off the road, into some object such as a parked vehicle, or simply causing the other vehicle to go out of control.

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Ken Siljander).



Figure 30. (a) Driver approaching the roadblock stops about 30-50 feet from it. (b) After stopping, the driver accelerates hard towards the roadblock striking the rear fender or wheel area, driving the vehicle into the attacker. (c) Same as "b" but from a different angle and a fraction of a second later. Note the devastating effect upon the attacker. (d) Driver keeps full engine power applied and leaves the scene breaking *visual* contact as soon as possible (Photos by Chris Reed and Ken Siljander).




Figure 31. (a) Vehicle (3,700 lbs.) approaching a double vehicle roadblock involving a 5,500 pound Lincoln and a 4,000 pound Plymouth. (b) After stopping about 40 feet from the roadblock the driver applies full power and accelerates to about 20 miles per hour before ramming through the obstruction. (c) Driver leaves the scene with the only *mechanical* damage being a badly damaged radiator and one tire rubbing. This vehicle was driven several miles with full control after the impact (Photos by Chris Reed).

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It is highly important that the executive protection personnel who drive in the course of their duty fully understand the various techniques of vehicle elimination. Such an understanding is important because the protective personnel may find use of such techniques necessary to dispatch an attacker. Furthermore, understanding such techniques will also help to prevent such techniques from being used successfully by an attacker.

When the threat level is sufficiently high to justify the cost of personnel protective agents, it would behoove the company decision makers to expend the small additional sum of monies necessary to purchase *old* vehicles so that the protective team has the opportunity to actually experiment with and experience the techniques of vehicle elimination and roadblock ramming, if they have not already done so. Such experience will enhance the agent's preparedness and ability considerably. That will have a marked effect upon one's chances of survival in the event that an attack upon the vehicle occurs.

The techniques that will be discussed regarding vehicle elimination can be applied whether the executive is driving alone without an escort vehicle, or may be applied by the driver of the escort vehicle to thwart an attack made upon the executive's vehicle. This section will examine and illustrate how various forces will affect the control of a vehicle and how an understanding of those factors can be used to advantage. Accordingly, this section is intended primarily to provide the reader with *how* to suggestions, variations of which may effectively be used in the field.

Rear End Ramming

When a moving vehicle is struck sufficiently hard from the rear at an angle by another vehicle, the vehicle's rear end will have a tendency to slide sideways in the direction of the force. The degree to which it slides off course will be determined by the force of the impact, the weight of the vehicles, and the road surface.

The vehicle that is struck tends to continue traveling straight down the roadway *until* the sliding action of the rear stops and then, the tires regain traction and the vehicle instantly assumes a new course of travel that is in the direction it then is pointing. That usually is towards the shoulder of the roadway. Commonly, the vehicle will cover a lateral distance of two or more car widths before the driver can correct the new course of travel (see Figures 32 and 33). If the technique is applied in an area where there is a ditch or parked cars, it is quite probable that the vehicle struck would have an accident before regaining control.




Figure 32. Striking the rear of the vehicle sufficiently hard at an angle of about 20 degrees will cause it to assume a new course of travel diagonal to its original course, or it may spin out of control, depending upon the force of the impact.

Figure 33. Vehicle leans because of course of travel

This technique is used behind the vehicle to cause the vehicle to accelerate so that it impacts the target vehicle that is in the vicinity of 20 degrees. The attacker must not push the vehicle to become involved in the car since one's side. Furthermore, the vehicle will travel after the impact.

When this technique is used, the oncoming traffic is designated for the attack.

When an attacker is attacking a vehicle, whether as a target or as a means of attack that vehicle is designated for the attack.



Figure 33. Vehicle being struck in the rear at an angle. Note how the vehicle leans because of the fact that it is in a sideways slide and about to assume a new course of travel (Photo by Chris Reed).

This technique may be applied by pulling up about one car length behind the vehicle to be struck and assume a position that will enable one to accelerate hard and then, just before impact, redirect one's vehicle so that it impacts the rear bumper at an angle as illustrated. The impact must be reasonably hard, perhaps 8-10 miles per hour faster than the vehicle that is struck, and the angle of the impact should be in the vicinity of 20 degrees. The impact will be brief. It is important that one not push the vehicle but, rather, strike it. It is unlikely that one will become involved in the same accident should the vehicle strike a parked car since one's own vehicle has a tendency to continue moving to the side. Furthermore, the struck vehicle quickly assumes a new course of travel after being struck.

When this technique is applied, one must ensure that there is no oncoming traffic as one's own vehicle will usually end up in the lane designated for oncoming traffic.

Causing a Spinout

When an attacker's vehicle ends up in front of one's own vehicle, whether as a result of one's evasive action subsequent to an attack, or if it is attacking a vehicle for which one is running escort, it is possible to attack that vehicle and cause it to spin out of control.




Figure 34. (a) Attacking vehicle pulling out as if to pass. (b) Vehicle turning into the rear quarter section of the other; it is beginning to spin out. (c) Vehicle has spun about 90 degrees and attacking vehicle strikes it a second time to spin it completely around. (d) Attacker drives off. The time duration of the attack was about two seconds (Photos by Chris Reed).

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


Figure 35. This is the same elimination technique depicted in Figures 34 a through d, depicting how an escort driver can dispatch an attacker who is going after the executive.

Generally, using one's own vehicle to strike another vehicle's rear side section, or the rear corner, will cause the rear end to spin out. Figures 34a through 34d illustrate such an event occurring. In **A** the attacking vehicle has pulled out as if to pass another vehicle. In **B** the driver has turned into the rear quarter section of the vehicle causing it to begin spinning out. At that point the attacking driver brakes hard and corrects his steering to break physical contact. In **C** the vehicle is broadside in the road, and if not struck a second time, will often regain traction and lurch ahead, across the road and into the ditch or whatever else may be on the far side of the road. In **D** we see that the attacker did not stay on the brakes but, rather, accelerated and struck the rear section of the vehicle a

second time causing further spinout. At that point the driver speeds off leaving the other vehicle sitting in the roadway facing in the opposite direction. About two seconds elapsed from the first impact until the attack is over. Figures 35, 36 and 37 illustrate this technique, and variations thereof, for escort drivers to dispatch an attacker when moving in on the executive's vehicle.

Pushing Vehicle Off Road

It is a misconception to think that simply having a heavier vehicle will provide a decisive advantage over an adversary. More important than total vehicle weight is the manner in which one uses the weight of his vehicle against that of another.




Figure 36. A variation of the technique depicted in Figure 35. It is important that the attacker has not pulled alongside the executive vehicle before being struck or he will ram it.

Figure 37. A vehicle moving through the tunnel to eliminate the threat.

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


Figure 37. A variation of the technique depicted in Figure 36. Improper line through the turn by the attacker *can* enable an escort driver, using a proper line, to eliminate him.

A front engine vehicle typically has a weight distribution of 60/40 or 60 percent of the weight being on the front axle. It is this factor of weight distribution that makes it possible for a vehicle to forcefully push a much heavier vehicle off the road.

Figure 38 shows a 1970 Oldsmobile Cutlass (weight approximately 3,700 lbs.) forcing a 1964 Lincoln Continental (weight approximately 5,500 lbs.) off the road. Note the forces evident upon the vehicles. By using proper weight distribution, the driver of the Oldsmobile had no difficulty accomplishing the task. The drawing in Figure 39 illustrates how and why this is possible.

Observe that the driver of the Oldsmobile is using his vehicle's *total weight, evenly distributed*, against the Lincoln's front axle weight, which, figuring a 60/40 weight distribution, is 3,300 pounds. The driver of the Oldsmobile, therefore, is using his 3,700 pounds against 3,300



Figure 38. Oldsmobile (3,700 lbs.) forcing a Lincoln Continental (5,500 lbs.) off the road (Photo by Chris Reed).




Figure 39. By using one's total vehicle weight, evenly distributed, against only the weight on another's front axle, it is possible for a lighter vehicle to push a much heavier vehicle off the road.

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This technique, executive or h road, it is futile alone. The driver technique would ahead, and in

Once vehicle other options individual circumstances, if any. One may 180-degree turn broken, and even one has if he before vehicle the accelerator steer hard and spin out violently

Learning to driving from various techniques experimental proficient in confrontation

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Because there are potential one at a time

pounds giving him a weight superiority of 400 pounds. Accordingly, the driver of the Lincoln, even though he has a total vehicle weight superiority of 1,800 pounds, is at a disadvantage when subjected to this attacker using this vehicle and this technique.

This technique, although effective, can be countered. Once the executive or his chauffeur realizes that they are being pushed off the road, it is futile to try to resist using the vehicle's countersteering ability alone. The driver of the Lincoln tried to no avail. A better countering technique would be to brake suddenly to cause the aggressor to move ahead, and in so doing, vehicle contact is broken.

Once vehicle contact is broken, the executive or his chauffeur has other options available, the merits of which will depend upon individual circumstances, such as the number and placement of other attackers, if any, and the number and placement of other motorists, if any. One may consider a panic stop followed by a "U" turn or a reverse 180-degree turn. One may also accelerate rapidly, after contact has been broken, and engage the attacker's vehicle to spin it out. Another option one has if he realizes what is happening *after* the attack has begun but *before* vehicle contact has been made is to quickly remove the foot from the accelerator to cause one's vehicle weight to shift forward and then steer hard and sudden into the attacker's vehicle, which will usually spin out violently.

DRIVING EXERCISES

Learning various techniques and methods of defensive and offensive driving from a book will provide one with an *understanding* of the various techniques. However, only behind-the-wheel training and experimentation will produce a driver who is both confident and proficient in the execution of the various techniques in a stressful confrontation.

Practice and experimentation should be done using old vehicles that can later be discarded. A minimum of two vehicles will be needed, but additional vehicles will often be useful, especially in view of the fact that the kind of vehicles employed for purposes such as this are usually not highly reliable. All vehicles must be in running condition, however, except those that will be used only to set up stationary vehicle roadblocks for practice in ramming.

Because the various driving techniques involve vehicle contact, they are potentially dangerous. Accordingly, each maneuver should be done, one at a time, after discussion involving each driver involved. Helmets

and restraint systems are important to ensure driver safety. It is also desirable to have personnel ready with fire extinguishers and to assist with extrication should that become necessary. Furthermore, because the vehicle contact does result in vehicle damage, one should carefully plan what techniques will be practiced and then perform them in the order of least destructive progressing to more destructive maneuvers. Roadblock ramming should be reserved as a final.

The following is an example of a practice series one may consider using two vehicles. Each maneuver may be tried, by each driver, as many times as is necessary to gain a feel for the technique. It is important that the area selected is such that loss of vehicle control, which is certain, will not result in a collision with stationary objects. In preparing for the maneuvers, one should follow the discussion of each maneuver as presented in this text. In *most* instances a speed of about 30 miles per hour will be sufficient, yet not dangerous. The ramming of stationary vehicle roadblocks should be done at not more than 20 miles per hour. Greater speeds may result in excessive damage to one's own vehicle, the degree of damage depending, of course, upon the specific vehicle.

1. Reverse 180 Degree Turn.
2. Forward 180 Degree Turn.
3. Pushing vehicle off the road (see Figure 38 and corresponding text).
4. Countering being *pushed* off the road.
5. Causing a spin-out by striking a vehicle's rear corner, or rear quarter section, at an angle (see Figure 34A-D and corresponding text).
6. Causing loss of control by striking the rear of a vehicle at an angle (see Figure 33 and corresponding text). Employ measures to prevent whiplash (neck injury).
7. Ramming a stationary vehicle roadblock.

VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS

There are a number of modifications that can be made to a vehicle to increase its effectiveness and ability to survive a terrorist attack. Some modifications naturally will cost more than others, and the merits of each must be weighed against the cost as well as the results of the threat assessment.

Armor can be installed within the body to make the vehicle more resistant to gunfire, and the glass can also be replaced with a bullet resistant substance. Naturally, that does add weight which increases as

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


Figure 40 a & b
twenty rounds
feet. Caliber w

protection is afforded for increasingly higher energy weapons. Also, the cost is not always modest, but it can save lives and is often necessary, depending on the threat. In Figures 40a and b are illustrated the concentrated fire power capable with light semiautomatic assault carbines in only eight seconds. In each instance twenty rounds were fired from a distance of 25 feet in that eight-second time frame. Consider, therefore, that three assassins with such weapons could fire sixty rounds in just eight seconds. With full automatic weapons the time would be considerably less. Such odds would be difficult to deal with if one were depending on return fire capability or evasive maneuvers alone. Accordingly, vehicle armor has considerable merit.

Although armored vehicles do suffer a degree of added weight, which reduces the handling capabilities of the vehicle to some degree, the decreased maneuverability is more than offset by the added protection afforded by the armor.




Figure 40 a & b. With each semiautomatic assault carbine it was possible to fire twenty rounds with reasonable accuracy in eight seconds from a distance of 25 feet. Caliber was .223 (5.56mm).

In addition to providing armor for a vehicle, one may install an alarm system to help reduce its vulnerability to tampering while unattended, if it must be left unattended. A siren may be installed to attract attention should an attack occur while the vehicle is occupied. Inconspicuously mounted high intensity lights, projecting both front and rear can be useful should a night attack occur. Three high intensity lights can be inconspicuously mounted in the front of the vehicle, one directed straight ahead with the other two directed to the sides at a 30—45 degree angle. Such a lighting arrangement serves to impair the vision of the attackers should a roadblock be encountered at night. Front end lights are also helpful for extended visibility should a night chase occur. A high intensity light directed to the rear serves to badly impair the vision of a pursuer. The rear light can be turned on just prior to executing a sudden evasive maneuver such as a turn. Turning the light on too soon can cause the pursuer to simply drop back and follow from a distance. Leaving the light off until just before a sudden turn is made will temporarily blind the pursuer and, when the turn is made, he will most likely miss it and pass on by or have an accident trying to follow.

A pressurized system may be installed in the vehicle to spray a light film of water-soluble oil on the road surface to lose a pursuer on a turn or curve. Once the escape has been made, however, it is advisable to notify the proper authorities so that the slick area can be hosed down with water for the safety of other motorists. A similar oil spray system can be made to apply old crank case oil to the windshield of a pursuing vehicle to impair visibility. That would not be as hazardous to other motorists, but neither will it dispatch a pursuer as quickly or decisively.

Gun ports may be installed without creating holes in the outer metal of the vehicle. Security personnel can then return fire from within the vehicle with the only obstruction being the thin sheet metal of the body. With unarmored vehicles, security personnel should return fire shooting through the windows. Attempting to roll the windows down under attack conditions will waste time one will not have.

A safety wheel is a special wheel designed to run flat yet offers acceptable vehicle control. Its merits should be investigated.

A kill switch for brake and tail lamps is useful during a night pursuit. Eliminating the brake lights will serve to provide a pursuer with less indication that an evasive maneuver, such as slowing for a turn, is being accomplished, thus increasing the chances of the pursuer failing to respond appropriately. Eliminating tail lamps makes it more difficult to see a vehicle from the rear at a distance, even when its headlamps are on. That is helpful in that it helps to prevent a pursuer from

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A remote engine starting unit may be employed to enable one to start the vehicle from a distance in the event it is suspected that an explosive device may be wired to the ignition.

A tear gas system may be provided to ward off attackers should the vehicle be forced to a stop. Gas masks should be provided for the benefit of those in the vehicle if necessary.

A smoke screen system may be devised to be used in much the same manner during a daylight or night chase as the rear high intensity lights were used at night.

Reinforced bumpers, especially the front bumper, is desirable as it enables one to strike an attacker's vehicle harder with less damage resulting to one's own vehicle.

BULLET RESISTANCE OF UNARMORED VEHICLES

Only an armored vehicle offers *reliable protection* against gunfire. In spite of that fact, however, a normal vehicle body does provide some degree of protection, even though not as great as one would normally desire. The only portion of an unarmored vehicle that can be relied upon to stop a bullet is the engine block. Other portions of the vehicle will offer varying degrees of ballistic resistance depending upon the part of the vehicle as well as the energy of the bullet and the bullet type.

Test shots fired into a vehicle's door using various caliber weapons, provided the following information:

1. The outer and inner metal shell of the door alone failed to stop even low energy handgun bullets when struck at right angles (Figures 41a and 42a).
2. The outer and inner metal shell of the door together had *some* ability to stop handgun bullets up to and including .357 magnum and full jacket 9mm rounds when directed from an angle (Figure 41b and 42b).
3. The internal portions of the door such as the *safety bar* and window mechanism (arrows in Figure 43) stopped all handgun rounds up to the .357 magnum and 9mm full jacketed bullet even when struck at right angles.
4. The safety bar and window mechanism failed to stop a high powered rifle bullet (100 grain, .243 caliber) when struck at right angles but did prevent penetration when struck at an angle of about 45 degrees.




Figure 41. Outer skin of a vehicle door. (a) Hole produced by bullet striking at a right angle. (b) Hole produced by bullet striking at an angle.




Figure 42. Inner skin of a vehicle door. (a) Exit hole of bullet passing through door at a right angle. (b) Bullets striking door at an angle often fail to pass completely through.



Figure 43. The door frame showing a bullet impact. The door frame feature good ballistic protection.

This information will depend on some degree of

1. Energy
2. Distance
3. Bullet
4. Angle
5. Portion
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The conclusion is that unarmored vehicles are vulnerable in any circumstance. At best, the protection is at a low level.

Although the possibility of attacks at night is a concern, the use of lights to counteract the visual ability of the attacker is a




Figure 43. The door of an automobile contains many internal components that feature good ballistic resistance. Note arrows.

This information tends to suggest that while the vehicle does offer some degree of protection, the actual level of protection is limited and will depend upon the following:

1. Energy level of the weapon used.
2. Distance from which the shots are fired as that affects velocity.
3. Bullet type.
4. Angle at which the shots strike the vehicle.
5. Portion of vehicle struck.
6. Different vehicles offer differing levels of protection.

The conclusion of these test shots can only be that while the unarmored vehicle is capable of stopping some bullets under certain circumstances, it can be relied upon to stop only some of the shots fired. At best, the unarmored vehicle offers only partial protection of a very low level.

NIGHT VEHICLE ATTACKS

Although vehicle attacks during daylight hours are most common, the possibility of their occurring at night must be considered. Vehicle attacks at night can involve the use of smoke screens and high intensity lights to confuse and thus disorient the victim as well as reducing his visual ability and thus his ability to employ appropriate evasive tactics.

When such an attack occurs, one cannot know what he is getting into because of the badly impaired visibility, except that it is almost certain that one is entering a killing zone, whether the attack is for purposes of abduction or assassination. Such a tactic is designed to be most effective as the victim enters the killing zone, not for one traveling away from that zone. Accordingly, the best counter will often be to stop as quickly as possible and execute a reverse 180-degree maneuver. In so doing, one is retreating from the kill zone and from any attackers waiting beyond, and one is looking away from the bright lights if lights are being used.

ESCORT VEHICLES

Much has already been stated regarding escort vehicles and the drivers of same. However, a few more considerations would be worthwhile. When the executive will be traveling by automobile during a period of high threat it is often desirable to have an escort vehicle in addition to the trained driver and bodyguards *in* his own vehicle.

An escort vehicle, sometimes referred to as a *muscle car*, *firepower unit* or *chase car*, should be driven by a driver who is well trained in defensive and offensive driving and also contain a minimum of two, preferably three, gunners who are expert combat marksmen. Their choice of weapons should be such that they are capable of delivering a concentrated volume of gunfire with a high degree of accuracy.

The escort vehicle itself will be more useful as a weapon if it has reinforced front bumpers for ramming purposes should that become necessary. Although any vehicle may be used for ramming purposes, reinforcing the bumpers increases its effectiveness as an offensive weapon.

The most appropriate distance that should be maintained between the executive's vehicle and that of the escort is a difficult question. The only *rule-of-thumb* that can be offered here is simply to remain close enough to the executive to avoid becoming separated, but *avoid, at all costs, getting into a situation where one is in the killing zone with the executive when an attack occurs.*

When an attack is made upon the executive's vehicle, the protective agents in the escort vehicle must do anything that will draw attention away from their intended victim. Generally, a concentrated volley of gunfire works well. If the attackers are firing from a moving vehicle, ramming their vehicle will also serve to reduce their effectiveness.

Effective radio communications between all vehicles concerned is essential.

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BOMBINGS AND BOMB THREATS

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although most bomb threats directed at business and industry prove to be false, this cannot be relied upon. Bomb threats can present a very serious problem to the smooth, uninterrupted and profitable function of a business operation, and although there are no definite rules for how they should be handled, there are some guidelines of a general nature. Exactly how any bomb threat should be handled will depend to a large degree upon many factors and can only be decided upon at the time in accordance with the situation.

While it is true that each situation will make unique demands upon those receiving a bomb threat, an understanding of certain guidelines will make one better able to respond in a responsible manner, and when properly indoctrinated, all concerned will usually be more confident in themselves as a result. Being referred to here is *preparation* through *preplanning* and *training*.

In the event that a bomb threat is made, everything will go smoother, and the chances of handling the emergency in a competent manner will be much better if it has already been decided how such a call should be handled at the switchboard (or after hours locations), who is to be notified, and the manner in which they will be notified, procedures for evacuation and search and any other considerations that may be important.

From a humanitarian viewpoint it would seem desirable to evacuate a building every time a bomb threat is made. Unfortunately that is not always desirable or possible. Management, therefore, must have some idea as to what will justify at least a partial evacuation.

This chapter is not intended to offer instruction in the manufacture of explosives or their proper disposal, but rather, it is intended to make the reader aware of the threat of explosives and incendiary devices, how threats can be handled, suitable search procedures and, above all, to make one aware of the fact that if nothing else is known about how a bomb threat should be handled, one should understand the need to *leave*

alone anything that is suspected of being a bomb. Law enforcement authorities have personnel specially trained to deal with bombs and will handle such a situation.

BOMBS

All bombs other than incendiary devices (fire bombs) will be found to contain an explosive which may be defined as *a substance, or mixture of substances, that is capable of undergoing sudden decomposition with the formation of heat and gas*. Explosives may be classified as either a *high explosive* or a *low explosive*. A high explosive requires no confinement to cause an explosion while a low explosive does.

High explosives, such as dynamite, nitroglycerin or TNT, have a very fast rate of detonation, and for that reason, no confinement is necessary for an explosion to occur. When the detonation takes place, the substance changes very rapidly from a solid or liquid form requiring little physical space to a gaseous state requiring a much greater space, and an explosion is the result. Again, that is why confinement is not necessary.

Low explosives such as black powder or smokeless powder do not detonate, but rather, are slow burning and, therefore, require confinement to cause an explosion. A pipe bomb is a good example of this kind of explosive device. A pipe bomb is simply a short length of pipe with two end caps, filled with gunpowder. The pipe provides the confinement necessary for a buildup of pressure when the powder burns and, consequently, an explosion occurs (Figure 44a).

The primary effects of a bomb are *fragmentation*, *blast* and *incendiary*. Fragmentation is very noticeable when items such as nails are mixed in with the powder or secured to the outside of the container as illustrated in Figure 44b. Blast, also referred to as concussion, is especially noticeable when the bomb explodes inside a building. Incendiary action accompanies explosions because there is a flash of flame, and if combustibles are present, a fire can result. This is one of the many reasons why good housekeeping practices are important.

Most bombs directed against business and industrial concerns by terrorist groups will be of the homemade variety. These may range from a simple pipe bomb or single stick of dynamite with a time fuse or, they may involve an explosive with a complicated time delay mechanism. There are basically two types of homemade bombs one may encounter: the *straight bomb* and the *disguised bomb*.

Figure 44. (a) caps, filled with items as nails explode.

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


Figure 44. (a) Common pipe bomb consists of a short length of pipe and two end caps, filled with gunpowder. A time fuse is used for ignition. (b) Taping such items as nails to the pipe bomb makes it more dangerous to people should it explode.

A straight bomb is one in which no attempt has been made to conceal or alter appearance; it may be readily recognized for what it is. A disguised bomb is made to appear as something other than what it really is. It may, for example, be concealed in an innocent looking container.




Figure 45. A clock is a common method of controlling the time at which a homemade bomb will explode. The clock becomes a part of the electrical system.

Bombs of this type present a serious hazard to security and law enforcement personnel.

Three basic types of triggering mechanisms will be found when dealing with homemade bombs:

1. Time delay.
2. Remote control.
3. Target (victim) activated.

Time delay mechanisms can delay the explosion anywhere from a few seconds to several months. A slow burning fuse (time fuse) typically burns at a rate of 30—45 seconds per foot, and the desired delay is controlled by the length of the fuse. An electric time delay can be made to allow for longer time periods. A clock (Figure 45) can be used for a delay of several hours while a *collapsing circuit* mechanism can allow for several months time. The latter mechanism involves an electromagnetic switch held in the desired position by the power provided by a dry cell battery(s). When the battery wears down to a certain point, the position of the switch changes and an explosion results.

Remote control triggering devices often consist of a radio transmitter and receiver system whereby the offender can detonate the explosive at will by transmitting a radio signal of a given frequency. This is one reason why it is recommended that radios not be used for communica-

tion purposes with electronic blast. Remote control is difficult and e-

Target activation on the part of the victim in this variety includes the intended victim a mercury switch is disturbed. Target is limited to the imagination.

It is interesting to note that the homemade bomb

In recent years have become a major injury and death postal employees letter or package correspondence.

A letter bomb warning signals include:

1. Foreign
2. An Ad
3. An ad
4. Air ma
5. Extra
6. Greater
7. Stiffne
8. Oil sta
9. Some

A letter bomb They natural detonating by the letter bomb a metal detector and Figures 4

tion purposes when searching for a bomb. The sensitivity of common electronic blasting caps is another good reason not to use radios. Remote control mechanisms are generally *not* used because of the difficulty and expense involved in constructing them.

Target activated triggering mechanisms rely on some kind of action on the part of the intended victim. Letter bombs are a good example of this variety inasmuch as the bomb is rigged to explode when opened by the intended victim. Other types of target activated mechanisms involve a mercury switch that will complete a circuit when the bomb is disturbed. Target activated triggering mechanisms are not, however, limited to the examples given here and are as diverse as man's imagination.

It is interesting to note that about 30 percent of those killed by homemade bombs are the offenders themselves.

Letter Bombs

In recent years letter bombs, which are of the target activated variety, have become a problem and have caused considerable property damage, injury and death. People injured and killed by such devices include postal employees, corporation mail room employees, the addressee of the letter or package and executive's secretaries who commonly open their correspondence for them.

A letter bomb will often have certain characteristics that can serve as a warning signal to alert the recipient. Some common warning signals include:

1. Foreign return address.
2. An Address done by hand.
3. An address to a specific person—sometimes marked "personal."
4. Air mail.
5. Extra postage (due to weight).
6. Greater weight than a normal letter.
7. Stiffness.
8. Oil stains.
9. Some metal content such as wires.

A letter bomb is similar in construction to many homemade bombs. They naturally contain an explosive and are *usually* of the electrical detonating type and, therefore, will contain a battery and wires. Because the letter bomb contains a battery and wire, they can be detected by use of a metal detecting instrument or X-ray apparatus (see Figures 46a and b and Figures 47, 48a and b and 49).



Figure 46a.




Figure 46 a and b
field use or at
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


Figure 46 a and b. Bucky Miniature X-Ray System is portable and applicable for field use or at a semi-permanent installation (Courtesy of Bucky X-Ray International, Inc.).




Figure 47. The MailScan X-Ray Inspection System provides the means of inspecting incoming mail and parcels. A stack of mail up to six inches high can be inspected in seconds (Courtesy of Torr X-Ray Corporation).





Figure 48a. Mark control unit and... Corporation).



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



Figure 48a. Mark X Conveyor X-Ray Inspection System and detachable operator control unit and movable television monitor (Courtesy of Astrophysics Research Corporation).






Figure 49. Photographed observation of the X-Ray Inspections System's television screen depicting a suitcase containing a weapon (Courtesy of Astrophysics Research Corporation.)

FIREBOMBS (INCENDIARY DEVICES)

Incendiary devices, commonly referred to as firebombs, are a favorite tool of rioters because of their ease of construction, ready availability of materials necessary for their construction, the near impossibility of tracing the materials back to the offender, and their great destructive potential.

The typical firebomb consists of three basic components:

1. Fragile container such as a glass bottle.
2. Flammable liquid filler such as gasoline.
3. A source of heat or ignition.

In use, a firebomb is commonly thrown against a combustible

surface. Upon impact, the liquid contents are released, which will ignite and ignite combustible materials.

There are several ways a firebomb can be ignited. Figure 49 shows a version of which is used in this case, a ray gun. A flammable liquid is placed in a bottle which is then ignited. The bottle has been capped, and the liquid has been soaked with liquid. Some of its contents are released, depicting a firebomb. The bottle has been soaked with liquid, and a chemical reaction has taken place, resulting in a flame. The bottle is shown in a photograph, depicting a bottle of liquid. The bottle is shown in a photograph, depicting a bottle of liquid. The bottle is shown in a photograph, depicting a bottle of liquid. The bottle is shown in a photograph, depicting a bottle of liquid.

Firebombs are commonly used upon automobiles, buildings, and driven. The liquid is released through the windows closed.


Dry chemical fire extinguishers are used to wash the liquid off the surface; it has been found that it also can be removed. Therefore, floating in the danger. When the firebomb arrives, it arrives.

surface. Upon impact, the container breaks, thus spilling its flammable liquid contents, which are then ignited by the source of heat; a fire ensues which will ignite the surface upon which the container broke, or it will ignite combustible items in the near vicinity.

There are several ways in which the firebomb's contents can be ignited. Figure 50a is an example of a typical firebomb, the original version of which was called a *Molotov Cocktail*, used during WWII. In this case, a rag is inserted into the bottle and almost reaches the flammable liquid content. In use, the bottle is inverted to soak the rag which is then ignited and the bottle thrown. In Figure 50b, the bottle has been capped, and a rag tied around the bottle's neck. The rag is then soaked with lighter fluid, or the bottle uncapped long enough to spill some of its contents onto the rag, ignited and then thrown. Figure 50c depicts a firebomb with a cloth taped to its surface that has previously been soaked with *sulphuric acid*. When the bottle breaks, there will be a chemical reaction between the sulphuric acid and the gasoline and a flame results. In "D" of Figure 50 a railroad flare has been taped to the bottle. All one need do is ignite the flare and throw the bottle. Figure 50e depicts a bottle of flammable liquid to which a high powered rifle shell casing filled with gunpowder has been taped. The end of the shell case has been crimped over a piece of (simulated) time fuse. In such a case, the offender would conceal the device, light the time fuse and quietly leave the area. When the burning fuse reaches the powder filled case (a blasting cap works well), it explodes, thus breaking the bottle and igniting the flammable liquid contents which are also spread as a result of the explosion. A clock, battery and electric blasting cap also serve this purpose.

Firebombs have been used in attacks not only upon buildings, but upon automobiles, both while parked unattended and while being driven. The latter is one reason why it is advisable to drive with the windows closed.

Dry chemical type fire extinguishers work well when faced with a flammable liquid fire as do CO₂ extinguishers. If the only kind of extinguisher available is of the water type, it should be used in an effort to wash the liquid away. Water should not be sprayed onto the burning liquid; it has a tendency to splatter and compound the problem. It must also be remembered that a flammable liquid is lighter than water and therefore floats. That can serve to spread the burning area and increase the danger. Water may also be employed to cool surrounding areas, thus containing the fire until the burning liquid has burned itself out or help arrives.



BOMB THREATS

An industrial or commercial concern should decide how a bomb threat will be handled *before* such an incident arises. The general plan should then be put in writing, and all persons with a responsibility appropriately briefed and/or trained. Rehearsal and updating as necessary is important.

In formulating a plan, a consideration must be given to the eventuality of a threat being received by mail, or by telephone. Personnel should be instructed not to handle a threatening letter any more than is absolutely necessary, and then only by the extreme edges. The letter should be given to police as soon as possible. If an immediate danger is evident, one should respond in much the same manner as would be appropriate were a serious threat received by telephone. In preparation for a threat received by telephone, a preprinted form should be devised and furnished to *all* persons who could possibly receive such a call along with appropriate explanation. Such a form should address the following:

1. Time the call was received.
2. Time caller hung up.
3. Caller's exact words.
4. Caller's tone of voice.
5. Caller's sex.

6. Background.
7. Ask: Who?
8. Ask: What?
9. Ask: Why?

The form should be used during the call. Also, specify who will be notified and the time.

When a bomb threat is received, the most suitable course of action must be established in advance, even though the event that they are referring to, however, the following steps should be taken:

1. Evacuate the building.
2. Notify the police.
3. Conduct a search of the building.
4. Check the area.

occur.

5. Perform a search of the area.
6. Allow the area to be cleared.

physical damage to the area.

Evacuation should be considered if feasible. Further, in the case of a hostile situation that could cause a loss of life or not properly handled.

Often a danger is not believed to be a threat, and not to mention the most callers of a call, they should be given information and assessed. In the line as a result.

When an incident occurs, that the worst result in an

6. Background noises at the caller's location.
7. Ask: Why was the bomb placed?
8. Ask: What kind of a bomb is it?
9. Ask: What does it look like?

The form should be signed and dated by the employee who received the call. Also, a *call list* should be provided along with the form specifying who should be notified, the order in which they are to be notified and the means by which they are to be notified.

When a bomb threat is received, circumstances will dictate what the most suitable course of action will be. Each situation is different, and it must be established beforehand who will make the decisions and, in the event that they are not available, who will act on their behalf. Generally, however, the following procedure, or variation of it, will be appropriate:

1. Evacuate to not less than 300 feet.
2. Notify police (call list).
3. Conduct a bomb search.
4. Check for utilities that could be affected should an explosion occur.
5. Perform protective works as may be necessary to minimize physical damage should an explosion occur.
6. Allow only a necessary minimum number of personnel in the danger area.

EVACUATION

Evacuation is a costly activity, and therefore, it may not always be feasible. Further, total evacuation is not always possible, such as in the case of a hospital or persons attending critical machinery or operations that could cause tremendous damage and danger in and of themselves if not properly attended. Consider, for example, boilers.

Often a decision regarding evacuation will rest upon factors such as the believed sincerity of the caller and the information thus provided, not to mention the history of such calls the firm has received. Although most callers will not answer the questions asked by the person taking the call, they should be asked, because if any are answered, a great deal of information will be gained and the sincerity of the call can be better assessed. In this respect, every effort should be made to keep the caller on the line as long as possible.

When an order is given to evacuate a building, it must be remembered that the word *bomb* can cause panic and disorder which in turn can result in unnecessary injury to employees. For this reason, consideration

should be given to use of a cover reason for evacuation, such as electrical problems. If a fire drill is used as a cover reason, it must be taken into consideration that a fire drill usually involves closing all windows. In the event of an anticipated explosion, the windows are usually left opened to minimize the blast effect. That should be considered.

When evacuating a building subsequent to a bomb threat, all electrical equipment, such as electric typewriters, should be turned off, in addition to opening doors and windows.

BOMB SEARCHES

Bomb searches must be a preplanned and coordinated task. The following considerations are important and will help to make searches quicker and more thorough:

1. Divide the premises into areas to be searched.
2. Assign specific personnel to each area.
3. Assign personnel who are familiar with the area to be searched.
4. Establish a report-back system.
5. Assign searchers trained in the techniques of bomb search.
6. Keep in mind the importance of good housekeeping.
7. Communications with law enforcement agencies must be kept open.

8. If a suspicious device is found, *it must not be disturbed*. Qualified law enforcement disposal teams will handle the problem.

It is important to divide the premises into *search zones* and then assign specific people to each zone, one or two people to each area, never more, so that the entire premises can be searched in the shortest possible time. It is desirable also to subdivide each search zone so that they too may be searched in a deliberate and methodical manner that ensures thoroughness without overlap. This will be further discussed later in this chapter.

Searchers should avoid congregating into groups at any time so as to prevent several people being injured or killed should an explosion occur. Furthermore, because of the possibility of a radio controlled triggering device having been used, and because of the sensitivity of electric blasting caps, the use of radios for communications by the searchers should be discouraged.

Searchers assigned to each area should be intimately familiar with that area as they will be better prepared to observe any object foreign to that location. Again, good housekeeping practices will aid greatly in this respect. It is much easier to conceal a bomb in an unkept area than it

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Bomb searches should give particular attention to any area accessible to the public, in areas where a bomb could logically be hidden or, in areas where a bomb could do considerable damage. Such areas include:

1. Lobbies.
2. Telephone booths.
3. Restrooms.
4. Food service centers.
5. Areas containing electric, gas or communications service controls.
6. Closets.
7. Trash accumulation areas.
8. Shipping and receiving areas.
9. Outside areas around the building with special attention to areas of easy concealment such as shrubs.

The precise method of searching an area is not highly important, but it is important that a systematic approach be employed. One may divide the area into strips, a grid or a spiral and then search accordingly. The important thing is that the search be systematic so that all areas are searched without unnecessary and time-wasting overlap.

In addition to dividing the area into sections, there is merit to searching upward in zone fashion as well. For example, the first search may include everything from the floor level to crotch high. Furniture included. The second search would include everything from crotch level to perhaps six feet up the wall. The final search would include ceiling light fixtures, false ceiling and air vents. When the searchers first enter an area, they should first pause to look and listen for anything out of the ordinary before beginning their physical search.

In the event that a suspicious object is found, the appropriate persons should be notified immediately and the area quickly evacuated if evacuation has not already taken place. Again, *the device must not be disturbed in any manner.*

When a suspicious device is found, it is desirable to record the following information if it is felt that it can be accomplished without exposing human life to unnecessary danger:

1. Shape and size of the object.
2. Any writing on the object.
3. Any sounds emitted by the object such as ticking.
4. Photograph the object if a camera is available.

This discussion has remained general because each situation is different. The only hard and fast rule that remains unchanged is *be prepared and leave suspected bombs alone.* In Figure 51 is illustrated

how easily a bomb could be set to explode in a victim's home upon his return. Figure 52 depicts a simulated package of dynamite wired to a vehicle's electrical system.




Figure 51. A simulated bomb set to explode when the opening of the door brings the two wires into contact thus completing an electrical circuit.




Figure 52. Simulated bomb wired to a vehicle's electrical system.

When a bomb is discovered, prompt medical attention and emergency services are required to meet the specific needs of the victims.

When an explosion occurs, more than one person must be involved in the investigation. The first step is to ensure that the personnel are not injured and that the bomb is being planted. The response to a bomb is a critical part of the investigation.

When an explosion occurs, it is as secure as possible. The effort cannot be made to ensure that the injured person is not injured. The notification is always necessary to ensure that the bomb is not planted.

Notification is always necessary to ensure that the bomb is not planted. The notification is always necessary to ensure that the bomb is not planted.

AT THE SCENE OF EXPLOSIONS

When a bomb explodes, the most important consideration will be prompt medical attention and evacuation for injured persons. Other emergency services must also be performed in accordance with the specific needs of the situation.

When an explosion has occurred it is important to remember that *more than one bomb may have been planted*, and protective measures must be implemented accordingly. A bomber may set one charge to detonate first and a second charge timed to detonate while emergency personnel are on the scene. The possibility of more than one bomb being planted must also be recognized when a search is conducted in response to a bomb threat, even though no explosion has yet occurred.

When an explosion occurs, the scene of the blast must be made as secure as possible to *preserve evidence* and to *prevent looting*. This effort cannot, however, be permitted to interfere with the more important functions, such as medical attention and evacuation of injured personnel and fire-fighting efforts.

Notification of law enforcement authorities in a prompt manner is always necessary and every effort must be made to fully cooperate with them.

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THE SNIPER THREAT

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The sniper who is equipped with a high powered rifle and telescopic sight presents a very real and frightening threat to life, and his potential cannot legitimately be ignored or underestimated when planning and implementing an executive protection program. In this chapter we will examine the capabilities of the sniper under both day and nighttime conditions, and we will discuss the problems of acoustical errors in the perception of the direction of a shooting and how an understanding of that phenomenon can be beneficial.

SNIPER CAPABILITIES

Although high powered rifles equipped with telescopic sights are not as frequently used to assassinate as are other weapon types, they are used enough to warrant serious consideration, and they do present a very serious danger that must be thoroughly acknowledged and understood.

During daylight hours the possibility of a sniper attack is readily recognized and accepted. However, one often fails to recognize the great distances from which such an attack can successfully be launched. The effective range of a sniper depends upon many factors, the most notable being the skill of the sniper, magnifying power of the telescopic sight, ballistic characteristics of the rifle, the weather conditions, and the topographical conditions of the locale within which the attack occurs. Generally, however, one should consider that a range of 500—600 yards presents a threat and not overlook possible sniper vantage points at such distances. National competition has seen marksmen shoot ten bullet groups of less than twelve inches at 1,000 yards (over $\frac{1}{2}$ mile), which is an interesting observation even though that kind of accuracy would normally not be expected of an assassin under field conditions.

In 1966 on the University of Texas campus at Austin, the mentally deranged Charles Whitman positioned himself on the observation deck of a tower and began sniping people at random. He used a variety of

weapon types and calibers; one being a 6mm rifle with a four-power telescopic sight, a very effective caliber for long range precision shooting, although the magnifying power of the scope was only moderate. With that rifle and scope combination this individual shot people as far away as 400 yards with alarming accuracy. When Whitman was finally shot by police 97 minutes and 44 victims later, many of the police officers who had responded were given the opportunity to view the positions they themselves had occupied using the sniper's rifle/scope from the position on the tower. Many were amazed at how dangerously they had unknowingly been exposing themselves during the ordeal. The point being made is simply that people are accustomed to viewing with the unaided eye. Optics, however, greatly extend the effective range of one's vision. It is important to remember that fact when anticipating and analyzing the threat presented by a sniper.

Figure 53 has a view of a store and parking lot at a distance of 100 yards photographed using a camera with a normal angle lens. In Figure 53b is a photographed observation, through a *four-power* telescopic sight, of a subject approaching that store. In Figure 53c is a photographed observation of the same setting through a *twelve-power* telescopic sight. Both would present an easy shot with a *very high kill probability*. In Figure 54a is a view of the same store and parking lot photographed through a camera's normal angle lens at a distance of 300 yards. In Figure 54b is a photographed observation through a *twelve-power* telescopic sight from that position. This represents what the sniper would see, and again, this does not represent a difficult shot; the kill probability would be dangerously high.

Although sniper attacks at night are not as frequent as they are during daylight hours, it is important to understand that telescopic sights for high powered rifles, when featuring a proper relationship between the magnifying power and the size of the objective lens (large lens at the front of the scope), offer excellent light gathering capability under very poor lighting conditions, just as many binoculars do. This results from the fact that a sufficiently large diameter objective lens gathers considerably more light than does the unaided human eye, which has a maximum opening of only about one-quarter inch when fully dilated (see Figure 55). The result is an instrument that enables one to view subjects, with remarkable clarity, under lighting conditions too dim for effective viewing with the unaided eye (see Figure 56). *In an urban setting there are exceptionally few areas where a properly scoped rifle cannot effectively be used at night at considerable distances, often 200—300 yards or more, with a high kill probability.* This means that the

threat presented during daylight because of darkness from a long distance him with the advantage of the victim.

ACO

There is an occurrence with supersonic sound) that slows down the speed of the sound and the protection.

When a fire travels outward from a point, it travels outward at a speed of approximately 1,125 feet per second. The barrel of the rifle is an illustrative example of the velocity of a bullet. A bullet travels at one-half times the speed of sound, not retain its velocity, it slows down. But 2,500 feet per second. This discussion is a discussion of the velocity of a bullet per second.

As a supersonic report, the velocity of a supersonic bullet outward from the muzzle of a rifle also travels at a velocity of approximately 1,125 feet per second. The bullet also travels at a velocity of approximately 1,125 feet per second. The bullet also travels at a velocity of approximately 1,125 feet per second.

When a supersonic sound of the muzzle of a rifle with normal angles to the muzzle of the rifle fired from a

threat presented by a sniper remains practically as real at night as it does during daylight hours. Any disadvantage presented to the sniper because of darkness is largely offset by the fact that his assault with a rifle from a long distance would normally not be expected, thus providing him with the added advantage of surprise and unpreparedness of the victim.

ACOUSTICAL ERRORS IN PERCEPTION OF THE DIRECTION OF A SHOOTING

There is an interesting and important sound phenomenon that occurs with supersonic bullets (bullets traveling at a speed greater than sound) that should be understood by possible targets of a sniper attack and the protective force whether they be private or police personnel.

When a firearm is discharged, there is emitted a muzzle report that travels outward spherically at the speed of sound which is approximately 1,125 feet per second. At that very same instant the bullet leaves the barrel of the gun and travels down range. The weapon used as an illustrative basis for this discussion is a .243 caliber rifle with a muzzle velocity of about 3,000 feet per second which is approximately two and one-half times greater than the speed of sound. However, the bullet does not retain its velocity because of air resistance and, therefore, gradually slows down. By the time it has traveled 200 yards, it has slowed to about 2,500 feet per second. For simplicity of illustration, we will treat this discussion as if the bullet has an average and constant velocity of 2,600 feet per second.

As a supersonic bullet travels, it pushes the air aside with such tremendous speed and force that it creates what is called a *bow-wave* report, the very same phenomenon as the sonic boom created by supersonic aircraft (see Figures 57 and 58). The bow-wave travels outward from the bullet's path at the speed of sound and, because the bullet also travels forward at tremendous speed, the bow-wave is actually cone shaped. The sides of the cone are tangential to the circumference of the muzzle report (see Figure 59). The greater a bullet's velocity, the sharper the bow-wave will angle back.

When a supersonic bullet, while in flight, passes near someone, the sound of the bow-wave is heard as a loud sharp crack. Because a person with normal hearing will perceive the source of sound to be at right angles to the sound waves, hearing the bow-wave and believing it to be the muzzle report can lead one to incorrectly believe that the shot was fired from a position other than the true direction.



Figure 53. (a) View of 100 yards. (b) a subject in the telescopic sight. (c) is extremely




Figure 53. (a) View of store and parking lot as viewed normally from a distance of 100 yards. (b) Photographed observation through a *7 power* telescopic sight of a subject in the parking lot. (c) Photographed observation through a *12 power* telescopic sight of a subject in the parking lot. The kill probability in both b and c is extremely high.




Figure 54. (a) Normal view of the store and parking lot from a distance of 300 yards. (b) Photographed observation through a 12 power telescopic sight of a subject in the parking lot. Note arrow in "A" depicting the subject's automobile. Kill probability would be high.



Figure 55. The light than does thus the intensi lighting.



Figure 55. The scopes large diameter objective lens gathers considerably more light than does the unaided eye. That large quantity of light is concentrated and thus the intensity increases making for effective use under conditions of poor lighting.



Figure 56. This illustration depicts what a sniper would see when viewing a subject through an eight power telescopic sight at night from a distance of 100 yards when illuminated by the courtesy light of an automobile as the victim gets in.




Figure 57. Photo showing the absence of a b




Figure 57. Photograph of a bullet traveling *less* than the speed of sound. Note absence of a bow-wave (Courtesy of Dr. Edgerton, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass.).

passes by someone, they hear the bow-wave as a loud sharp crack. The sound of the bow-wave report is followed momentarily by the muzzle report. If the person is very close to the gun when it is discharged (under 100 yards) the time interval is so short between the bow-wave and muzzle report that they are often perceived as one sound only. However, when the distance exceeds 100 yards so that there is a sufficient time interval between the two, two distinct sounds are heard; the first being the bow-wave of the bullet as it passes by, the second being the muzzle report. The time interval between the two sounds depends upon the distance one is from the gun and the velocity of the bullet. The bow-wave is perceived as being much louder than the muzzle report and is frequently mistaken for the muzzle report, and the obtuse muzzle report is often believed to be only an echo.

To better analyze this phenomenon, a sound meter (GenRad Model 1982) along with an experienced operator of the instrument was taken into the Arizona desert where there were minimal sound obstructions, and a variety of test shots were fired and the sound levels measured in decibels (dB). First, sound readings were taken from a distance of about ten feet to the left of the gun position. The rifle, a .243 caliber, had a muzzle report of 129.5 dB. The next test involved placing the sound meter 200 yards down range and about 50 feet to the side of the bullet's path. The bow-wave report of the bullet registered at 99.6 dB. The next test involved leaving the sound meter in the same position (200 yards down range) and the bullet being arrested in a container of dirt a short distance ahead of the rifle's barrel. That eliminated the bow-wave and made it possible to measure the muzzle report which was determined to be 78.9 dB. Here, at 200 yards, we have a difference of 20.7 dB between the bow-wave and the muzzle report, the bow-wave being the louder of the two (refer to Figure 59).

Numerically it may not appear that there is considerable difference in loudness between the muzzle report and the bow-wave but when considering the value of a decibel, one begins to realize and appreciate that the difference is tremendous. To *double* the volume of sound is to increase it by three decibels. If sound is increased by ten decibels, it is increased fifty times. Similarly, if the volume of sound is increased twenty decibels, it is increased one hundred times. This being the case, the volume of the muzzle report at 200 yards was only 1/100 that of the bow-wave. This leaves little question why it is the bow-wave rather than the muzzle report that tends to capture one's attention when a bullet passes nearby. To provide a better idea of how loud the bow-wave of 99.6 dB at 200 yards was, a .22 caliber rifle with a long rifle bullet was fired

Because the sound of the bullet's bow-wave is so loud in comparison to the muzzle report, and because the sound of the bow-wave is perceived to originate from a different direction than that of the sniper, there is little wonder why one often incorrectly estimates the direction from which a shot has been fired. Placing the sound meter closer than 50 feet to the bullet's path, and also placing it at distances greater than fifty feet, changed only the loudness of the bow-wave report to some extent. When standing at varying distances to the bullet's path, the bow-wave sounded louder and closer, or further and quieter, as one would expect. One's proximity to the bullet's path, however, had no effect upon perception of the direction from which the sound originated except with one possible exception that was not experimented with for obvious reasons.

American combat soldiers from Viet Nam have reported that when sniped upon and the shot missed by a considerable margin, they were often confused as to the direction from which the shot had been fired, for the reasons stated. Conversely, soldiers have reported that when the bullet missed their head by only a very few inches, they tended to have a better idea from where the shot had been fired.

In the urban environment where there are many buildings and other obstructions to deflect sound, a different situation often develops. Police officers working during periods of social unrest (riots) have reported

Figure 59. The bullet is fired from the gun (a) and travels forth at a speed of 2,600 feet per second. At the same moment that the bullet leaves the gun, the sound of the *muzzle report* travels outward at a rate of about 1.125 feet per second. As the bullet travels it leaves in its *wake* what is called the *bow-wave* report. The bow-wave is tangential to the circumference of the muzzle report. When the bullet passes near someone (b), that person perceives the bow-wave report as a loud sharp crack and perceives its source as being at a right angle to the sound wave (c) and thus believes it to have originated from the direction of point "D". Because the bow-wave is heard *before* the muzzle report (note comparative times on drawing of muzzle report and bullet travel) and, also because the bow-wave report is much sharper and louder than the muzzle report (perceived as a comparatively dull thud) heard a moment later, the bow-wave report can logically be mistaken for the muzzle report and, therefore, error results in estimating the direction of the shooting. One perceives the direction of the muzzle report correctly (assuming that the sound has not deflected from a building surface), because it is perceived as being at right angles to the sound waves (e). Unfortunately, as stated, one does not always recognize the muzzle report for what it is, thinking that the bow-wave was the muzzle report. Many, if not most, people are not aware of the existence of the bow-wave report.

occasions where they were under sniper fire, and while they distinctly heard the bow-wave of the bullet, they did not perceive any direction as to its source. In most such instances, the obtuse muzzle report was not heard at all, presumably drowned out by miscellaneous background noise. There have been occasions whereby the officers, just as they heard the bullet's bow-wave report, saw a glint of light reflect from a window of a nearby building, perhaps just a reflection from their own lights or perhaps the headlights of an automobile, and misinterpreted it to have been the muzzle flash of the gun that fired the bullet they heard and a counter assault was subsequently launched against the wrong location. An honest and understandable, though regrettable, mistake.

The important point all this discussion leads to is how these factors pertain to an executive and his protective force. First, if the setting is such that one perceives the direction of the bow-wave, recognize that the sound heard is in all likelihood not the muzzle report and also that the source of the shot is assuredly not from the direction one perceives it to be.

It is important that when this occurs one not take time to try to determine the true source, but rather, take immediate protective cover from *all* directions. Figure 60 depicts how mistaking the bow-wave for the muzzle report, and taking protective cover accordingly, could be a fatal mistake for the executive and the protective force. Second, as will be discussed, understanding this phenomenon can aid in determining the two possible positions from which the shot was fired. Escape efforts and future security measures can then be implemented accordingly.

DETERMINING THE ORIGIN OF A SHOT

It was mentioned that an understanding of acoustical errors in the perception of the direction of a shooting can aid in determining the true origin of a shot. Accepting that the source of the sound is perceived to be at right angles to the sound wave, and also accepting that it is the bow-wave of a supersonic bullet rather than the muzzle report that is often heard, one can begin to analyze the problem.

Figure 61 depicts a person and the direction from which the bow-wave was heard. That person may be the intended victim, a bodyguard or a bystander. On paper, the position of the observer would be indicated and then a line drawn to correspond with the direction from which the sound was perceived, just as has been done in Figure 61a. The next step involves drawing, on a second sheet of thin paper, a bullet's path and the bow-wave report just as has been done in Figure 61b. The third step is to




Figure 60. Mistake in the victim's

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


Figure 60. Mistaking the bow-wave report for that of the muzzle report can result in the victim taking improper protective cover.

place that drawing *over* the first so that the line in drawing a that depicts the direction from which the sound of the bullet was heard is at *right angles* to the bow-wave in b, and the position of the observer is on either side of the bullet's path as depicted in c and d of Figure 61. We begin to see that there are two logical directions from which the shot could have been fired.

The fourth and final step is to conduct a field search in accordance with what has been learned on paper. Possible sniper positions would be sought in the general directions indicated in the drawing.

An interesting and useful way by which one can obtain a quick and general idea of the *two* possible directions from which a shot has been fired is to face the direction from which the bow-wave was heard and then extend both arms outward and a bit forward as in Figure 62. Note




Figure 61. The two possible sources of a bullet can be determined on the basis of the direction from where the bow-wave report was perceived.

how the information provided is consistent with that of c and d of Figure 61. Each arm should be pointing in the approximate directions from which the shot could have been fired. If the muzzle report was also heard (often mistaken for an echo) and understood to be that which it really is, then no problem exists. The important thing is to be able to distinguish between the bow-wave and the obtuse muzzle report and not mistake the latter for an echo.

When it is necessary to interview witnesses in reference to the direction from which they believe they perceived a sound, it must be remembered that witness testimony can be erroneous. However, any qualified investigator fully realizes that and has learned to *test* a witness' perception and testimony and compare it with known factors.

Attempting to determine the true origin of a sniper's bullet by these methods is not infallible or exacting. However, it does afford a *logical* way to approach the problem and can, in many cases, save considerable field time and effort.

SUBSONIC BULLETS

Having examined the phenomenon of supersonic bullets and the acoustical considerations, it would be worthwhile taking a brief look at what occurs when dealing with subsonic bullets or, in other words, bullets traveling *less* than the speed of sound.

Generally a handgun bullet travels less than the speed of sound and, therefore, produces no bow-wave report. In those instances where a handgun bullet does leave the barrel at a speed slightly greater than that of sound, the difference is minimal and, the bullet will usually have

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Figure 62. Fac
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traveled only a short distance before its velocity has fallen below the speed of sound (refer to Figure 57). Note the absence of a bow-wave.

When a handgun bullet passes by someone who is a considerable distance from the shooter's position, perhaps 100 yards or more, the muzzle report is heard first because it travels faster than the bullet. After the muzzle report is heard, the bullet is heard as a soft hum or buzz as it passes by. The time interval between the muzzle report and the buzz of the bullet depends upon the distance between the gun and observer, and upon the bullet's velocity.




Figure 62. Facing the direction of the bow-wave report and extending both arms (slightly forward) will result in each hand pointing at the two possible sniper locations. Compare this with the information in Figures 58 and 61.

KIDNAP

The first thing presented between kidnappers and the two presenters in which such

Hostage taking perpetrator has hostages from and bargaining good example police and finally as the perpetrator circumstances

Hostage taking which it occurs and the location the typical police begin negotiations captors, many about the captors also, in many event that need assault.

Kidnapping rather than be Furthermore, available, the individual. For example, a few types of advance identity of the

KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE TAKING

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The first thing that should be done when considering the problems presented by an abductor is to examine the basic difference between kidnapping and hostage taking. The *basic differences* between the two present different kinds of threats and problems and, the manner in which such emergencies are handled varies accordingly.

Hostage taking most typically involves a situation wherein the perpetrator has found himself in a compromising situation and takes hostages from his immediate vicinity as a means of acquiring security and bargaining power with which to escape the immediate situation. A good example of such an incident is the robber who is interrupted by police and finds his escape route blocked. Anyone can become a victim as the perpetrator has generally not planned the act, but unfortunate circumstances brought it about.

Hostage taking is an *overt act*, because of the circumstances under which it occurs and, therefore, it is usually known who the captives are and the location at which they are being held. With this being the case, the typical police response is to (1) contain the situation and then (2) begin negotiations with the captors. While police negotiate with the captors, many other things are being done such as gathering information about the captors once their identity is known. Tactical personnel will also, in many instances, begin formulating plans in preparation for the event that negotiations are unsuccessful and the decision is made to assault.

Kidnapping, unlike hostage taking, is most often a *covert act* and, rather than being unplanned, it is preceded by considerable planning. Furthermore, while the hostage taker generally takes whoever is available, the kidnapper usually seeks to acquire custody of a specific individual. Finally, the kidnapper is not seeking simply an out from, for example, a fouled robbery attempt, but is using the captive for other types of advantage. Because kidnapping is usually a covert offense, the identity of the captors is often not known to police nor is the location of

the victim known. This fact alters the typical police response for obvious reasons.

When an executive has been kidnapped, the executive protective team will usually assume a subservient role leaving the negotiations to police personnel. However, protective service personnel should assist by cooperating with law enforcement authorities in any way reasonable. One of the ways in which they can often assist is with information pertaining to the victim. In this respect, the personnel data file will be of use in many instances.

RECEIVING THE CALL

Unlike the person making a bomb threat who calls the company's switchboard operator, the person who has abducted someone to use as a bargaining tool will generally notify a family member or someone high ranking within the organization. The person taking the call must remain calm if they are to efficiently obtain all the information possible. In this endeavor, it is advisable that a preprinted form be distributed to the persons most likely to receive such a call, a form that contains the necessary questions to be asked of the caller.

The person receiving the call should note the mood of the person calling along with any distinguishing characteristics such as speech or expressions. Any and all background noises should also be noted relative to time. An effort should be made to determine why the person was abducted and what specifically the abductor wants. The caller should be assured of cooperation. Tape recording the conversation is helpful.

An effort should be made to learn the condition of the hostage and whether the caller does in fact have the victim. There have been instances where the alleged victim was in reality not a victim, but the caller was attempting to obtain a ransom by *claiming* to have the victim. A request should be made to speak with the victim to verify his/her condition.

If money is demanded, the caller should be made aware of the problems involved in obtaining large sums of money on short notice. Many people tend to believe that corporations have ready access to huge sums of money, and they often do not realize how large and heavy a package containing a sizeable sum of money in small denomination bills can be.

When talking with the caller, a code word should be established so that their authenticity can be verified during subsequent communica-

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tion. This is important because once the news media learns of and publicizes the incident, it is quite likely that calls will be received from phonies attempting to receive the payoff. Finally, it is desirable to keep the caller on the line as long as possible and talking. The more he talks, the more likely one is to learn valuable information. Consider not only the possibility of the person saying something that could compromise their efforts, but recognize also the merit of background sounds that may later be pinpointed by time and location. A train whistle blowing in the background may, with assistance from railroad officials, help to determine from where the call was made. That would be a most valuable clue.

BEING ABDUCTED

The problems presented once the executive has been abducted are many and, as always, preventing the event is the most desirable strategy. However, because the possibility of an abduction cannot be completely eliminated, the protective plan, and the executive's safety orientation, must logically give consideration to how the executive should conduct himself in the event that he is taken captive.

Numerous individual factors will govern how to best conduct one's self if taken captive, and only some general highlights will be offered in this chapter. For additional considerations one should examine Appendix B.

Do not resist when the abduction takes place. A terrorist group will have planned the attack carefully and are adequately prepared to deal swiftly with any resistance one may offer. Should a weapon be produced by the executive, it will most certainly draw return fire. Accordingly, producing a weapon under such circumstances would in most instances be a suicidal act. This is not to infer, however, that appropriately armed, trained and prepared protective service personnel should not consider the use of arms to thwart the attack if the circumstances favor it.

Cooperation on the part of the victim after the initial abduction is important for several reasons. Uncooperativeness will very likely result in the captive being physically abused more severely than perhaps he otherwise would be. Additionally, lack of cooperation will cause captors to maintain a greater vigilance over the victim and thus minimize possibilities for escape should that seem appropriate at some point. Finally, if keeping the victim appears to be more trouble than he is worth, he may be murdered.

Stay alert and attempt to commit to memory all important information such as sounds, smells, captor's characteristics, times, locations and anything else that could later help to answer questions such as who, what, when, where, why and how. Remaining mentally alert and endeavoring to establish some degree of order in one's plight will also help emotionally to cope with the situation, uncertain and frightening though it may be.

These considerations are important because the shock, especially the initial shock, of being taken into captivity can be severe. One of the foremost fears will be whether one is going to live or die. In this respect, it is well to realize that most kidnapping victims are released unharmed. It is also important to remember, in spite of what the captors may say, that everything possible is being done by family, company and police to secure one's safe release.

Leave evidence whenever possible so that it can later be proved that one was held captive at a specific location. Leaving evidence also helps authorities in their investigative efforts if one is moved from one location to another. One form of evidence one may leave is fingerprints upon smooth surfaces. Leave them everywhere that it is possible. The best way to leave fingerprints is to run the fingers through the hair to get a good oil deposit on them and then touch them somewhat firmly on a smooth surface. Caution must be exercised not to apply too much pressure for that will cause the ridges to flatten, widen, and obscure ridge detail. One must also exercise care not to smudge the prints.

Do not provide information that could be of benefit to the captors or speculate what action may or may not be taken by one's family or employer. Conversely, however, it is well to not let the captors forget that one's well being, and continued proof of same, is essential to their having any bargaining power and having any of their demands met in whole or in part.

An *escape attempt* is not recommended unless it appears likely that the victim is going to be murdered, and it appears that the chances of a successful escape are reasonably good. An unsuccessful escape attempt can, and probably will, result in a higher level of subsequent security of the victim and could also result in physical abuse or death. Furthermore, if the actual escape is successful, one may find himself lost in a remote or foreign area and, in that respect, at a serious disadvantage.

If the escape can be made good for several minutes, the chance of it being successful is good, especially in an urban area. Generally, if recapture is going to occur in an urban area, it will be accomplished almost immediately. Accordingly, when escaping, every effort must be

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made to *break visual contact as quickly as possible*.

Escape attempts should incorporate stealth and avoidance rather than a violent confrontation with any one or more of the captors. In this respect, passive behavior will generally have a tendency to lull them into complacency and reduce their alertness. Also, a guard's alertness declines after more than about two hours on watch and is further reduced in the early hours of the morning. These facts should be borne in mind and taken advantage of when possible.

If escape into a rural area is made, one can attempt to put maximum distance between himself and the captors, or hide in close proximity to the location at which he was held. Considerations for escape possess merit and a value judgment should be made depending upon specific circumstances.

When attempting to gain a lead, it is not desirable to travel in a straight line, but to travel in a zigzag fashion. One should also avoid moving so rapidly as to become exhausted. It is best to move steadily alternating between walking and jogging.

While moving, every effort should be made to avoid being visible to anyone in pursuit. In this respect, one should avoid open areas, avoid walking along ridges where one will be silhouetted against the sky, and utilize natural contours of the land. Similarly, camouflage techniques, when possible, should be utilized so as to *blend with* the surroundings. If one's clothing is of a color that contrasts sharply with with predominant color of the background against which one could be observed, consideration should be given to soiling the clothing sufficiently to reduce the contrast. Utilizing portions of a tree branch with leaves can also be used to break up the familiar and distinctive human form.

If the decision is made to select a place of concealment near the location held in captivity, one will be in position to observe the captors actions and then modify one's own actions accordingly. Furthermore, a captor would normally not expect one to go into immediate hiding, but would expect the victim to flee. When in hiding, one must not only attempt to blend with the surroundings, but should remain motionless as well. There is little that will betray one's position quicker than will movement, even though slight.

If *police assault* the location at which one is being held captive, the captive should lay down to reduce the possibility of being injured or killed. It is also important that the victim attempt to cooperate with assaulting police in any way possible. It is important to bear in mind that police have learned through experience that they cannot depend on

any kind of predictable conduct on the part of the captive.

A little studied phenomenon, but one that should not be overlooked, is the *Stockholm Syndrome*. This, in basic terms, is a situation wherein the captive begins to identify with the captors. This phenomenon has actually resulted in a reluctance on the part of the victims to later testify against their captor, and to express great concern for their well-being after they are taken into custody by police.

PROTECTING THE CHILDREN

The vulnerability of executive's children to kidnapping cannot be overlooked, and here again, prevention is the main consideration. There are many things that must be considered depending upon the child and his necessary activities on a day-to-day basis. However, the following should be considered an integral part of a preventative program.

Constant adult supervision is desirable but not always possible. Alternatively, when possible, children should be encouraged to walk in pairs or groups rather than alone. This has a tendency to deter a kidnapper and, if the child is forcefully abducted under such circumstances, there will be witnesses. Additionally, it is advisable to walk on heavily traveled streets as opposed to those that contain little pedestrian or vehicular traffic. In short, the child should be instructed to walk in pairs or groups on heavily traveled streets.

The child should be firmly instructed that at no time, under any circumstances, is he/she to accept a ride from a stranger, or accompany a stranger, no matter how seemingly friendly and harmless such a person may appear. If a ride is offered, or the child annoyed or followed, the incident must be reported immediately. Depending upon the age and ability of the child, a registration number of any vehicle involved will be most useful.

Never should the child leave home without notifying a responsible adult where he is going, who he will be with and when he expects to return. A personnel data file indicating all friends of the child and other places the child may visit is helpful in the event that the child fails to arrive somewhere. Such a file can minimize the time necessary to contact friends, etc., to determine if an emergency does in fact exist.

School authorities should be instructed that under no circumstances is the child to be released to anyone without first contacting the parent or legal guardian. If someone should call the school indicating that they will be by to pick up the child, his/her identity should be verified. The

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child, for example, can talk to them over the phone. In other instances the caller can be asked questions that only a parent would normally be able to answer.

At home the child's room should be made secure so that an abductor cannot surreptitiously enter the room at night by way of a window. The physical security measures discussed in Chapter 10 apply here. The door to the child's room should be left open so that sounds from the room may be heard. When baby-sitters are used, they must be responsible individuals and instructed not to admit strangers for any reason. They should also be made aware of the fact that an abductor may use a pretext in an effort to gain access to the house.

THE POLICE RESPONSE TO HOSTAGE TAKING

Kidnapping and hostage taking situations are not easy situations to contend with and will always possess a great deal of painful uncertainty for all persons concerned. As earlier stated, the executive protective agents will usually assume a subservient role allowing law enforcement authorities to handle the situation, depending of course upon the country within which the incident occurs. The following should serve to illustrate the difficulties that one can encounter when attempting to negotiate for the release of the victim(s). The problem is truly complex in nature.

The following *lesson plan* prepared by Sgt. Gary Skeet illustrates the complexity and uncertainty that such problems present.

THE UNIFORMED OFFICER'S INITIAL RESPONSE TO A HOSTAGE SITUATION

(by Sgt. Gary Skeet)

Be Alert—Stay Alive

1. You may have little or no warning; in other cases the hostage taker will call for the police.
2. Assess the situation and advise the dispatcher and if possible, remove the public and yourself to a safe distance to observe.
3. Gather information for the commanding officer and staff.
 - a. Who is the hostage taker(s)
 - b. Why were the hostage(s) taken
 - c. What do they want

- d. How many hostage takers—how many hostages
- e. What is their threat potential—weapons, mental stability

If in a large building, count floors from the top down and be very careful that directions are not confused under a stress situation.

- 4. Avoid saying or doing anything that may irritate the hostage taker.
 - a. If possible, do not confront or make direct contact with the hostage taker unless he demands to talk.
 - b. Try to buy time for the department to make decisions and react to the situation.
 - c. Calm and cool thinking will slow down the situation in first critical minutes.
- 5. If you can contain the situation and protect the lives of the innocent, while gaining any of the information aforementioned, you may consider your actions a success. Just how successful will be determined a lot by the type of hostage taker you are confronted with.
- 6. There are three basic groups of hostage takers with eight individual types of people:

Group A. Psychological

Type I. Suicide-prone

Your success depends upon the ability to get close to the person and establish a personal contact—both visual and verbal. Be aware that they will often attempt to use the police as the destruction device.

Type 2. Distraught—Mentally deranged

A true mental case can seldom be handled by anyone other than a trained and familiar person that they trust. They are very dangerous to the uniformed officer. There is no organization to their actions.

Type 3. Revenge Seeker

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he wants. You talk to him to buy time in hopes of wearing him down if an assault becomes the only course of action. He is well organized and may have a psychological problem.

Group B. Criminal

Type 1. Inmates

As long as they are controlled within the jail or prison, they must negotiate and will unless pushed into a corner. They are very well organized. They are seeking improvements within their own realm.

Type 2. Robbers

If no lives are lost in the initial act of the crime or police contact, you can wear robbers down and establish negotiations. Usually this person is looking for a way out.

Group C. Political

Type 1. Protestor (fanatic)

While initial contact may be very difficult, if they can be continued and cooled down, negotiations may be successful. A long time may be spent in determining actually what the hostage taker wants.

Type 2. Ideological Revolutionary

They are well organized and difficult to deal with. However, if handled properly, they may be dealt with in most situations. They are well organized and have a specific goal.

Type 3. Anarchist Revolutionary

Cannot be negotiated with to any practical sense. Your only purpose is to buy time to react. *They are well trained and organized.*

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*Engler Instrum
250 Culver Ave
Jersey City, Ne

TACHOGRAPHS: AN UNORTHODOX APPLICATION

The tachograph* (Figure 63) is an instrument commonly installed in fleet vehicles as a means of supervising and controlling the manner in which vehicles are operated. Tachographs provide a chart reflecting the following information:

1. Time.
2. Speeds at which vehicle is driven.
3. Mileage (distance vehicle has traveled).
4. Number, duration and time of stops
5. Whether or not engine is running while the vehicle is stationary.

A tachograph features three styli as shown in Figure 64. The upper records the vehicle's mileage, the center records the vehicle's speed and the lower records whether the engine is running while the vehicle is stationary. All such information is recorded relative to time. The chart itself is a pressure-sensitive, plastic-coated, paper. The top layer of the chart is etched by the stylus leaving a permanent record.

An example of a tachograph chart and the information it provides is illustrated in Figure 65. Charts are available in both round form and strips. Both styles record vehicle operation on an hourly basis, but the maximum time periods vary. Round charts record a time duration most commonly of twelve or twenty-four hours. Strip charts generally will record a time period of eight, fifteen or thirty-one days. Individual needs will dictate the most appropriate chart to use.

Tachographs may be installed in most any type of vehicle whether it be a truck or passenger car. The instrument utilizes the speedometer cable as does the speedometer. It is also connected to the vehicle's electrical system so that the chart will indicate when the ignition is turned on and off. A tachograph may be connected to the speedometer

*Engler Instruments
250 Culver Avenue
Jersey City, New Jersey 07305




Figure 63. Mechanical tachograph by Sangamo Weston (Division of Engler Instruments) that records a vehicle's operation as it occurs relative to time.

cable leaving the vehicle's original speedometer inactive or, a *Dual Drive Adapter* may be used so that both the original speedometer and tachograph operate simultaneously (see Figure 66). The tachograph unit may be placed anywhere in the vehicle.

The tachograph would seem to have application as an anti-terrorist device with its degree of merit depending upon one's specific situation. The following discussion will serve to demonstrate how proper use of a tachograph can *aid* protective service personnel in preventing an abduction and, in determining the approximate time and location of an abduction as well as the subsequent route of the vehicle in the event that it is later found abandoned.

It is desirable to place the tachograph in an inconspicuous location within the vehicle so that an abductor, should he move the vehicle, does not become aware of it and destroy the chart. A long-term chart such as the 15 or 31 day strip will greatly minimize the inconvenience of



Figure 64. Open swinging front and records speed and vehicle is stationary.

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Unpredictable program. It is the prospective the vehicle of a examinations patterns that victim will be time and travel

When the chart the information known or information available. Some investigative construct the vehicle of the victim's executive's wife friends home to both the fr




Figure 64. Open view of a Sangamo tachograph. Note chart on inside of swinging front and the three styli. Upper stylus records vehicle mileage, center records speed and the lower records whether the engine is running while the vehicle is stationary.

replacing charts, especially if the tachograph is in an inconvenient location within the vehicle.

Unpredictability is an important aspect of any executive protection program. It is much more difficult for an attacker to plan his act well if the prospective victim is systematically unsystematic. Accordingly, if the vehicle of an executive or his spouse has a tachograph, periodic chart examinations by protective personnel can serve to identify dangerous patterns that would enable an attacker to predict when and where the victim will be. The executive can then be cautioned to modify certain time and travel routes accordingly.

When the chart is retrieved and studied subsequent to an abduction, the information contained on the chart should be compared with the known or intended itinerary of the victim, if that information is available. Some field investigation may be necessary. Whether field investigative efforts will be made before or after attempting to reconstruct the vehicle's route will depend upon how much is initially known of the victim's intended itinerary. If, for example, it is known that an executive's wife, after leaving home in the morning intended to stop by a friend's home prior to keeping a scheduled doctor's appointment, a call to both the friend and doctor's office would be made to verify whether




Figure 65. Miles Per Hour tachograph chart depicting the kind of information such a chart records (Courtesy of Engler Instruments).

she had in fact arrived at the two locations and, if so, the approximate times involved. That information would then be compared with the chart for verification purposes. The distances could also be verified using the chart. Assume that the victim did arrive at her friend's home, but failed to arrive at the doctor's office as planned. An attempt would be made to reconstruct the vehicle's route between the friend's home and the location where it was found abandoned. All graph information leading up to the friend's home would, for the present time, be discounted.

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Figure 66. A D speedometer and graph may be p

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


Figure 66. A *Dual Drive Adapter* may be employed so that both the vehicle's speedometer and the tachograph may be operated simultaneously. The tachograph may be placed anywhere in the vehicle (Courtesy of Engler Instruments).

There are basically seven steps involved in reconstructing a vehicle's route based upon tachograph information. The following is a list of each of those seven steps, followed by a brief discussion of each. It should be recognized, however, that if a vehicle has been driven about in an erratic manner, traversing the area, it will not be possible to reconstruct its route for reasons which will become obvious. It must be presumed that the vehicle was driven from one location to another without a lot of unnecessary and roundabout routes taken. It should also be recognized that in many instances it will be found that there is not just one route, but there are two or more possibilities for variations to a probable route, as we will see. As will be learned, therefore, the graph simply aids in establishing a probable route or routes and eliminates certain routes. One then has direction for subsequent field investigation efforts.

The following are *seven* basic steps in reconstructing a vehicle's travel route:

1. Determine as closely as possible the trip mileage reflected on the chart.

2. Note all stops (indicating possible stop signs and semi-fors), time duration of stops, whether engine was turned off or left running, as that will provide a clue as to the nature of the stop.
3. Note whether vehicle speed suggests freeway travel or local street use. High speeds that are sustained indicate freeway use.
4. Consider the time of day as it relates to the density of traffic. Heavy work hour traffic on a freeway can often, on the chart, appear as city street traffic flow.
5. Record on a map all the distances between major intersections along all reasonably possible routes between points A and B.
6. Total the distances (using the map) along various suspected routes until a combination is achieved that is consistent with the distance reflected on the chart. That will indicate a possible or probable route.
7. Identify all possible alternative combinations and list them in the order of their probability if possible.

The possible routes provide useful information for subsequent field investigative efforts. Once probable routes are identified, effort along those routes can be intensified to locate witnesses and other possible evidence.

Determining trip mileage is accomplished by examining the mileage area of the chart (see arrow in Figure 67). The mileage section consists of five concentric lines with the distance between each line representing one mile. As the vehicle travels, and the chart rotates with the clock, the mileage stylus moves up and down. Each complete upward or downward travel represents a traveled distance of five miles. Each complete cycle (up and down) represents a distance of ten miles and appears as a saw tooth.

As will be noted in Figure 68, the stylus and chart do not always align perfectly. An easy way to guard against incorrect chart reading when that situation occurs is to take an unused chart, cut it in half, and use the cut edge of one half as a measuring device as depicted in Figure 69. The more exacting the mileage reading is the more reliable will be the estimation of probable route traveled.

Note all stops, time duration of stops, whether the engine was left running and the distance between stops (distance in time and miles). In this respect, one can consider that the chart is, in a practical sense, a clock face that records information as it occurs relative to time. All information on the chart, therefore, reflects not only what has occurred, but when it occurred.

Figure 67. A concentric line represents 10 number of s

Figure 6 vehicle beg per hour, resumed. (chart refle final stop chart also stop signs




Figure 67. Arrow depicts the mileage portion of a tachograph chart. Each concentric line represents *one* mile. Each complete cycle (up and down) represents 10 miles. Under the mileage portion is a record of vehicle speeds and number of stops.

Figure 67 illustrates a portion of a chart. Note that in this instance the vehicle began moving at about 12:10 PM, attained a speed of about 38 miles per hour, and then stopped. After stopping, travel was immediately resumed. (Note wide stylus impression indicating two impressions.) The chart reflects that from the time the vehicle began travel until it made its final stop *twenty* minutes later, *eight* intermediate stops were made. The chart also shows that the stops were of a very short duration, most likely stop signs or semi-fors. Traveling the probable route will later help to




Figure 68. The tachograph mileage stylus and chart do not always align perfectly as illustrated.

substantiate the reasons for the stops and to verify that the route selected as being probable is, or is not, the most probable route. Whenever a stop of more than a couple of minutes is made, the chart will clearly reflect the fact (refer to Figure 65). The *engine operation* section of the chart will indicate whether or not the engine was left running.

Vehicle speeds will often suggest freeway use or local streets. Frequent stops or lack of stops will also provide useful indications. This determination will sometimes be helpful if there are local streets running parallel to a freeway that can provide the same trip mileage as




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


Figure 69. Using half of an unused chart will aid in making an exacting determination of a vehicle's mileage in those instances where the chart and stylus did not align perfectly. A magnifying glass is also helpful.

the freeway. There are sometimes situations on the outer fringes of a city where local streets have speed limits of or near that of a freeway. A clue in such instances as to whether the vehicle traveled the freeway or a parallel street is whether the chart reflects a high uninterrupted speed for a sustained duration. Or there may be speed reductions indicating yielding to other traffic. Speed reductions to ten to twenty-five miles per hour suggest slowing to turn corners or to yield.

Consider the time of day, and the day of week, as it relates to the density of traffic. Freeway traffic during rush hour can, in some cities, produce a chart that may appear that local streets were traveled due to slow speeds and frequent stops. Also, the time of day traveled should be considered when seeking witnesses. It is important to remember that people often will be at certain places at certain times on certain days of each week.

Record on a map all the distances between major intersections along all reasonably possible and logical routes of travel between what is




Figure 70. Map with arrows depicting a vehicle's route from the starting point (upper right) to its destination (lower left). Refer to text for discussion.

determined to be point A and B. See simplified example in Figure 70. This must be done as accurately as possible.

Total the distances along various suspected routes until a combination is achieved that best corresponds with the total trip mileage

reflected on the route.

Identify possible probable route the same, or variations to error (tire size on the chart with the map and mileage from which each mile space. A mag

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Figure 70 (discussion) with finish point intersections

The tachograph the total trip. Totalling the provides a figure. There could be problems of

The next step that traveling been done on distance (9.8 as Bell Road down 43rd Avenue mileage would slightly less now have a be another

In attempting one must the

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reflected on the chart. One will then have found a possible or probable route.

Identify possible alternate routes or possible variations of the probable route. In some instances there are variations that will provide the same, or very nearly the same, total trip mileage. Determining the exact route is not always possible because in some instances two or more variations to the route will provide the same mileage or, mechanical error (tire size, etc.) can make for some deviation in the mileage reflected on the chart which will cause a certain amount of discrepancy between the map and chart. Finally, it is not possible to determine the exact trip mileage from the tachograph chart because of the small space within which each mile is recorded, and the size of the stylus in relation to that space. A magnifying glass or low power microscope is a great aid.

The following is an example of an actual field exercise that will depict how this system works. This exercise was kept short and basic for ease of discussion. A longer trip would call for the same approach, however, more time would be required to work the problem.

Figure 70 depicts a map (small local streets omitted for this discussion) with the starting point shown in the upper right and the finish point at the lower left. The distances between the various intersections are also shown (miles between large dark dots).

The tachograph chart indicates, as closely as can be determined, that the total trip mileage was about 9.5 miles. Refer to Figure 67, 68, and 69. Totaling the applicable distances along the actual route shown provides a figure of 9.87 miles. There is an inconsistency of .37 miles. There could logically be that much error when considering the problems of accuracy which were discussed.

The next step is to consider possible alternatives. It can readily be seen that traveling west from 43rd Avenue to 51st Avenue could easily have been done on either Greenway, Thunderbird or Cactus, and the same distance (9.87 miles) would result. Therefore, those three streets as well as Bell Road represent possible routes. Had one proceeded all the way down 43rd Avenue to Peoria and traveled west to 48th Avenue, the total mileage would have been 9.16 miles, leaving an error of only .31 miles, slightly less than the .37 error taking the previously discussed route. We now have a deviation the other way. We also have what would appear to be another possible route.

In attempting to eliminate possible routes to narrow the alternatives, one must then make further considerations:

1. Do the number of stops reflected on the chart suggest the likelihood of one route over another? Consider such things

- as stop signs and semi-fors.
2. Would things such as road construction or repairs along one of the possible routes eliminate it as a probable or possible route?
 3. Do the speeds traveled suggest one route over the other?
 4. Precise reading of the graph is difficult. The total distance of the two possible routes varies, one being greater than the 9.5 miles shown on the chart, the other being less. Do indications suggest that the 9.5 miles shown on the chart is a liberal or a conservative figure?
 5. Insert a new chart and drive the possible routes using the same vehicle and tachograph and compare the findings with the original chart. This must be done *only* after the vehicle has been appropriately examined for evidence such as fingerprints.

When the foregoing considerations have been appropriately addressed, it is time to then engage in field investigation in an effort to locate witnesses and further evidence.

In the example provided, three things indicated that the freeway had not been used. First, had the freeway been used, the total trip mileage would have been in the vicinity of 8.94 miles, which is too great a deviation from the 9.5 miles reflected on the chart. The freeway, therefore, does not represent a logical possibility insofar as mileage is concerned. Second, the number of stops (8 total) indicate that freeway travel is highly unlikely. Third, the maximum speeds at which the vehicle traveled do not indicate freeway travel.

As can be seen, the tachograph represents a tool that offers aid. It can enable one to determine where an abduction *did not* occur, and where and when it *may have* occurred. It also will indicate what routes were *definitely not* traveled, and what routes *could have* been taken. The tachograph and this application, like any other crime detection, deterrent or investigative tool, is not so perfect as to revolutionize matters. It is simply an aid that is useful when viewed and applied within its proper perspective.

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PHYSICAL SECURITY

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

An executive or public official typically will spend about 50 percent (12 hours) of each day at his place of residence, 33 percent (8 hours) at his place of employment and 17 percent (4 hours) in transit (see Figure 10). As can be seen, most of the executives time (83 percent) is at work or at home.

This chapter deals with physical security measures appropriate for buildings such as the residence and place of employment. In this chapter a brief overview will be made of such things as locks, alarms of various types, security lighting and barriers such as window bars and fencing.

Proper utilization of physical security measures appropriate for a particular location and threat level can succeed in making the potential victim of a terrorist attack quite secure while at home or work, and proper measures can offer some degree of protection against vehicle tampering while it is unattended. When one begins moving between the home and business, however, the level of protection that is possible decreases considerably. It is for this reason that more terrorist attacks occur during such times. Security during transit is discussed in another chapter.

As in all cases of physical security, the program will not consist of a single element such as locks or a fence, but will employ many factors that, when working together, provide the desired level of protection. The precise nature and application of the various elements will, of course, depend upon the specific needs in question, and this latter concern can only be determined after making a thorough physical security survey of the premises in accordance with the findings of a properly conducted threat assessment.

THE SECURITY SURVEY

Before one can begin implementing measures to reduce the vulnerability of the home or business to a physical attack, the weaknesses must

be assessed and the corrective measures devised accordingly. This can only be accomplished by conducting a security survey of the premises. When the survey is made, one must think as the attacker would, trying to identify the weak points. Notes should be prepared during the survey, and after the survey has been completed, appropriate security measures decided upon, using as criteria the severity of the threat and the desired level of protection.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine various security weaknesses one may encounter on a premises and, at the same time, discuss ways in which the various weak points may be made stronger. Once one understands the weak points and the types of hardware available, as well as their limitations, a valid determination can be made as to what will fulfill specific security needs. In many instances, however, it is desirable to have a specialist conduct the survey and then make appropriate recommendations. The desirability of this will, of course, depend upon the expertise of the person desiring security or that of their protective force. In many instances the security director will conduct a general security survey himself and then have a specialist, such as an alarm or lock specialist, or someone knowledgeable in the area of terrorism, conduct a survey as it pertains to their particular area of expertise.

A point worth noting is the fact that the physical security of many premises can be upgraded appreciably at a modest cost. With this being the case, one often stands to gain a great deal of added protection at a modest cost.

DOORS AND LOCKS

Doors can present a security problem and are often a weak point in several respects. However, doors can be made secure once their weaknesses are understood. Homes of recent construction often feature hollow core doors that are weak and vulnerable to physical assault. Naturally, such doors do not offer adequate protection against unauthorized entry and should be replaced with solid doors. Furthermore, if the door opens outward, it may be possible to remove the hinge pins and thus remove the door in that manner. Hinges can easily and inexpensively be modified to prevent this, as will be discussed.

In addition to inadequate doors, buildings are often furnished with inadequate locking devices as well. Locks must be of quality construction and properly installed on a quality door set in a sturdy frame.

The door must be screwed in secure.

Springlatches on exterior doors usually require something to depress the latch to operate. *security for e*

Dead Bolt springlatches in many instances is the fact that they cannot be slipped into a vulnerable position.

Single Key in proper location. The bolt through the door is 1 inch long. The bolt through the door is 1 inch into the door. The bolt spread far enough to clear the frame. If the bolt is to clear the frame, get the end of the lock by breaking the frame.

The single key of the inside case should be of the single intruder can be an intruder from the premises. The inside w

Double Key offer a high installation both inside and outside. With this lock to operate in premises by key lock, the

The door must closely abut the jamb, and the jambs striker plate must be screwed in securely.

Springlatches, offer little more than no security and their use on exterior doors should be discouraged. To compromise a lock of this type usually requires nothing more than a driver's license or credit card; something that is thin enough to slip between the door and striker plate to depress the latch. *Springlatches offer privacy on interior doors, not security for exterior doors.*

Dead Bolt Latches, offer a greater degree of security than do springlatches, but the level of security they offer is not acceptable in many instances. The only way such locks are superior to the springlatch is the fact that when the door is closed and the pin depressed, the lock cannot be slipped (case knifed) with a credit card. This lock is, however, vulnerable to various types of physical force.

Single Key Dead Bolt locks will offer a high degree of security if used in proper locations. This kind of lock, if it has a bolt throw at least one inch long that inserts into a solid door frame, cannot easily be defeated. The bolt throw is the length that the bolt protrudes from the door. The reason that it is necessary, or at least desirable, that the bolt extend one inch into the door frame is to prevent the door and frame from being spread far enough with a jack or pry bar to allow the bolt to clear the frame. If the door and frame are not spread far enough to allow the bolt to clear the frame, but the spread is sufficient to enable the intruder to get the end of a pry bar ahead of the bolt, it can be forced back into the lock by breaking the internal mechanism.

The single key dead bolt offers the advantage of quick opening by use of the inside knob should rapid exit become necessary as would be the case should a fire occur. Convenience is also a factor. The disadvantage of the single key dead bolt is the fact that if it is used near a window, an intruder can break the glass and reach in to release the lock. Also, should an intruder enter through a window and wish to remove large items from the premises, or desire to leave quickly, he can open the door from the inside without a key.

Double Key Dead Bolt locks are available in a variety of styles and offer a high level of security so long as a quality brand is selected and installation is proper. The double key lock requires a key to operate it both inside and out and, hence, the term *double key, or double cylinder*. With this lock, an intruder cannot simply break a window and reach in to operate it nor can he conveniently leave by the door once entering the premises by another means. With the double key lock, as with the single key lock, the bolt throw should be no less than one inch. If in a residence

at night, a key should be left in or near the lock for emergency fire exit if necessary.

Rim Locks of various styles, some jimmy resistant, are available and, if the quality is adequate and installation properly done, offer a high degree of physical security. The considerations of single or double key and bolt throw apply to the rim lock just as they applied to the dead bolt locks.

Door hinges can present a serious security weakness when the door opens outward, thus necessitating having the hinge pins exposed to the outside. The reason this is a problem results from the fact that with a normal hinge an intruder can remove the pins and pull the door from the frame regardless of the type or quality of the locking device used. A simple and inexpensive way to overcome this weakness is to create a *pinned hinge* (see Figure 71). To pin a hinge, remove the center screw and insert a sturdy screw or nail with the head clipped off leaving about one-half inch protruding. Next, a drill is used to enlarge the opposing hole so that when the door is closed, the portion of the nail protruding will fit into the hole. When the pins are then removed from the hinges, it will not be possible to pull the door from the frame, thus greatly improving the security level of the door. Although the nails will not extend the full one inch required of dead bolt locks, one should remember that it is much more difficult to spread the door and frame any appreciable distance at the top and bottom edges of the frame where hinges are located. Pinned hinges for doors that open inward can also be desirable, as were double key locks, to prevent an intruder from leaving by way of the door after gaining entry by another means.

Flush Bolt Locks are necessary for double doors (French doors) to firmly secure the inactive door containing the striker plate. The door carrying the dead bolt lock will then have a sturdy counterpart. Without flush bolts, preferably both top and bottom, the doors can usually be forced open. Jimmy resistant locks are also desirable for double doors because their mechanical mechanism is such that the lock and strike become interconnected. That feature adds considerably to the level of security.

Arcadia Doors operate on the same basic principle as do sliding windows and, therefore, suffer from the same security weaknesses. Security measures that apply to one apply equally well to the other. To avoid redundancy, both arcadia doors and sliding windows are discussed together in the section under windows.

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


Figure 71. A pinned hinge prevents an intruder from pulling a door from its frame by removing the hinge pins.

Door Chains offer a certain degree of protection in that they enable one to determine who has announced their arrival without enabling them to force their way into the room. To be effective and reliable, however, it is essential that the chain be securely and properly installed so that a would-be intruder cannot simply reach in and release the chain. Some such chains can be locked into position, some cannot. Those that cannot be locked in position may be released if the door can be opened far enough to insert an arm. Although simple tools are required to accomplish this, it can be done in a matter of a minute or less and leaves little physical evidence of the compromise.

Door viewers are a desirable security item for homes and offer valuable protection by allowing an occupant to determine who is on the other side of the door before it is opened. These devices are available in a variety of viewing angles, depending upon the quality and cost of the item. However, they are all wide angle and offer protection. The installation of door viewers is easy as all one must do is drill the proper size hole through a door, at the desired position, and then insert each half of the device into the door and screw them together snugly (see Figures 72a and 72b).

Garage Doors containing their original (standard) hardware generally offer a low level of protection against unauthorized entry. This is a serious problem inasmuch as once an intruder has successfully gained entrance to the garage he can hide and wait for the arrival of the victim, or he is in a desirable position to leisurely break into the house, often using tools available in the garage. While in the garage the intruder is concealed from the view of neighbors and passersby.

If the garage door is the type that swings outward from the bottom, a *cane bolt* at each side of the door is desirable. Securing only one side of the door still allows an intruder to force the opposite corner out far enough to crawl in. Doors that roll up on a track can easily be secured by placing padlocks through the roller track on each side of the door.

WINDOWS

Windows, just as doors, can represent a possible point of unauthorized entry for an intruder unless proper security measures have been employed. The best way to secure a window will depend upon the type of window and its location. The following discussion should serve to provide some ideas.

Double Hung Windows can be a means of unauthorized entry because they can often be jimmied open easily. If it will not be necessary at any time to open such a window, the best means of securing it is to screw it shut permanently with a screw long enough to pass through the top portion of the lower window and into the bottom portion of the upper window. If opening the window will remain a desired feature, a pin may be employed in place of the screw. To accomplish this one should drill a downward sloping hole through the bottom edge of the upper window and into the top edge of the bottom window. The downward slope of the hole will prevent the pin from working its way out. To allow for some degree of security against intrusion while such a window is open, commercial locks are available that will permit one to lock the window



Figure 72. (a) Door viewer installed in door and screwed to opposite side of door.




Figure 72. (a) Door viewers are inserted into a hole in the door, from each side, and screwed together firmly. (b) Viewers enable one to view the caller on the opposite side of the door prior to admitting him.

in a predetermined position that, while opened, will provide an opening too small for someone to crawl through. This can also be accomplished by screwing strips of wood into the window track the desired distance above the lower window. The window then will raise only to the point where it encounters the wood strips.

Sliding Windows and Arcadia Doors, both of which operate on the same basic principle, offer a security problem because they both can be easily lifted out of their track and removed. There are basically two acceptable ways by which to secure them against this kind of compromise. Since the sliding window and arcadia door must be raised in order to be pulled outward from the lower track, providing an obstruction in the upper track will prevent this kind of compromise. An easy and economical way to accomplish this is to slide the door or window all the way open and then drill two holes in each end of the now exposed upper track. After the holes have been drilled, two sturdy sheet metal screws are screwed part way into the hole leaving a portion protruding downward so that the door or window, when in the closed position, clears the screw heads by a very small margin. The screw heads then will prevent the door or window from being raised from the lower track far enough to effectuate removal. It is also desirable to provide a better locking device so that the intruder cannot compromise the standard lock and simply slide the door or window open. Placing dowling or broom handles in the track will offer some degree of protection but, they can be dislodged. A mechanical locking device is more reliable.

Crank Windows are reasonably easy to secure as one must simply drill a hole through the latch handle and frame when in the closed position and insert a pin or small padlock through the hole. Key operated replacement latches are also available through many locksmith shops or hardware stores.

Louvered Windows offer a very low level of physical security. Normally they are easy to pry open; on some, the individual panes of glass may be removed while the window is in the closed position. Often the best protection with windows of this type is to replace them with a more desirable style or securely affix a decorative grill (bars) over the opening. The latter, however, can prevent emergency exit should a fire occur.

Grills and bars when properly affixed to window openings provide a tremendous degree of protection. Generally, bars secured within the opening are more difficult to dislodge than are bars mounted over the opening. The latter are much easier to pry away. Bars mounted behind

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the glass are the most difficult to compromise because a would-be intruder must first break the glass or pry the window open and, even then, the bars are not quite as accessible.

SECURITY LIGHTING

Darkness can be an intruder's best ally. Therefore, proper security lighting is an important ingredient of any physical security program. The specific types of lights chosen, their intensity and their placement will depend upon the specific needs. However, there are several key points that should be borne in mind when planning a lighting arrangement, and these considerations will be briefly discussed here.

Lighting units should be positioned where they do not present a safety hazard or where they will be vulnerable to compromise by anyone desiring to render it ineffective so as to create a cover of darkness. The lighting arrangement should be such that it provides good illumination of openings such as doors and windows which are possible points of unauthorized entry, and hiding places, so that an intruder is either deterred or detected (see Figures 73a, 73b and 73c).

Lights that glare out from the building have merit inasmuch as such lighting has a tendency to obscure the intruder's view of the building while making him highly visible to anyone looking out from within. However, such a lighting arrangement also has a tendency to reduce the effectiveness of the visual surveillance of passing police or security patrols.

Security lights may be turned on and off manually, may be on a timer or may be of the photoelectric variety activated by the outside level of illumination. There are merits to each.

All electrical installations must be safe and comply with applicable electrical and building codes for the area.

PERIMETER FENCING

Perimeter fencing, in many instances, is a necessary security aid that serves to deter some, slow down and detect others, and to channel those persons with legitimate access through proper entrance points.

To date, chain link is the most appropriate type of fence under most circumstances. The chain link mesh openings should be no larger than two inches square. Eleven gauge wire strands meet U.S. Government minimum requirements for the woven part of the fence, but nine- or six-




Figure 73 a, b
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


Figure 73 a, b & c. Proper security lighting contributes a great deal towards a secure and safe environment. Note that all points of entry, walk ways, and natural shadow areas have been adequately illuminated (Courtesy of General Electric, Lamp Marketing Department).

gauge wire offers a higher level of protection and lasts longer. Individual needs must be assessed in this respect.

A chain link fence, to be effective, must be properly installed. The chain link fabric must be tight and securely affixed to well-anchored posts. The bottom of the fence must be such that one cannot readily crawl under it, and special attention must be given to areas such as where creeks pass under the fence. To minimize the chance of an intruder climbing over the fence, barbed wire at a 45 degree angle may be

installed, preferably angled outward, or a product such as Razor Ribbon® may be used (see Figure 74a, 74b and 74c). As added protection, various security systems may be installed (see Figure 76).

VISUAL BARRIERS

Clear zones are important. Although trees and large shrubs are beautiful, they are visual barriers and offer places of concealment for an intruder. Every effort should be made to create a clear zone around the building, a clear area through which an intruder must pass, without the benefit of cover, in order to penetrate. Additionally, the area should be well lighted as was indicated previously.

AUTOMATIC GARAGE DOOR OPENERS

Automatic garage door openers are a desirable security aid because they eliminate the necessity of alighting from one's vehicle to open the garage door, thus subjecting themselves to an unnecessary and preventable attack. This is an important consideration, because case studies have shown that many terrorist attacks, such as abductions and assassinations, have occurred as the victim entered or alighted a vehicle at a place of employment or at home. Many automatic garage door openers turn the garage lights on automatically as the door opens and then extinguishes them a few minutes after the door closes, thus allowing one time to enter the building after parking.

SMOKE DETECTORS AND FIRE EXTINGUISHERS

Fire protection is an important safety consideration that cannot legitimately be neglected. Two inexpensive and readily available tools that offer tremendous protection are *electronic smoke detectors* and portable *fire extinguishers*.

Electronic Smoke Detectors are a valuable investment because, when properly placed and when functioning correctly, they will detect the particles of combustion, often before the fire has reached the flame stage. Smoke detectors have proven to be so valuable as a life-saving device within the home that many states now have codes requiring their installation in new construction of homes, apartments and mobile homes.

The two most common types of detectors in use for residential purposes are *photoelectrics*, which see smoke, and *ionization-chamber*





Figure 74 a, b, c
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


Figure 74 a, b & c. Razor Ribbon® in place of barbed wire on top of a fence deters those inclined to attempt climbing the fence (Courtesy of American Security Fence Corporation).

detectors, which *smell* smoke. The photoelectric units feature a small light beam (internally) that detects smoke particles entering the unit, and the alarm, usually an ear piercing buzzer, activates. The ionization-chamber units feature a tiny trace of radioactive (safe) matter that ionizes air in a small chamber, thus creating an electric current in it. Smoke particles, even though invisible when entering the unit, disturb the current and the alarm sounds.

Both photoelectric and ionization-chamber units offer valuable and reliable protection when properly placed within the home and maintained according to the manufacturer's instructions. Units are available that operate from battery power, others may be wired into the building's electrical system. Both offer valuable protection. *Most* residential fires do not interrupt the electrical system soon enough to prevent a warning, although some people prefer the battery operated units for this reason.

Smoke detectors feature a test button that should be depressed each week to ensure that the alarm works. However, testing in this manner only ensures that the buzzer is working. To determine that the smoke sensing unit is properly functioning, one may blow cigarette smoke into the unit or light a match under it and allow the smoke to drift up into the unit after the match has been extinguished. The alarm, after sounding, will usually reset itself after the smoke clears the unit. Only about 10—20 seconds is normally required for this.

Because smoke rises, detectors should be positioned at high points such as on the ceiling or on a wall near the ceiling. When placing the units, care should be taken to avoid areas where heat vents or cold air return vents would serve to prevent smoke from reaching and activating the detector, thus delaying the warning. Desirable locations for detectors are outside bedrooms, at the tops of stairs and in hallways. The kitchen is not desirable because cooking odors have a tendency to cause false alarms.

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) states that it normally takes a person three minutes to escape from a burning home at night. Unfortunately, a fire may often require that one be out in less time if survival is to be assured. A firebomb situation, for example, would greatly reduce the available time to clear the residence. A smoke detector, by providing an early warning, will greatly increase one's chances in this respect. The NFPA estimates that if one has a single detector placed just outside the bedroom door, one has a 40 percent chance of receiving notice early enough to have enough time to escape. In the event that a smoke detector is placed at each level, such as the

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Fire Exting

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basement and first and second floors, the chances are increased to an attractive 88 percent.

A family plan is important in the event a fire should occur. The following plan is a basic one and should be modified according to any threat that may be prevalent. It is desirable to bear in mind that at least one assassination was committed with a firearm when the victim ran from his burning home after the assassin set fire to it.

Family members should decide on an escape route, along with a secondary route as a precaution against the primary being impassable. The escape route should then be practiced on a periodic basis. Fire drills are important. Included in the plan should be a designated meeting area at which all members should congregate so that they may be accounted for. No attempt should be made to call the police or fire department from within the burning structure as fatal gasses can kill one with just a couple of breaths. It is recommended, therefore, that a neighbor's phone be used. The little time that could be saved by attempting to call from the burning home is an expensive gamble when human life is at stake.

Fire Extinguishers are available in a wide variety of types of sizes. Types vary according to the type of burning material they will extinguish such as paper or flammable liquids, or one of these products burning in close proximity to electrical apparatus. Sizes range from very small units to ones so large and heavy as to require a cart with wheels. The value of a fire extinguisher is being able to extinguish small fires before they become large. However, one should be aware that many serious fires have gotten out of hand because of a delay in calling the fire department because someone attempted to fight the fire themselves and called only after they failed in their efforts. Generally, if one is absolutely sure that he can extinguish the blaze immediately, this should be done. However, if any doubt exists, it is advisable to call the fire department immediately.

In the event of a fire, human life should always be regarded as most valuable. A structure destroyed can be replaced; human life cannot.

ELECTRONIC ALARM SYSTEMS

General Considerations

There is a wide variety of electronic alarm types that offer many forms of physical protection depending upon one's specific needs. Because this field is highly specialized, since individual needs vary considerably, and because there are ever increasing modifications and advancements

to electronic security alarm systems, only a very basic discussion is appropriate here for purposes of familiarization. When examining the various types of alarm systems, it is important to remember that the appropriateness of each is dependent upon the specific needs and circumstances involved. Ultrasonic, for example, which produces high frequency sound and utilizes the Doppler principle to detect movement within an area, is highly effective in some settings and of little or no use in areas featuring disturbances, such as strong air currents or drafts.

An alarm system consists basically of a (1) *sensor*, (2) *control* and (3) *alarm*. The sensor is the portion of the alarm that actually detects the condition being guarded against whether it be an intruder, a fire or perhaps a sprinkler system valve being tampered with. There are numerous types of sensor devices, the more common of which will be briefly discussed in this section. The control, in response to the signal generated by the sensor, activates the alarm. The alarm may consist of lights, a loud horn or gong on the protected premises, or it may be a signal that is located at a municipal fire or police station or a privately owned central station. Furthermore, the alarm may consist of more than one type of signal activating simultaneously.

Alarm systems are very useful and provide a great deal of protection when properly engineered in accordance with the specific needs and circumstances under which they are to be used, and when the installation and maintenance is proper.

Types of Systems

Alarm systems can be categorized in the following manner:

1. Local Alarms
2. Central Station Alarms
3. Proprietary Alarms
4. Police Connections

Local alarms are those that simply activate an alarm (gong or horn) on the protected premises. Systems of this type are generally calculated to startle an intruder and frighten him away before his transgression can be accomplished. Although the local systems do offer a certain degree of protection, they suffer certain limitations. First, the intruder will know in some cases specifically what he intends to accomplish and have determined that he will have sufficient time, after activating the alarm, to accomplish his intended act and depart before anyone responds to the

alarm. In remote areas, there are many reasons.

Central Station Alarms are used because the alarm is located at a central station. The response time is usually very fast. There are instances where there are instantaneous response times. Complete a central station alarm response time is usually very fast.

The central station alarm sounds in advance of the alarm. However, it is not a true alarm) so that the alarm is not apprehended.

Proprietary Alarms are those that the alarm is a proprietary system. The alarm is on the premises. The location. Such as large industrial plants, central locations, security agencies.

Police Connections are those in the local police department. That and, when a program such as personnel to

Having very current use, systems. The

1. Perimeter
2. Space
3. Spot

Perimeter Alarms are those that, in simple terms, attempt is made of hardware include the

alarm. In remote areas such a system is of little value for obvious reasons.

Central Station Alarm systems offer a high degree of protection because the alarm terminates at a manned central station away from the protected premises via telephone lines or by radio signal. Although the response time is often almost immediate with a central station system, there are instances where an intruder will have calculated that he can complete a certain act before anyone can respond, even though the response time may be little more than just minutes.

The central station system may be such that a gong on the premises sounds in addition to the signal being sent to the central station. However, it is common to have no alarm sound on the premises (silent alarm) so that an intruder may unwittingly remain on the premises to be apprehended.

Proprietary Alarm systems are similar to the central station systems in that the alarm signal terminates in an alarm headquarters. With the proprietary system, however, unlike the central station, the alarm center is on the premises being protected rather than at some more distant location. Such a system is often compatible with the security needs of a large industrial complex because security personnel can, from the central location, monitor many areas simultaneously and dispatch security agents and/or contact authorities as the situation may require.

Police connections are systems in which the alarm signal terminates in the local police station. However, not all police jurisdictions permit that and, when they do, there are shortcomings associated with the program such as the frequency of false alarms that can cause police personnel to begin disregarding the seriousness of alarm signals.

Types of Protection

Having very briefly examined the types of alarm systems that are in current use, one must consider the types of protection offered by alarm systems. The various types can be classified as follows:

1. Perimeter (point of entry) protection
2. Space (specific area) protection
3. Spot protection

Perimeter protection, sometimes referred to as point of entry protection, is simply employing the proper sensors to activate an alarm when an attempt is made to gain entry to the protected area. There is a vast array of hardware applicable for this need, the more common of which include the following:



Figure 75. Seismic Processor System (SPS-1), shown being implanted, is an underground electronic system that detects, by the vibrations they produce, persons or vehicles attempting to enter restricted areas. Sensing devices are attached to the processor (left hand) by a cable (Courtesy of GTE Sylvania).

1. *Vibration detectors* are used to detect the presence of a person by sensing the vibrations produced. There are many applications for such equipment. In Figure 75 is shown a system being installed to detect people and vehicles in a perimeter area. Vibration detectors are also used to detect sound vibrations transmitted by a surface through which forced entry is being attempted. Examples of such surfaces include doors, interior and exterior walls, roofs, floors and vaults.

With vibration detectors, according to the frequency of false alarms, anti-intrusion.

As the reader knows, detectors have been used for protection, the perimeter of the

2. *Magnetic* openings such as an alarm signal.

3. *Metallic* inch wide and and open an electrical is cracked or broken.

4. *Wireless* current, laced through the wire alarm. There is a circumvent the however, does chances of a person offers 100 per cent.

5. *Wood* through which The screen is intruder break by severing introduced to

6. *Light* directed across that projects intruder wall unit will project

Early models be seen and an infrared intruder would still had the aware of the the receiving

With vibration detection systems, the sensitivity may be adjusted according to specific needs and they generally have a reasonably low frequency of false alarms. Such systems can be a useful backup for other anti-intrusion systems.

As the reader will observe, although this discussion of vibration detectors has been placed under the section discussing perimeter protection, they can logically be employed to handle security needs at the perimeter or specific objects such as vaults.

2. *Magnetic switches* will open or close an electrical circuit when openings such as doors or windows are compromised, thus activating an alarm signal.

3. *Metallic window foil* is made of a conductive material, about $\frac{1}{2}$ inch wide and, when cemented to window glass, will become severed and open an electrical circuit causing an alarm to sound when the glass is cracked or broken.

4. *Wire lacing* consists of tightly stretched wires, carrying electrical current, laced over openings such as skylights or vents. Anyone cutting through the wires to gain entry will open the circuit and activate the alarm. There have been instances of intruders using additional wire to circumvent those over the opening prior to cutting them. That, however, does involve additional time and serves to deter or increase the chances of apprehension. It also serves to demonstrate that no system offers 100 percent protection.

5. *Wood screens* are basically screens made of wood dowling through which fine wires carrying electrical current have been placed. The screen is secured over openings such as windows or skylights. Any intruder breaking or cutting through the screen will activate the alarm by severing the wires and opening the circuit. Wires may also be introduced to wood panelling to protect walls.

6. *Light beam interruption* is a system whereby a light beam is directed across an area to be protected. On one side of the area is a device that projects the light beam across the area to a receiving unit. If an intruder walks through the beam, thus interrupting it, the receiving unit will produce a signal to activate an alarm.

Early models utilized a visible light beam (photoelectric) that could be seen and avoided by an intruder. An improvement made was to place an infrared filter (opaque to visible light) over the projector so an intruder would not see the beam and subsequently avoid it. That system still had the limitation of being compromised by intruders who were aware of the instrument's location and shined a strong flashlight into the receiving unit while passing through the beam. More recent



Figure 76. The post just inside the perimeter fence contains a laser beam system that protects the entire perimeter of the property to detect anyone who may climb over, or cut through, the fence.

advancement has brought about the *pulse-beam* that cannot be circumvented with a flashlight, because the light beam pulsates at a specific frequency.

Another fairly recent development of this concept is utilizing a light emitting diode that can project an invisible light beam up to 1,000 feet, a beam that cannot be defeated by an intruder easily. This latter device is referred to as a *laser beam*. These units commonly feature standby power to provide protection during power interruptions (see Figure 76).

Space protection, referred to as specific area protection, consists of proper utilization of sensing devices to detect an intruder's presence in

an interior space. The more complex the system, the more comprehensive the protection.

1. *Audio* protection systems are active components that are only when a system is the responding party. They may also get triggered by a sound.

2. *Sonic* protection systems that are receptive to echoes from sound waves. They subsequently detect a small disturbance such as a small object to minor disturbances.

3. *Ultrasonic* protection systems detected by the principle of sound. More than one sound wave of the size of the space and walls and is a sound wave.

4. *Micro* shift principle ultrasonic sound spectrum properly engineered to protect to motion outside the space.

5. *Photo* protection to space protection.

6. *Vibrational* protection for space protection.

Spot protection such as a safe, acts, at night, day it may be and space protection.

Spot protection referred to as establishing

an interior space. There are many types of systems applicable for this, the more common of which include the following:

1. *Audio detectors* consist of microphones installed in the space to be protected, the sounds to be received at another location. Some systems are active constantly while others will activate and transmit a signal only when a certain condition exists. One of the advantages of such a system is the ability to monitor an intruder's activity and keep responding personnel appropriately appraised of the situation. One may also get an indication as to the number of intruders.

2. *Sonic detectors* produce sound in the sonic range (700-800 Hz) that is received by a monitor which perceives an interruption of the *echoes* from stationary objects when an intruder is present. An alarm subsequently sounds. This type of system is often appropriate for spaces such as a small store or storage area. This system tends to be less sensitive to minor disturbances, such as air currents, than are some other types of systems.

3. *Ultrasonic detectors* emit inaudible sound (too high to be detected by the human ear) and utilize the *Doppler frequency shift* principle to detect an intruder's movement within a protected space. More than one transmitter/receiver may be needed depending upon the size of the space to be protected. This system does not readily penetrate walls and is appropriate for *most* enclosed spaces.

4. *Microwave detectors* (radar) operate on the *Doppler frequency shift* principle just as do the ultrasonic systems. Instead of utilizing ultrasonic sound waves, this system utilizes electromagnetic waves in the spectrum above 890 megacycles per second. It is necessary to properly engineer the installation of the system to the area being protected to prevent or control wave penetration through walls where motion outside the protected space could cause an alarm.

5. *Photoelectric* and *laser* systems, previously discussed, also apply to space protection.

6. *Vibration detectors*, previously discussed, also have application for space protection.

Spot protection is utilized in those instances where a specific object, such as a safe or file cabinet, must be protected. Such a system usually acts, at night, as a back up for a space or perimeter system. During the day it may be used as a primary means of protection when the perimeter and space alarms are inactive.

Spot protection of metallic objects is commonly achieved with what is referred to as a *capacitance alarm*. A capacitance alarm operates by establishing an electrical field around the object, a field that will be

interrupted when someone touches or gets too close to the object. It is possible to protect one object, such as a safe, or several objects, such as a row of filing cabinets, with a system of this nature.

This system can be arranged to activate any kind of an alarm signal, including the activation of a closed circuit television camera (CCTV) so as to document the intruder's actions.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) (see Figure 77a, b, c) offers unlimited potential in the field of physical security and protective services. Such cameras may be strategically located inside or outside a building, either openly or concealed. Cameras for outside use may be mounted in a protective housing, and all cameras can be affixed to a pan/tilt base that is operable from the security office.

HOTEL AND MOTEL SECURITY

There are a number of uncertainties, and therefore security problems, that manifest themselves when considering a stay in a hotel or motel. Although one can attempt to learn who else will be lodging on the premises and within adjoining rooms during the period of time in question, only a partial degree of success will often be realized. Additionally, there is no way to know how many room keys are in unauthorized hands. The problem is further compounded by the fact that sometimes a room key will fit more than one room lock.

When staying in a hotel, it is desirable to have a floor plan prepared by the advance person(s) depicting the executive's suite and all exits and the routes to same. It is advisable to also make notations depicting the location of other important items such as the location of fire extinguishers and telephones.

When conditions permit, it is desirable to obtain adjoining rooms with a door connecting them. That allows the executive to have the desired privacy, yet the security provided by security agents in the adjoining room. In that respect, the connecting door should remain closed but not locked.

Many hotels feature door locks that enable the room occupant to render the lock inoperative to all keys except an emergency key. That helps to protect against someone who has obtained a second key. Unfortunately, that still leaves the lock operable by anyone having access to the emergency key. The quality of the hotel key control cannot logically be relied upon. For that reason a portable travel lock is a useful accessory item to carry in one's luggage.

Travel locks are offered in different designs by various manufacturers

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but, they all operate on the same basic principle. In Figure 78a, b and c is illustrated a Port-A-Lock® that, while not expensive, offers added protection. As will be noted, one end of the lock engages the striker plate after which the door is closed and the locking head is slid forward to secure the door. A second portable travel lock is advisable when there is a door adjoining two rooms, and the second room is not occupied by security personnel.

Another useful security aid that can be carried in one's luggage when traveling is a portable burglar alarm that can be hung on the doorknob inside the hotel room as depicted in Figure 79. This instrument is a *capacitance alarm*, which, when hung on the metal door knob of a nonmetal door, creates an electronic field around the door knob that is interrupted when someone touches the outside knob. Disturbance of the field causes the alarm to sound. One or two such alarms will be needed for the same reasons discussed for portable travel locks.

When the executive is in the hotel room, procedures must be established to prevent someone from employing a guise to cause the door to be opened, thus exposing the executive to an attack. This may involve surveillance both inside and outside the building. Door viewers, when installed, are useful. If there is not a guard posted outside the door and there is a knock, security personnel from another room should establish that all is in proper order before the executive's door is opened.

Hotel rooms are cleaned daily by the maid service. Under no circumstances should such personnel be permitted to enter the room unescorted. Ideally, one known member of the staff should be designated to service the room and even then such a person should be closely supervised while in the room. This will guard against an unauthorized person's being given access to the room to wait in ambush or for an explosive charge to be planted.

Entering the hotel by a route other than through the main lobby or by a route that would not logically be presumed by a potential attacker should be given serious consideration. When entering the hotel, a security agent should enter each area ahead of the executive to ensure that it is clear and safe.

Elevators can usually be set to stop at one designated floor, bypassing all others. If the priority of the situation is sufficient to justify it and if there is more than one elevator, it is possible to provide security personnel with a key to operate the elevator so that a designated one may be used, and when in use, it will not stop for elevator calls at other floors. Although these measures are not uncommon when political dignitaries are concerned, it is not common with executive protection.





Figure 77A, B,
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



Figure 77A, B, C. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras are applicable for a wide range of security needs. (A) Indoor fixed mount camera (courtesy of Pelco Sales, Inc.). (B) CCTV camera in a protective housing, featuring a remote control pan/tilt, surveils the surrounding grounds and parking area. (C) Close up view of camera in "B"



Figure 78A,B.
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


Figure 78A,B,C. Portable travel locks such as that shown offer additional security on overnight trips at modest cost.

When using an elevator, consideration should be given to taking it to a floor above or below the one desired and then using the stairs the remaining distance. The reason for that is simply the fact that if an attacker is waiting in the vicinity of the elevators at the desired floor, upon arriving one is extremely vulnerable standing cornered in the open elevator. When using the stairs, the executive should be preceded by a security agent and should also stay to the outside of the stairwell so that an armed attacker will not get as great an opportunity for a clear shot from above or below.

When staying for several days at a hotel, some means of securing vehicles must be established when they are unused. It may be necessary to post a guard on them. Also, it is desirable to leave and arrive at somewhat varied times and park in varied spots as well.



Figure 79. Portable burglar alarm is a capacitance alarm that can be hung on the doorknob at home or in a hotel or motel room. It will sound when the outside doorknob is touched (Courtesy of Regal Ware, Inc.).

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COUNTERSURVEILLANCE AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Before an individual or terrorist group makes an actual attempt to assassinate or abduct a person, a great deal of time will be devoted to gathering information about the victim, such information to be used to plan the attack. The information needed will be somewhat varied, and the sources from which it is obtained will depend upon the status and position of the intended victim. Also, the resources of the attacker will influence the methods and sources used to gather information.

It has been learned that, in the past, attackers gathered a great deal of their information through such sources as the victim's family (a pretext phone call for example), the victim's place of employment, public records and documents, newspapers, physical surveillance of the victim, as well as surveillance of his home and place of employment. Methods of electronic surveillance are also used at times.

In this chapter we will examine the security problems presented by employees of an executive's firm in regard to information leaks and the methods of reducing such threats. We will also examine briefly how sensitive information or papers should be handled and disposed of when not in use. Attention will be given to methods of physical surveillance and countersurveillance as well as to conventional methods of electronic surveillance and countermeasures. Although the discussion of the latter (electronic surveillance) is an oversimplification of the problem, it will serve to provide the reader with a general understanding of the problem.

PERSONNEL HAZARDS

Without a doubt, the greatest hazard presented to a company's sensitive information is that of its employees. Employees present a risk to proprietary information primarily through such things as loose talk

resulting from company pride in processes or products or thoughtlessness in talking about information without being aware of its confidential nature. There is also the danger of information being discussed where it can be overheard by unauthorized persons. Employees may also disclose information as a result of bribes, blackmail, or a desire for revenge for such things as having been passed over on a promotion, a feeling of being underpaid or a generally unsatisfactory relationship with management. In some instances the employee may have secured a job for the sole purpose of obtaining the desired information.

PERSONNEL SECURITY MEASURES

The number of possible security measures that may be considered for safeguarding against personnel hazards are many, and it will usually be found that the security program will involve not one but a combination of several considerations. Initially one should consider and develop a *need to know* policy. If there are employees who have no need to know about certain information, they should not be permitted to possess it. In some cases it is necessary for an employee to possess part of the information regarding a certain program, but not all of it. When this is the case, he should possess only that information which is essential to the performance of his job. For every individual who possesses or has access to sensitive information that he does not need, the threat of a security leak is compounded. When it is necessary for certain individuals to possess secret information, they should be made aware of its sensitive nature and given instruction as to how such information is to be treated.

Companies who stand to lose a great deal, should they have an employee misusing sensitive information, cannot afford to hire and promote personnel without carefully scrutinizing their life-style and background. Pre- and postemployment investigations will often serve to disclose one's associations with undesirable organizations. Also, if a prospective employee or an employee being considered for promotion to a sensitive position is found to be living a life-style that exceeds his means, he will be vulnerable to bribes. Similarly, if an individual is a problem drinker or prone towards other indiscretions, he will tend to be more vulnerable to extortion. It is for such reasons that pre- and postpersonnel investigations are important. The cost of such investigations is inconsequential when compared to what many companies stand to lose should their proprietary information be misused. Something as simple as an executive's travel plans should be considered proprietary, and it takes little imagination to know how sensitive such information

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


Figure 80. A secure means of storing confidential documents is essential. Illustrated is but one means of accomplishing such a task.

would be in the hands of a terrorist group planning to abduct or assassinate the individual.

PHYSICAL SECURITY OF CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

Not totally unrelated to the hazards presented to confidential information by persons is the consideration of the physical security of documents containing such information. The *need to know* policy was discussed, and proper security of documents is an essential part of such a program. It stands to reason that one cannot implement and enforce such a policy and expect it to be successful if the material is available for all to read. Consequently, provisions must be made for the safeguarding of all documents and printed matter reflecting confidential information. When such documents are not actually in use, they should be locked in

quality filing cabinets with high quality locking devices (see Figure 80). This is important. It is also desirable that confidential documents be appropriately marked so that they can be readily identified as such. This will help to ensure that they are treated and handled according to policy.

Assuming that the documents have been marked according to policy and also that they are contained in quality cabinets, it is then important that the filing cabinets be located in an area that affords the degree of physical security which is consistent with the particular needs. If the information is of an extremely sensitive nature, it may be desirable to post a guard to control entry to the area. A proper and strict identification policy is recommended for such areas. When there are visitors, they should be required to sign in and out and also to wear an appropriate visitor identification tag. It may be necessary in some cases to have a trained guard escort guests and service personnel.

DISPOSAL OF PROPRIETARY WASTE

How confidential documents are handled is very important, but of equal importance is how such documents are disposed of when their usefulness has expired but the information still remains sensitive. It is a well-known fact that rummaging through trash is a good source of intelligence data, and anyone seeking a company's proprietary information will certainly not overlook it.

The best method for disposal of waste material will depend upon various circumstances, but one of the best methods to date is to feed the documents into a shredding machine (as depicted in Figure 81). If the papers are destroyed by burning, it is important that the fire be attended until all papers are totally consumed.

Finally, the person or persons responsible for destroying confidential documents must be trustworthy, for they are in a unique position to effectuate a compromise.

DEFENSIVE METHODS AGAINST ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING

General Considerations

While the scope of this book does not permit an indepth and detailed discussion of the interception of wire and oral communications, also known as electronic *eavesdropping* or *audiosurveillance*, and the defense methods against such practices, a brief discussion of the basic

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Figure 81. Paper shredding is one of the surest means of destroying documents containing sensitive information. Pictured is the Super Speed Model 33 which is capable of shredding up to 1,000 pounds of paper per hour (Courtesy of Electric Wastebasket Corporation).

conventional methods of electronic surveillance and appropriate countermeasures will be useful.

Although there are many obstacles that make the job of the electronic eavesdropper a challenging task, the basic concept of *conventional* techniques is not difficult. In fact, almost anyone with a basic

understanding of electricity and communications systems will find that he has the necessary background for such practices, at least on an elementary level.

There are federal laws regulating and limiting such activities as bugging a room or tapping a telephone line. The federal laws were enacted because of a need, and the penalty is severe if one is found to be in violation. When convicted, one may not only be penalized by the criminal court, but he is civilly liable for damages arising from his illegal activities. This discussion is to aid one in understanding the threat to better defend against it. The reader should be cautioned also about the risk of electrocution when engaging in debugging activities; therefore, extreme care must be exercised when examining unknown wires.

When one desires to intercept wire or oral communications, there are basically three methods that may be employed:

1. Tapping the telephone line.
2. Concealing a microphone and its wires on the premises.
3. Concealing a radio transmitter on the premises.

There is a wide range of equipment one may employ, depending upon his degree of sophistication and the money with which he has to operate, but the basic essentials necessary for eavesdropping can often be purchased over the counter by anyone for a modest cost. Much of the equipment that is manufactured *specifically* for eavesdropping is very expensive and not available to the average citizen. Such equipment and the promotional literature for it are often available only to bonafide law enforcement agencies upon written request on their official letterhead.

Some of the more conventional eavesdropping equipment includes automatic voice starters that will activate a tape recorder when a predetermined level of sound is present and then will automatically stop the recorder when the sound ceases. Telephone line recorders do the same job as an automatic voice starter, except in this case they activate a tape recorder involved in a telephone tap. Telephone number decoders will print the time, date and number dialed each time the telephone in question is used. Finally, there is an array of miscellaneous items, such as miniature microphones and radio transmitters, built into such things as cigarette lighters and pens. Telephone lineman's test sets are also useful to the eavesdropper.

WIRE TAPS

To monitor conversations being conducted over the telephone system

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is not difficult and can be accomplished by using an induction coil, which does not require than an actual physical connection be made to the line. To make a physical tap is not difficult, and the equipment needed is very minimal. This is not to infer, however, that some eavesdroppers do not use some very expensive and highly sophisticated equipment. An *amaturish* physical tap can be accomplished using nothing more than an earphone, a capacitor in series with that earphone and a set of alligator clips to connect to the desired wires. The capacitor serves to eliminate the excessive drop in the level of volume that could serve to alert the subject to the existence of a tap. The earphone can be replaced with a tape recorder or a radio transmitter. One may also use a standard telephone lineman's test set.

Generally, the eavesdropper will attempt to tap a telephone line at a time when the phone is not in use by the subscriber. That is done as a precautionary measure against the subscriber's hearing a distinctive click, which could serve to make him suspicious.

At this point the reader should understand that when seeking out a phone tap, one is seeking any device that is foreign to the telephone system. The next question is where a tap may be installed.

Whether the telephone line has been tapped by use of an induction coil, by means of a capacitance-coupling, which is simply the wrapping of leads around the telephone lines to pick up the effects of the magnetic field that builds up around a wire carrying an electrical current, or by means of a physical connection, there are only certain points at which that may effectively be accomplished. Some of the locations are more readily accessible than others, and the person charged with the task of locating the tap must be very thorough in his physical search if detection is to be ensured.

The eavesdropper, if he has access to a building, may install his equipment at any point between the telephone and the terminal box on the side of the building. If the tapper does not have access to a building, he may attach his apparatus at either the terminal box on the outside of the building, where the line connects to the telephone pole, or at the junction box where the subscriber's wires join a cable route. To tap at the junction box, however, requires one to have a very good understanding of what he is doing, and only an experienced eavesdropper will normally be found to tap a line at that point. The practitioner with less experience will generally choose to install the tap at some point between the telephone itself and the point where the wires leading from the building reach the telephone pole. If the telephone to be tapped is in an apartment building, the eavesdropper's task is simplified because the

terminal box is usually in a utility room that is easily accessible. While a subscriber's telephone can be monitored in the central office of the telephone company, it is beyond the scope of the security officer's responsibility to actually check that location, and the appropriate official within the telephone company should be contacted if such a tap is suspected. Furthermore, it is *highly unlikely* that an illegal phone tap would be conducted from the telephone company premises.

This nontechnical discussion of how a telephone line is tapped should serve to make the reader realize that there is nothing magical or mysterious about wire tapping, because the *basic principles* are indeed simple. However, some of the equipment employed and the implementation of same can be sophisticated.

HIDDEN MICROPHONES AND RADIO TRANSMITTERS

In a conventional telephone tap, only those conversations actually being conducted over the telephone may be monitored. In many cases that will not produce the desired results if all conversations taking place upon the premises in question are deemed to be of interest to the eavesdropper. When faced with such a situation, the eavesdropper may decide to conceal, on the premises, one or more microphones or radio transmitters as an alternative to tapping the telephone line. In some cases he may do both, depending upon the circumstances, and the security officer charged with combatting that should not assume that if one condition is found to exist, the other does not.

The eavesdropper planting a microphone or radio transmitter is faced with some very definite problems, and it is to the security officer's advantage to recognize what those problems are, since his task of locating such devices will be easier as a result.

The security officer should also recognize that the eavesdropper will in some cases make a minor alteration to the wiring within a telephone so that its microphone will become active and, consequently, pick up all sounds within a reasonable distance from the unit. The eavesdropper can then tap the telephone line in the usual manner and monitor conversations taking place near or over the telephone. Detection of that type of alteration is not difficult and will be discussed later in this section.

Bugging a room using a microphone can present obvious problems in all but unique situations because of the necessity of concealing the wire, which must travel between the microphone and the recording or

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transmitting apparatus. It is for that reason that the radio transmitters are often preferred by electronic eavesdroppers.

There is a wide range of sizes and quality among transmitters. One can make a cheap transmitter from an inexpensive walkie talkie unit, or he may choose to make one from a schematic drawing. Also available to anyone over the counter are low quality transmitters that operate on the FM radio band and may be monitored from 100 to 300 feet away using any FM radio. Those transmitters are not advertised as a clandestine eavesdropping device but, rather, are described as such things as remote and wireless microphones, remote babysitters, and so forth (see Figure 82).

In spite of the small size of many eavesdropping devices, placement where they will not only avoid detection but where they will be most efficient in picking up and transmitting the desired sounds is not always an easy task. If the bug is placed on the floor under a piece of furniture such as a sofa or easy chair, the sound of people walking about and moving furniture will have a tendency to obliterate any conversations that may occur within the area. Similarly, if the bug is placed inside a sofa or under a bed, the squeaking of the springs will often interfere with good pickup and transmission. Air conditioners, fans, radios and television sets also serve to interfere with the efficiency of a bug.

Hidden Microphones

When the security officer is called upon to search a room or building for electronic eavesdropping devices, he will be concerned with telephone taps, hidden radio transmitters and hidden microphones. In this section, locating and disposing of hidden microphones will be discussed. It should be pointed out at this time that, while there are a number of electronic aids for debugging, *the most important phase of any debugging operation is the physical search.*

Early in the search, the security officer should endeavor to learn who previously occupied the room or building. If only a portion of the building is occupied, it is important to know who else occupies the building, especially those in adjoining spaces. If there are others who operate within the building, anyone having recently moved in should be carefully scrutinized, especially if they have moved into an adjoining space.

When searching for electronic eavesdropping devices, one should not be misled by devices that may have been left as *decoys*, bugs intended to lead the security officer into thinking that he has found and disposed of




Figure 82. Low quality miniature FM radio transmitter has a range of 100 - 300 feet. Pen included for size comparison.

the threat. An eavesdropper will at times place one or more dummy bugs hoping that the security officer will find them, discontinue the search, and thus overlook the real thing.

All lines and wires leading into and about the building should be examined and scrutinized. A volt-ohm meter is necessary for this purpose. It is important that the lines be checked out and established to be what they are purported to be; for example, are such things as electrical lines, telephone lines, thermostat wires and intercommunication wires actually operational? The security officer should check the lines for the presence of voltage and then for the presence of audio frequencies. It is desirable to also check the wires for the presence of radio frequencies by use of an untuned radio frequency (R-F) detector. If one encounters wires he cannot explain and they are suspicious in nature, it may serve well to set up a distinctive sound within the various spaces in question and check the wires for the presence of that sound.

When searching for hidden microphones, one may employ what is called a *supersonic frequency generator*, a device that will cause nearby microphones to heterodyne and emit an audible squeal. Another technique one may employ when dealing with wires that are believed to be connected to a microphone whose location is not known is to connect an *audio generator*, which is simply an electronic oscillator, to the line and listen for the sound emitted by the microphone, which will be acting as a speaker.

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As stated, a very thorough and systematic search of the premises is essential to detect hidden microphones, in addition to the electronic aids. One should closely examine carpeting for slits along the edges, the inside of furniture, lighting fixtures, the underside of covers of electrical outlets, the inside of false ceilings (one may find a hidden closed circuit TV camera there), wall paneling, the inside of air vents, and anywhere one's imagination will lead. Any signs of recent construction should be scrutinized very carefully.

Hidden Radio Transmitters

Just as was the case when searching for hidden microphones, the search for hidden radio transmitters must include both a question of prior occupancy and a very thorough physical search of the premises. When conducting the search, realize that transmitters must be placed to efficiently pick up sounds. Also, the antenna must be properly positioned to efficiently transmit the radio signal. The security officer should also understand that the transmitter may not necessarily be transmitting constantly but may transmit only at certain times. When the transmitter is not transmitting, *only* a physical search will reveal its presence. When it is transmitting, however, use of a radio frequency detector will prove a useful tool.

It will be found that many, but by no means all, eavesdropping transmitters operate within a frequency range of between about 72mc. and about 150mc. Radio frequency detectors are untuned and will detect a radio frequency range much in excess of this limited range.

The use of radio frequency detectors is not difficult. Most devices must be calibrated each time they are used, a procedure that is quite simple and is discussed in the instruction manual provided with each unit. Assuming, however, that one is using such a tool and has calibrated it according to the manufacturer's instructions, he will begin moving slowly about the area to be searched, keeping the probe as close as possible to the walls, floor, ceiling, wherever it is suspected a miniature radio transmitter could be (see Figure 83). Furniture should not be overlooked. It is important to move slowly, for a rapid motion may cause one to miss a reaction of the unit. When examining radio frequency detectors, it will be found that some provide only an audible indication when a signal is received, some provide only a visual indication, and some feature both.

With the use of a radio frequency detector, such things as a passing patrol car, taxi cab, or CB radio may cause a momentary reaction of the




Figure 83. Inexpensive radio frequency detector. This instrument is untuned and will respond to radio signals within a frequency range from below 25mc. to above 600mc.

detector. Such transmissions generally cause little problem because of their short duration, however.

Radio frequency detectors are also useful for detecting radio transmitters that are connected to the telephone system and intended to transmit only when the telephone is in use. The security officer, to detect such a transmitter, simply places the probe against the telephone line and lifts the receiver from its cradle. A slight rise in the needle reading is normal. A sharp rise is cause for suspicion and should be investigated. If such a bug is not found within the telephone itself, one should carefully

trace out the line.

If it is suspected that there are hidden premises but the professional is not sure that the transmitter is in the room, many of them will use a radio, one may be in question. The stereo set. On and slowly operating with. In the event of taking the radio when it comes to location can be once the apparatus. This test may be of frequency.

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The security should be a vibration meter or suction cup will be picked up dropper to microphone sticking the wall and a

trace out the line, since the transmitter could be as much as 50 feet away.

If it is suspected that there may be a hidden radio transmitter on the premises but one does not have access to a radio frequency detector, a less professional approach would be to use an FM radio, assuming of course, that the transmitter is operating within the FM frequency range as many of them do. To detect the presence of a transmitter by use of a radio, one must simply set up a distinctive sound within the area in question. The sound may consist of nothing more than a record upon a stereo set. One then begins tuning the radio on either end of the band and slowly scans the entire band. If there is a hidden transmitter operating within the frequency range, it will be picked up on the radio. In the event a transmitter is detected, its location can be pinpointed by taking the radio about the premises because it will howl from feedback when it comes near the transmitter. Fine pinpointing of the transmitter's location can better be accomplished by turning the radio volume down once the approximate location of the transmitter has been established. This test may be performed using a radio, or radios, featuring a number of frequency bands.

TELEPHONE "HOT MIKE"

It was mentioned earlier that an eavesdropper will at times alter the wiring within a telephone so that the microphone will become live and pick up all sounds within its range. To determine if a telephone has undergone such an alteration, the security officer must simply remove the mouthpiece and check with a volt-ohm meter to determine if there is a current passing through the transmitter microphone contacts while the telephone switch is in the *hung up* position. If there is, the telephone has been tampered with and the telephone company should be notified.

CONTACT MICROPHONES

The security officer, when searching for eavesdropping devices, should be aware of the existence of contact microphones, also known as vibration microphones. Such microphones often feature either a spike or suction cup that is placed in contact with a surface, whose vibrations will be picked up by the microphone. They are used by the eavesdropper to listen through such things as window panes by placing the microphone against the glass or by sitting in an adjoining room and by sticking the spike of the microphone through a hole in one side of the wall and against the wall of the adjoining room, which acts as a




Figure 84. A variety of eavesdropping devices, some of which have been found concealed within a firm's lamps. (1), (2), (3) and (4) are radio transmitters. (5) is a fountain pen microphone; (6) is a miniature microphone and (7) is an ultraminiature microphone. The round disc it rests upon is a penny included for size comparison.

diaphragm for any sounds within. If one is conducting a conversation in a room and fears the possible presence of such a device, he will do well to place a radio or television set so that its speakers are directed towards the suspect wall or door. Figures 84 and 85 illustrate a variety of eavesdropping devices with which the security officer could come into contact and with which he should be familiar.

DEFEATING EAVESDROPPING EFFORTS

Because of the time, cost and uncertainty often associated with detecting and neutralizing eavesdropping devices, the decision is sometimes made to operate as if a device were present and simply take appropriate measures to render its interceptions unintelligible. That




Figure 85. A variety of eavesdropping devices, including a vibration microphone (1), a transmitter (2), a monitor (3), a phone (4), and a transmitter (5).

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


Figure 85. A variety of eavesdropping devices. (1) audio amplifier (2) spike mike (vibration microphone) (3) long-range radio transmitter (4) induction coil alleged to pick up telephone conversations up to 4 feet from the phone (5) FM transmitter (quarter included for size comparison) (6) auto line (telephone) monitor (7) regular telephone microphone (8) combination telephone microphone and FM transmitter (operates only when telephone is in use) (9) body transmitter (10) spike mike (vibration microphone).

may be done in lieu of searching for the device or as a precautionary measure in case a search has failed to uncover an existing device.

With *protective* rather than *detective* measures one commonly employs some means by which to *mask* the communications or to conduct the sensitive communications in a specially constructed space from which a radio signal cannot transmit. Masking may be accomplished by generating audible sounds, such as scrambled human speech or by generating a radio signal that will interfere with the effective transmission and reception of any clandestine transmitting devices that may be present. FCC regulations prohibit the latter within the United States, but it is permissible in some other parts of the world. The

effectiveness of r-f protection devices is not always as great as one would desire, however.

The protective measures most appropriate must be determined by a *competent* specialist in accordance with existing conditions. In determining whether to attempt negating the effectiveness of eavesdropping devices, it must be considered what the consequences will be should certain information fall into the wrong hands. As with all loss control and protective efforts, the cost of implementing safeguards, to be justified, must not outweigh the savings. Good judgment does not dictate spending a dollar to save a dime.

PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE AND COUNTERSURVEILLANCE

General Considerations

Physical surveillance may best be defined as the secret visual observation of persons, their vehicles and their premises. There are many techniques and methods to this art that one must understand before any reasonably proficient effort can be made to detect and thwart a surveillance. Understanding surveillance and countersurveillance is very necessary for anyone involved with an executive protective force for the following reasons:

1. To effectively surveil suspects before and after an attack has occurred.
2. To detect and thwart a surveillance effort (surveillance is the most common method used by an attacker to study his victim and form an attack plan).

For those readers desiring an in-depth discussion of surveillance methods, this author has prepared a book dealing specifically with this topic*.

In this discussion, before going into countersurveillance, an examination will be made of the methods used for foot surveillance of a subject who walks, vehicle surveillance to follow a subject who utilizes some kind of motorvehicle for transportation, and stationary surveillance of a location such as a building and all who frequent it. Finally, an examination will be made of various visual aids used in conducting a physical surveillance.

*Siljander, Raymond P.: *Fundamentals of Physical Surveillance: A Guide for Uniformed and Plainclothes Personnel*. Springfield, Thomas, 1978.

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THE PRELIMINARY SURVEY

Regardless of the type of surveillance one will be conducting, whether it be foot, vehicle, or stationary, a preliminary survey will be made of the area in which the surveillance is expected to take place. The information obtained during the survey will be used to make crucial determinations, such as where to position oneself so as to have an unobstructed view of the subject yet remain unnoticed. A selection of vehicle and dress type may be made depending upon the class and type of neighborhood involved. Also, one can better anticipate what kind of optical visual aids may be used.

The preliminary survey must be accomplished in a manner that does not attract attention or arouse curiosity on the part of anyone in the area. Repeated passes through an area should be avoided, and if several passes must be made, a change of vehicles is highly recommended. In some instances public transportation facilities may prove useful. In yet other instances, taking photographs or motion pictures from a van making a single pass through the area may make subsequent passes unnecessary. Photographic documentation also enables others to study the area without being required to actually visit the location.

VEHICLE SURVEILLANCE

General Considerations

When a subject who is to be followed uses some type of motor vehicle transportation, it is naturally necessary also for the protective team to utilize a motor vehicle. In this endeavor, there are a number of surveillance techniques, variations of which may be employed, depending upon the conditions under which the surveillance is conducted. Some of the factors that will influence the choice of technique or variation thereof are the following:

1. Whether the surveillance is being conducted during daylight hours or at night.
2. The wariness of the person to be followed.
3. The amount of vehicle traffic in the area.
4. The number of protective agents and vehicles assigned to the case.
5. The importance of the case.
6. The physical layout of the area.

In situations where the nature of the case is very serious or important,

the use of two or more surveillance vehicles equipped for effective radio communications is encouraged. Also, it is desirable for each vehicle to be a different color and contain two agents. Assigning two agents to each vehicle allows the driver to concentrate on that important task while the other observes the suspect, records notes and uses the radio when necessary. Also, having a second agent (foot man) reduces the chance of losing the subject in the event that he parks and alights before the surveillance vehicle can be parked.

When a moving surveillance is to be conducted using a motor vehicle, it is important that the driver be proficient and capable of reacting quickly to the ever changing traffic conditions. It is also important that he be willing to drive very aggressively at times to avoid losing the subject. This point is important since many otherwise good agents have failed as surveillants because they were unwilling to drive in the aggressive manner so often necessary. When driving in an aggressive manner, however, the driver must remain very alert and anticipate traffic conditions so that he can drive aggressively yet safely.

When preparing for a vehicle surveillance, it is desirable to have various disguise items in the car, such as a couple of caps and perhaps a pair of glasses. Such simple items allow one to occasionally alter his general appearance. Elaborate disguises should be avoided.

Vehicle Surveillance Techniques

As was previously stated, there are a number of different surveillance techniques that may be used, depending upon the circumstances. These techniques will be discussed; however, before becoming involved with them, it would be desirable to discuss some of the more general aspects of vehicle surveillance.

Naturally, the amount of traffic on the road will have a significant influence on how close the agent can be to the subject without risking detection. Because the possibility of losing the subject increases with an increase in distance between the two vehicles and because the possibility of being detected increases the closer the agent is to the subject, it is desirable to remain as close to the subject as possible to avoid losing him and also to see what he does, but not so close that the possibility of detection becomes unnecessarily great.

When it becomes necessary to drive very close to the subject, as will often be the case in heavy intercity traffic, and when conditions favor it, every effort should be made to utilize the subject's blind spot. The blind spot is that area outside the vision provided by the rear view mirrors and

behind the blind spot, in the event that there is some

When following a vehicle, it is controlled, it is in the control light after the light is faced with the subject, if it disobeys it, or if it parks in a lot, it is in the light, it must be in the other motor

When following a vehicle, it is desirable, if possible, to be in the entrance. The subject. In some cases, rather than the subject, it will be the

Parallel traffic is visible detected by the rear.

When following a vehicle, it is with the subject, it is left. This fact that the agent will watch for the subject between the intersection, the subject may allow this

Utilizing

behind the driver's normal vision. When driving in another driver's blind spot, it is recommended that one be ready to take evasive action in the event that the subject changes lanes. He may do so unaware that there is someone in his path.

When following a subject in an area where intersections are controlled, it is important to anticipate the pending status of each traffic control light being approached to avoid having to contend with a red light after the subject has gone through on the green or yellow. When faced with such a situation, one must decide whether to obey the light, disobey it, or attempt to bypass it by driving through a service station or parking lot if such is available. When the decision is made to disobey the light, it must be done giving full regard to the right-of-way and safety of other motorists.

When the subject of the surveillance turns into a parking lot, it is desirable, if conditions allow, to pass on by and enter the lot at a further entrance. This will tend to attract less attention on the part of the subject. In some instances it may be better to utilize on-street parking rather than follow the subject into the lot. Experience and judgment will be the best teacher.

Parallel Surveillance

Parallel surveillance is a method employed when the amount of traffic is very light and the surveillance would therefore be easily detected by the subject if an attempt were made to follow him from the rear.

When conducting a parallel surveillance, the agent drives parallel with the subject vehicle on a street that is one block to either his right or left. This form of surveillance has its greatest advantage in that it greatly reduces the possibility of detection. Its primary disadvantage lies in the fact that the subject is not under constant observation, inasmuch as the agent will see the subject vehicle at an intersection, then speed up and watch for it at the next intersection. One does not normally see the subject between such points. When the subject fails to appear at an intersection, the agent then drives to that intersection to see where the subject may be. Naturally, not all areas, because of the street layout, will allow this technique.

Multiple Vehicle Surveillance Techniques

Utilizing two or three vehicles to follow a subject greatly increases the

effectiveness of the operation. The primary advantage offered by utilizing more than one vehicle is being able to trade positions behind the subject frequently, thus avoiding having the same vehicle behind him for extended periods of time. Radio communications between the surveillance vehicles is important.

The most basic multiple vehicle surveillance technique involves having two vehicles follow the subject or having one or two vehicles follow the subject and another parallel him on either his right, left, or both. Naturally, the number of vehicles assigned to the case and the topographical conditions will greatly influence which variation of this technique will be chosen.

When the driver of the lead vehicle, the vehicle actually following the subject, feels that it would be desirable to drop back and allow the other vehicle to assume the lead position, he can either slow down or turn off as the other increases his speed. The original lead vehicle will then assume the number two position.

In the event that the subject makes a mid block "U" turn, the lead vehicle will normally continue on and radio to the second vehicle who will pull off and wait for the subject to pass by. At that point the number two vehicle would assume the lead position. The original lead vehicle will make a turn around when conditions permit and assume the number two position.

In the event that three surveillance vehicles are following the subject and they are all behind him when he makes a turn, the lead vehicle will normally proceed on by allowing the second vehicle to turn the corner to follow the subject with the third vehicle's turning a block early and then waiting to see what the subject does after having made the turn. If only two surveillance vehicles are being utilized, it will be necessary to decide whether the lead vehicle should turn the corner with the subject while the second vehicle turns a block early or, if the lead vehicle should proceed on by allowing the second vehicle to assume the lead position. Experience, judgment, and the specific circumstances will generally indicate the best thing to do at the time (see Figures 86 through 89).

FOOT SURVEILLANCE

General Considerations

A protective agent will endeavor to follow a subject on foot when the subject himself travels on foot. When conducting a foot surveillance, one must also anticipate the possibility of the subject's using some form

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


Figure 86. To rotate the positioning of the surveillance vehicles in relation to the subject, vehicle #2 increases his speed while vehicle #1 turns off, allowing #2 to assume the lead position.




Figure 87. Subject makes a "U" turn. The lead vehicle (#1) should continue on and radio to #2 who will turn off, wait for the subject to appear and then assume the lead position. Vehicle #1, which was originally in the lead, will pass from the subject's view and make a "U" turn to assume the #2 position.

Figure 88. S
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


Figure 88. Subject turns a corner. The lead vehicle (#1) passes by and later makes a "U" turn or circles the block. Vehicle #2 turns the corner and follows the subject. Vehicle #3 turns a block early and waits for instructions from Vehicle #2 who has assumed the lead position.




Figure 89. Subject turns into an alley. Lead vehicle (#1) stops short of the alley, allowing the second agent to go on foot to see if the subject stops or passes through the alley and turns. If he turns the direction of the turn is indicated. Vehicle #2 turns a block early. Both vehicles are in position to assume the lead position depending upon which way the subject may turn.

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of public transportation, such as a taxi or bus. This form of surveillance can be conducted employing one or more agents; however, the effectiveness of the operation will be significantly increased when using two or more agents.

Before engaging in a foot surveillance, as is the case with moving surveillance, the agent should have a sufficient supply of expense money in his possession, and he must dress according to the locale within which he will be working.

The two principal risks faced when conducting a foot surveillance are those of being discovered by the subject or losing sight of him. The more familiar one is with the subject and his habits and the area in which the surveillance is to be conducted, the less chance there will be of either of these two possibilities becoming a fact. When an agent is familiar with a subject, his general activities, and the area, he will also stand a better chance of reestablishing contact should he lose sight of the subject.

Because the agent will generally be observing the subject from behind, it is desirable that he be familiar with those characteristics that will enable him to distinguish the subject from other people in the area while viewing him from the rear. It has happened on occasion that one has started out following the right individual only to have a switch made somewhere so that he ended up following a different person. Also, one must learn to follow the person, not the clothing, because a change can be made somewhere along the way. Consider the ease with which such a change could be made with nothing other than a reversible jacket and cap.

General Techniques

When conducting a foot surveillance, the most appropriate distance to be maintained between the subject and the agent will be influenced largely by the area in which the surveillance is being conducted, the amount of pedestrian traffic in the area, and the sensitivity of the case. If in a very crowded downtown area, the agent would naturally remain much closer to the subject to prevent losing sight of him than he would if in a quiet residential area. Similarly, in a crowded setting, there would be less chance of being discovered by the subject, even though the agent remained fairly close to him. The proper distance to be maintained, therefore, is dependent upon the conditions and can range from as little as five to ten feet to one-half a city block or more. This is something that one will pick up rather quickly as it involves little more than good judgment and practice. Logically, then, the agent must remain close

enough to the subject to see what he is doing and to avoid losing him, yet remain far enough from him so that he is not detected.

While following a subject along a city sidewalk, if the subject turns a corner, the agent must attempt to get to the corner as quickly as possible to avoid losing contact with him should he enter a building immediately upon making the turn. However, the agent must guard against rushing to the corner in a manner that would attract attention. Should the agent discover upon turning the corner that the subject has stopped, he should casually continue along his way as if nothing were wrong and attempt to reestablish his position behind the subject when conditions permit.

When a subject has occasion to look at the agent, he should not look away, thus making it apparent that he is consciously avoiding eye contact with him. However, the agent should not look the subject directly in the eye, for eye contact helps to ensure that the subject will remember him. Under such circumstances, the agent should regard the subject in the same unconcerned manner in which people normally view others on a busy street. One's actions must always appear normal.

Should the subject enter a building, the type of building and the nature of the case will dictate whether he should be followed inside. When the subject boards a bus or some similar public transportation facility, one should get on fairly close behind him and select a seat a short distance behind him. If the subject takes a back seat, one will naturally have no alternative but to sit across from or in front of him. Should he sit on a seat that is positioned lengthwise, an effort should be made to secure a position on the same side of the vehicle and a few seats away from him.

When conducting a foot surveillance, one should have some idea in mind as to what will be used for an excuse should the subject become suspicious and accuse him of following. The best reaction in some cases is to act indignant at the suggestion that he would be following anyone. In other instances, a well-prepared cover story supported by fictitious credentials will be the best solution.

When following a subject, one should consider the merit of simple disguise techniques, such as wearing or removing a hat, wearing eyeglasses or using a reversible jacket. Avoid elaborate disguises.

Multiple Man Surveillance Teams

When the seriousness of a situation justifies the use of more than one agent to conduct a foot surveillance of a subject, a technique often

referred to as using a multiple operation are attempted frequently because the corner.

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referred to as the A-B-C method may be used to good advantage. By using a multiple man surveillance technique, the chances of a successful operation are increased many times over those possible if the same task were attempted using one lone agent. This is a result of being able to frequently rotate the position of the agents in relation to the subject, and because the subject is flanked, he can be observed even after turning a corner.

For a surveillance team to be effective, it is necessary for them to clearly understand the techniques that will be employed and to then practice them in the field with another agent acting as the subject. If this is not done prior to attempting the actual surveillance, successful results will probably not be realized. With practice, however, it will be found that this method of surveillance is very effective.

When employing a multiple man technique the typical arrangement is to have a lead man follow the subject. A second agent will follow the lead man, while a third agent walks abreast of either the subject or the lead man on the opposite side of the street. Figures 90 through 93 depict methods by which the positioning of the agents in relation to the subject may be rotated each time a turn is made.

STATIONARY SURVEILLANCE IN URBAN AREAS

General Considerations

Stationary surveillance, often referred to as a fixed surveillance or stake-out, is a surveillance technique in which one will endeavor to observe a subject or area that is stationary, i.e. a given address and everyone who frequents it. When preparing for a stationary surveillance, the most important consideration to be made is that of selecting an observation post that provides both maximum cover and an unobstructed view of the area of interest.

During the planning stages of the surveillance, the needs of the case will generally suggest such things as the number of security agents that should be assigned to the case, the time duration of the operation, and the equipment to be employed.

When conducting a stake-out in an urban setting for an extended period of time, having two agents assigned to the case is better than one. By assigning two agents, it is possible for one to make observations while the other writes notes and utilizes the radio. When the distance between the observation post and the subject necessitates the use of




Figure 90. In the event that the subject turns right, agent "A" can cross the intersection, thus assuming the "C" position. Agent "B" turns the corner and assumes the "A" position. Agent "C" assumes the "B" position.

optical aids, and it often will, the two agents can alternate making observations to avoid eye fatigue.

Observation Posts

During a stationary surveillance some form of cover is essential. In many instances it is desirable to select a point that is a considerable distance from the subject and make all observations using some type of optical aid, such as binoculars or a telescope. Often, when working with

Figure 91. In the event that the subject turns right, the subject can cross the intersection, thus assuming the "C" position. Agent "B" turns the corner and assumes the "A" position. Agent "C" assumes the "B" position.

optics from a distance, the two agents can alternate making observations to avoid eye fatigue.

There are many factors in selecting a point for observation. The point should be effective in providing a clear view of the subject and the surrounding area. The point should be specific in its location and should be easily identifiable.

Automatic observation posts are often used in operations. These posts are ideally suited for long-term surveillance and can be used in a variety of ways. They can be used to monitor a specific area or to observe a particular subject. They can also be used to observe a group of subjects or to observe a specific event.




Figure 91. Subject turns left before crossing the intersection. Agent "A" follows the subject while Agent "B" follows "A". Agent "C" crosses and turns left. All have maintained their original position except that Agent "C" is now on the opposite side of the subject.

optics from a long distance, the distance itself provides considerable cover.

There are a number of possibilities that suggest themselves when selecting an observation post in an urban area. As one would expect, the effectiveness of any post is relative to the needs of the case and the specific circumstances under which the surveillance is being conducted.

Automobiles are often used as an observation post for surveillance operations of short duration. Unfortunately, automobiles are not ideally suited for use as observation posts because cars are intended as a means of transportation, not as a place to sit for extended periods of




Figure 92. Subject crosses the intersection and then turns right. Agent "A" crosses and either turns right thus maintaining the "A" position, or goes straight, only to double back and assume the "B" position after Agent "C" has taken the lead position. Agent "B" turns before crossing thus assuming the "C" position.

time. This being the case, when an automobile is being used for such purposes, it is sometimes desirable to make use of several different vantage points and frequently to move the vehicle from one to another to avoid being in any one place for prolonged periods of time. When moving the vehicle, an effort should be made to do so in an inconspicuous manner. Moving will help to avoid arousing undue worry and/or suspicion on the part of local inhabitants.

When moving from one vantage point to another cannot be accomplished because there is only one suitable point from which to observe

Figure 93.
Agent "B"
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


Figure 93. Subject crosses the intersection and turns left. Agent "A" follows. Agent "B" turns before crossing, thus assuming the "C" position. Agent "C" crosses the intersection and either turns left, thus assuming the "A" position, or goes straight, only to double back to assume the "B" position.

the subject or when moving cannot be accomplished without leaving the subject area uncovered, one should consider use of a suitable *pretext* for the purpose of adding an air of legitimacy to being in the area. The agent may, for example, use a manual counter and/or a printed *traffic volume survey form* to give the appearance of making a traffic volume survey, or he may raise the hood of his car to simulate mechanical trouble. The appropriateness of any pretext will depend upon such factors as the nature of the neighborhood and the expected duration of the surveillance.

When working from an automobile, one should drive to the desired position in a normal manner so as not to attract attention. Furthermore, a position on the next block is much better than being on the same block as the subject. Upon parking the car, one will tend to be less conspicuous if he sits in the passenger's seat and appears to be waiting for the driver rather than sitting behind the wheel. As an alternative, one may not be noticed at all if he sits in the back seat; when this is done, lowering the visors and raising the head rests will help to conceal one's presence. The make of car (body style) has some effect also. Another point worth noting is that a couple sitting in a car will draw less attention than will a lone male or two men.

Vans and campers have proven to be ideal for use as observation posts in situations where more suitable vantage points are, for some reason, not available. This is especially true when photographic equipment is employed. There are different schools of thought regarding how surveillance trucks should be equipped. Some feel that one-way glass is the answer. Others feel that the mirror effect of one-way glass has a tendency to betray the purpose of the vehicle.

One agent attempted to conceal the purpose of the one-way glass on the sides of his van by having a fictitious *TV Repair* name printed on the sides with a picture of a television set also painted on the truck. The screen of that television set was then fitted with one-way glass. Agents who do not use one-way glass often have curtains that can be drawn to darken the interior, thus allowing them to secretly observe or photograph through one of the windows that is only partially covered. Another technique that has proven to work well is the painting of a fictitious business name on the windows with the center portion of letters and numbers left unpainted, leaving a space through which observations and photographs can be made. Finally, some such vehicles have a *blind* that can be placed against the windows that gives the appearance of boxes and similar items stacked up. Camouflaged peep holes are provided in the blind. Commercially available periscopes disguised as air vents are also worth consideration.

When one is working from a truck, all unnecessary conversation and activity should be held to a minimum to prevent anyone outside the vehicle from becoming aware of the fact that it is occupied. It is also for this reason that the volume of the radio should be checked to prevent its sounding loudly at an inappropriate time.

When a truck is being moved into position, the procedure will appear more natural if the driver alights and walks away after parking rather than remaining in the vehicle. This, of course, requires more than one

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provide ideas. It is expected that these techniques would be modified in the field according to the actual circumstances of the moment.

Detecting an Automobile Surveillance

1. Turn a corner and immediately park. Study the reaction of others turning the corner.
2. Drive up to the curb as if to park while carefully observing the actions of other motorists, especially those that are also parking or appear to be lingering in the vicinity. Drive away abruptly and observe if anyone else does likewise.
3. Use excessive and/or irregular speeds while observing the driving pattern of other motorists.
4. Use devious routes and note whether other vehicles do likewise.
5. Drive the wrong direction on a one-way street and observe whether anyone does likewise or attempts to parallel on the next street.
6. Make a midblock "U" turn and observe the subsequent reaction of other drivers.
7. Go through a red traffic light, or time one's arrival at a light so as to cross the intersection on the yellow while anyone following will be forced to stop or disobey a red traffic light. Watch traffic to the rear.
8. Make false starts to lure a surveillant into making a premature move.
9. Drive into a dead-end street to see if anyone follows. Be sure that there is an out, however, so that escape is possible, if necessary. Escape routes include such things as unfenced yards or yards with weak fences.
10. Drive through alleys and carefully note the subsequent movements of other vehicles.
11. Have a member of the protective team follow the executive using a second vehicle. That is called a *convoy* and is an effective method of detecting a vehicle surveillance.
12. Utilize radio monitors to detect a multiple vehicle surveillance. Radio communications are practically essential when more than one vehicle is used for a physical surveillance.
13. Stop after descending a hill or rounding a curve and note the reaction of other drivers.
14. Drive at a very low rate of speed and note the subsequent actions of other drivers.
15. Stop abruptly and observe actions of drivers in the rear.
16. Carefully note at all times what vehicles are in the vicinity. Note

especially those that appear to be trying to avoid being in direct view using other vehicles for visual cover.

17. Drive into parking lots or through gas stations and exit immediately by another exit. Observe action of other drivers.

18. Turn a corner and park out of view of anyone else turning the corner and note the reaction at your disappearance. That usually requires knowing the locale or being alert to situations offering such opportunities. Do not get boxed in doing this, however.

Eluding an Automobile Surveillant

1. If not alone, park the vehicle, leaving it attended by the other person. Leave on foot only to make efforts to lose anyone following on foot, after which discreetly double back and lie down in the vehicle as it is driven from the area. Do not sit up too soon as the vehicle may be followed a short distance.

2. Pull into or across traffic timing oneself so that anyone to the rear is unable to follow.

3. A member(s) of the protective team, in a second vehicle, can interfere with the surveillant, making it appear unintentional.

4. Drive on the inner lane of a freeway, and if circumstances favor it, a last moment decision to exit may make it difficult for a surveillant to follow, depending upon his placement on the freeway, the distance from which he is following, as well as the positioning of other vehicles. The executive's driver can control his placement and proximity with other vehicles to some extent, thus affording him an advantage.

5. If the surveillant is following from a considerable distance, execute a quick "U" turn after rounding a curve or descending the crest of a hill (out of view) and meet the surveillant wearing a different hat and glasses, perhaps a pipe in the mouth. If one has passengers, they should lie down out of view. The surveillant may mistake the vehicle for that of another.

6. At night use kill switches to alter the lighting of the vehicle after passing from view and gaining a lead. It will appear different.

7. Consider driving without lights if a lead is gained after passing from view.

8. Drive at a rate of speed that is excessive enough to make a persistent surveillant conspicuous if he does not give it up. He may discontinue the surveillance.

9. Depending on the circumstances, a switch may be made with a

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protective agent in a very similar appearing decoy vehicle.

10. Make a discreet switch of vehicles somewhere along the route.

Detecting a Foot Surveillance

1. Stop after turning a corner and passing from view, and then study the reaction of other pedestrians as they turn the corner and find themselves face to face with you.

2. Board a public conveyance such as a bus, wait until it is about to start, then jump off as if something has been forgotten and note whether anyone else does likewise.

3. Discreetly look about frequently and make note of all persons to the rear and on opposite sides of the street. Be aware also of who is preceding in front, although that technique is not as frequently employed.

4. Use a convoy, which is simply having a protective agent follow for the purpose of detecting a surveillance effort.

5. Drop a scrap of paper and discreetly note whether anyone attempts to retrieve it.

6. Walk at irregular paces stopping frequently to window shop. Be alert to the actions of those about you. Reflections in store windows aid in discreet observation.

7. Arrange with trustworthy persons in the area to be alert to a surveillance effort.

8. When staying in a hotel, loudly open and close the hotel room door to make it sound as if leaving the room. If someone leaves an adjoining room, leave your own room and note their appearance and what room they left.

9. The same as number 8 except that, after opening and closing the door, one simply listens for a while for any sounds that indicate a surveillance effort.

10. Closely observe people in the lobby area who appear to be observant of others in the area.

11. Start to leave the hotel lobby and then double back to see if anyone has gotten up to follow.

12. Employ close timing crossing a busy street and note who, if anyone, has taken a similar chance.

13. Converse in the street with an accomplice, while each looks in opposite directions for signs of a surveillance effort.

14. Pass through large open areas where a surveillant will be evident if he attempts to follow.

15. Suddenly reverse direction and note appearance of those you met for later recognition.

Eluding a Foot Surveillant

1. Go into a suitable location and change clothing to alter general appearance. Adding or removing glasses, changing frames, adding or removing a hat or adding a wig all make notable alterations to one's general appearance. Theatrical type disguises should be avoided.

2. Jump off a public conveyance as it is about to depart.

3. Cross a street against heavy traffic. Time your move so that it will be difficult or impossible for anyone to follow.

4. Take the last taxi at a stand.

5. Enter a building by one door and immediately leave by another.

6. Become lost in a crowd.

7. Have another member of the protective team distract the surveillant with an inquiry for directions or some other suitable pretext.

AIDS FOR VISION EXTENSION

General Considerations

Physical surveillance involves making visual observations of people, of vehicles, and of activity that may be taking place at various locations. Because the practitioners of this art must rely so heavily on their sight when engaging in this form of activity, it is essential that they take advantage of the various tools that serve to extend the effective range of their vision.

Although a lot of physical surveillance activity takes place during daytime hours, much of it takes place at night. It is for this reason that aids to extend one's vision under both day and night-time conditions are necessary. In this section, an examination will be made regarding the use of binoculars, telescopes, infrared viewers and electronic light intensifiers.

The agent who does not utilize some means to extend his vision must often move in dangerously close to a subject to discern important details or, if he works from a safe distance, settle for results that are less precise.

When it becomes necessary to observe a subject under low light conditions, the light gathering capability of large aperture binoculars will often produce the desired results. In other instances, it will be

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necessary to employ some other means such as infrared viewers or electronic light intensifiers.

Binoculars

General Considerations

Because binoculars are a very important and frequently used optical accessory for extending the vision of those engaged in physical surveillance activity, executive security agents should be familiar with them and their proper use. A binocular is simply an optical device comprised of two telescope systems that are mounted parallel to each other, enabling the viewer to see an enlarged image of some distant object using both eyes.

When considering the purchase of binoculars, one should understand that binoculars differ primarily in the following aspects:

1. Magnifying power.
2. Field of view.
3. Illumination (light-gathering capability).

The specific binocular features that will best suit one's needs will, of course, depend upon the intended use of the instrument. To be considered are such things as the subject matter, the distance and the conditions under which the viewing will be accomplished, such as the level of illumination. The latter will influence whether one should select large or small aperture binoculars (large or small objective lenses).

Magnifying Power

When examining binoculars, one will observe that there are two numbers printed on the instrument, which are separated by an "X." On many binoculars, one will see the numbers 7 X 50, for example, a very popular binocular. The number seven, which precedes the "X," indicates the magnifying power of the instrument. The second number, fifty in this case, designates the diameter of the objective lens measured in millimeters. An object viewed through a seven power binocular will appear seven times closer than when viewed with the unaided eye.

A binocular whose magnifying power exceeds seven or eight times will prove difficult for many people to hand hold effectively, with the degree of difficulty logically increasing as the magnifying power of the instrument is increased. The greater the magnifying power of an optical instrument, the more susceptible it will be to small movement




Figure 94. High powered binoculars perform best when securely mounted. Illustrated is an 11X80 binocular by Novatron, P.O. Box 718, Big Bear City, California.

and vibrations that will be amplified to increasingly greater degrees as the power of the instrument is increased. This fact holds true not only for binoculars but for all optical equipment such as telescopes and cameras with telephoto lenses. In many instances a support such as a tripod or window mount will be necessary (see Figure 94).

Field of View

The field of view refers to the width of the area that can be seen through a binocular. Although field of view is sometimes expressed in degrees, it is more often expressed by the width in feet that can be seen at a distance of 1,000 yards. A normal field binocular of seven power, for example, will generally have a field of view that falls roughly between 350 and 375 feet at 1,000 yards. A wide field seven power binocular will have a field of view in the 550 to 575 feet vicinity at 1,000 yards.

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The diameter of the objective lens has nothing to do with the field of view, since this is determined by other factors, such as the focal length of the objective and the diameter of the ocular (eyepiece lens). Because the ocular of a wide field binocular is more complex and thus costlier to manufacture than the ocular of a normal field binocular, wide angle binoculars are generally more expensive. Whether the added expense is justified is something each individual must decide for himself.

Objective Lens Diameter

In the example of the 7 X 50 binocular, it was stated that the seven designated the magnification power of the instrument and the fifty designated the diameter of the objective lens in millimeters. Most binocular objective lenses range in size from approximately 20mm to 60mm. While there are binoculars that have objective lenses ranging in size from 80mm to as large as 150mm, they are less common.

The primary advantage of a large diameter objective lens lies in the fact that the larger the objective, the greater will be its light-gathering capability. For example, a 7 X 50 binocular has the same magnifying power as a 7 X 35 binocular, but about twice the light-gathering capability. The 7 X 50 binocular, while being much larger and bulkier than the 7 X 35, would be the logical choice for low light level work at night.

Binocular Alignment

Good binocular performance depends not only on quality optics but also on proper alignment of the two lens barrels. As was previously stated, binoculars are merely two telescope instruments mounted parallel to each other to provide the viewer with both an enlarged and stereoscopic view of some object. Naturally, it is important that the two lens barrels be correctly aligned so that each eye will see the same view as the other. If the instrument is faulty in this respect, each eye will see a slightly different view and eye strain will result because of their effort to fuse the two images. The result of eye strain is a notable degree of eye discomfort and possibly a headache after prolonged use of the defective instrument. If the degree of misalignment is severe, the viewer will actually perceive two different images (double image). Binoculars that are correctly aligned will cause no eye strain whatever. There are three types of alignment error that occur in binoculars, either singly or in combination:

1. Vertical misalignment.
2. Horizontal misalignment.
3. Rotational misalignment.

The first, vertical misalignment, results in the view in one eyepiece being higher than the other. Vertical misalignment causes severe eye strain even if the degree of error is slight.

The second type of alignment error is horizontal misalignment, which results from one lens barrel pointing too far to the right or left with respect to the other. The degree of error that can be tolerated with the type of error will depend upon whether the eyes must attempt to diverge or converge in order to fuse the images.

The third kind of alignment error that may be encountered is rotational misalignment, a condition that is characterized by one image being rotated with respect to the other. There is nothing that the eyes can do to correct for this condition.

Proper Use of Binoculars

When using binoculars, it is important that they be properly used if the user is to benefit fully from the instrument's capabilities. Unfortunately, we have a tendency to raise the instrument to our eyes, adjust the distance between the eyepiece lenses to where they feel somewhat comfortable, and then focus in a hit-and-miss fashion until the image appears acceptably sharp.

One should endeavor to become familiar enough with the binocular so that its use is automatic and requires no special attention. This is important because the agent has the more important task of observing activity and cannot afford to be hindered by the very tool that is intended to assist him in making his observations.

The barrels of the binocular should be set at the widest distance that will afford a clear circular field of view. Each eyepiece then should be properly focused. This is best accomplished by turning them out as far as they will go and then turning them in, one at a time, until proper focus has been achieved.

The eyepiece lenses of binoculars must be positioned the correct distance from the observer's eyes. If too great a distance is maintained, one will not see the full field of view. Normally, when the flange around the eyepiece lens is held against the eyebrow, the full field of view will be seen. A person wearing sunglasses or corrective lenses may experience some degree of difficulty, however, and not see the full field. As a possible solution, one may purchase binoculars that have retractable eye

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cups made of rubber. When the binocular is used by someone not wearing glasses, the eye cups are extended. When the observer is wearing glasses, the eye cups are retracted.

Binoculars will often yield better results if some means is taken to prevent bright extraneous light from shining into one's eyes from above and from the sides. One may shade the eyes with a hat that can be pulled low or by proper positioning of the hands.

When it is necessary to surveil large open areas, as would be the case if an executive had a country home or farm and a watch were made to detect intruders, one should not sweep the area but, rather, examine the area in sections that equal the viewing angle of the binocular, allowing for a slight overlap.

Telescopes

While there is no doubt that binoculars serve a very useful purpose, there are circumstances under which one must make visual observations at distances that exceed the effective range of binoculars. When such is the case, the possibility of accomplishing the task using a telescope should be considered.

With telescopes for physical surveillance, it will be found that the most useful magnifying range lies between about 20 and 100 times. The most notable factor determining the desired power will be the distance from which one is working. A twenty power telescope, under normal daylight conditions, will enable one to discern vehicle registration numbers at distances approaching one-half mile.

Prismatic telescopes, more commonly referred to as spotting scopes, are used to a considerable degree by sportsmen for such applications as spotting targets when sighting in firearms. These telescopes have proven to be especially useful for physical surveillance applications because of their compact size, a result of prisms that fold the optical path and because the magnifying range of these instruments will fulfill the needs of most surveillance operations that require the use of a telescope (see Figure 95).

It will be found that spotting scopes available from various manufacturers offer a variety of features such as fixed magnifying powers that cannot be changed, models featuring interchangeable eyepieces that alter magnifying power, models featuring several eyepieces on a turret, and finally, scopes whose power may be zoomed through the entire range of powers. Naturally, one will find a significant price difference between various models.




Figure 95. Prismatic telescopes, also called spotting scopes, are useful for many surveillance applications. Illustrated is a Bushnell Sentry II on a window mount.

Spotting scopes, not unlike binoculars, have objective lenses of varying sizes. The size of the objective lens will prove to be an important consideration if one will be working with relatively high magnifying powers or under questionable light conditions or both.

It is important that telescopes, just as is the case with any optical equipment, be mounted in a manner sufficient to prevent excessive movement and vibrations. This becomes increasingly important as the magnifying power of the instrument is increased.

Night Vision Devices

When examining night vision devices, one will find that such equipment generally operates on one of two basic principles. The first type are infrared viewers (Figure 96), which are referred to as active devices because they project an infrared beam (invisible to the unaided eye) that illuminates the subject so that it may be viewed with the

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Figure 96. Infrared viewer (Courtesy of FJW Industries).

appropriate equipment. The second type is electronic light intensification equipment (Figure 97), which is referred to as being passive rather than active inasmuch as such equipment projects no infrared radiation but simply amplifies the level of the existing light by several thousand times. That is accomplished by changing the light energy to electrical energy, amplifying it, and then changing it back to light

energy. Figure 98 depicts a photographed observation through such a scope.

Electronic light intensification equipment is available with appropriate adapters so that night photographs can be taken through them conveniently.



Figure 97. Star-tron® electronic light intensifier (night viewing device) that operates on the principle of light intensification (Courtesy of Smith and Wesson).

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


Figure 98. Subject photographed through a Star-tron® night vision device at a distance of about 80 feet under lighting conditions that would approximate normal starlight (Courtesy of Smith & Wesson).

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SURVEILLANCE PHOTOGRAPHY

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are occasions when executive protective personnel will find it desirable to take photographs (still and motion picture) during a surveillance operation. Photographs can aid in many instances to document wrongful or suspicious activity, establish the identity of persons, and prove associations between certain people; and they can be used for various intelligence purposes. One application of the latter would be to routinely photograph the spectators attending any functions or speeches involving the firm or its executives. The photographs taken at various events would be examined to determine if perhaps the same individuals consistently reappear without justification. That is important because an attacker will generally engage in a considerable amount of research and study of an intended victim before the actual attack is attempted. Suspects, as they come to the attention of protective personnel, may also be identified in the photographs. It is also desirable to routinely photograph any demonstrations that in any way pertain to the firm.

The basic fundamentals of surveillance photography are presented with the hope that even the novice photographer will acquire a general understanding of how a background in general photography can be adapted to this specialized application of photography. Those readers desiring a deeper examination of this application of photography will find one of the author's earlier books of particular interest.*

CAMERA TYPES GENERALLY USED FOR SURVEILLANCE PHOTOGRAPHY

As a general rule, the cameras best suited for surveillance photography are 35mm SLR, 16mm motion picture, and in some unique situations,

*Siljander, Raymond P., *Applied Surveillance Photography*, Springfield, Thomas, 1975.

the subminiature cameras that are about the size of a pack of cigarettes or smaller.

The value of the subminiature cameras lies primarily in their small size and easy concealment. The most notable advantages of 35mm SLR and 16mm motion picture cameras are their fast lenses and the wide variety of film types available for them. The 8mm and Super 8 motion picture cameras are becoming more accepted for investigative photography because of their ease of operation and availability of film. The 35mm cameras are better for subject identification but the motion picture cameras offer the obvious advantage of being able to record activity.

TELEPHOTOGRAPHY

When engaged in surveillance photography, the agent will find that it is generally necessary to use a telephoto lens. Except for some distinct problems that are quite characteristic of telephoto photography, much of the art of telephotography is simply that of taking pictures. A telephoto lens working at $f/16$ is very much like any other lens working at $f/16$ as far as exposure is concerned. The only exception is that with a lens that employs a system of mirrors to shorten the optical (light) path, there is a light loss of about two-thirds of an f /stop because of the mirror's inability to reflect 100 percent of the light striking their surfaces.

The only distinguishing feature of a telephoto picture is a flat, long perspective. This is, however, a result of the long camera-to-subject distance and has nothing to do with the lens system being used. Think back to a television showing of a baseball game, where this compressed effect is quite apparent. A telephoto lens requires firm support of the camera and lens assembly because of the fact that telephoto lenses tend to amplify any vibrations that may be present. In addition, a cable release should be used. Figures 99a through 99d depict a comparison of various telephoto lenses.

AIR TURBULENCE AND LIGHT SCATTER

Extreme telephoto lenses of 1,000mm or more will encounter problems with atmosphere. Looking through a camera focused on some distant object will prove the fact that air is visible and moves to a great degree. The problems caused by air turbulence becomes greater with increased focal length. When working with extreme telephoto lenses in

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the vicinity of 2,000mm focal length, one will have exceeded the maximum for everyday use. The following is an examination of the problems presented by the atmosphere and how those problems can be overcome to some degree.

As the sun heats the earth's surface, the air near the ground expands, gets lighter, and then rises, being replaced with cooler air from adjoining areas. As a result, the density of the air is not uniform, thus causing light rays traveling from the subject to the camera to refract or bend, causing an unsharp and somewhat distorted image. Once one realizes and understands this, there are a number of things one can do to eliminate or at least minimize the problem. Although it is true that in surveillance photography the circumstances will often dictate when and from where photographs are taken, the photographer should make an effort to take advantage of any and all favorable factors.

Air turbulence is not as severe in the early morning hours before the sun has had a chance to heat the earth's surface, so photographing should be considered at that time. If there is more than one prospective vantage point from which to choose, there are other factors to consider. First, if exposures are made from a high location much of the air turbulence close to the ground can be avoided. Second, the air turbulence over a field is less severe than over a parking lot. There is even less air turbulence over snow and water than over a field. Third, side lighting is preferable to front or back lighting because light scattering is severe with back lighting and front lighting tends to reduce contrast. If one is working with color films, the use of a skylight filter to reduce excessive blueness of distant subjects is worth consideration. With black and white films, a yellow filter should be considered.

Once a vantage point has been selected and photographing is anticipated, it is advisable to use the shortest exposure duration possible as that will help to minimize image diffusion resulting from air turbulence. A short exposure duration also helps to minimize the problems of camera movement.

SURVEILLANCE PHOTOGRAPHY AT NIGHT USING ULTRAHIGH-SPEED FILMS

Often, the need for surveillance photography arises at night. When this is the case, the surveillance photographer must decide between using ultrahigh-speed film and working with available light, using infrared materials or using an electronic light intensifier, sometimes referred to as a night viewing device (NVD).



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Figure 99. Subject photographed from a distance of 300 feet using (a) normal lens of 50mm, (b) 400mm telephoto lens, (c) 800mm telephoto lens and (d) 2,000mm telephoto lens.

When working with ultrahigh-speed film and available light, there is no easy way to ensure proper exposure. One can, nonetheless, be assured of a very good percentage of success by doing some experimental work taking photographs of a person under various conditions to form an understanding of how to best approach various situations. One may try photographing a subject standing under a streetlight, inside a normally lit building from outside, and in a yard as the headlamps of a passing automobile briefly illuminate him.

When working at night with ultrahigh-speed film, it will generally be necessary to use as large an *f*/setting as possible and as slow a shutter speed as conditions will permit. The large *f*/setting will limit depth of field, and accurate focus is essential. Consider using an eyepiece magnifier; it will help ensure good focus. Because the shutter speed will be quite slow, proper support of the camera and lens is essential or an unsharp image will result.

Unfortunately, even the speed of the fastest films available is often not sufficient to produce an acceptably exposed negative when working under nighttime conditions using available light. The photographer can, in such cases, pretend the film is of an ASA rating much higher than it actually is and later compensate for the resultant underexposure by overdeveloping the film. For example, Tri-X film, which is actually 400 ASA, may be exposed as if it were really 1,600 ASA. The film will naturally be underexposed as a result of this, and the photographer, realizing that fact, will compensate by overdeveloping the film. This is accomplished by increasing the development time, the development temperature or both. This is called *push-processing* or *force-processing*. Although the quality of a negative that has been so processed will suffer from increased grain and contrast, this weakness usually proves inconsequential when one considers that the push-processing enables him to obtain a printable negative under conditions that would otherwise not have permitted it.

INFRARED PHOTOGRAPHY

The visible light spectrum is made up of various wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation. The spectrum is made up of violet light on one end with a wavelength of about 400 $m\mu$ and as the wavelengths get longer, the colors become blue, then green, yellow, orange, and finally deep red, which is about 700 $m\mu$. Beyond the two extremes is electromagnetic radiation, which continues to get shorter in wavelength on the violet and longer on the red end. Infrared photography takes

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


Figure 100. Subject photographed at night from a distance of 50 feet using infrared materials and a 135mm lens.

place in the region just beyond the red end of the spectrum between about $700\text{ m}\mu$ and $900\text{ m}\mu$. This region of the spectrum is not visible to the human eye. Although the spectrum does continue far beyond $900\text{ m}\mu$, it has nothing to do with infrared surveillance photography.

All that is needed to surreptitiously take an infrared photograph of someone in the dark is any 35mm SLR camera, a role of Kodak High Speed Infrared® film, a gelatin Kodak Wratten Filter Number 87® and an electronic strobe unit, the more light output, the better.

To utilize this equipment, the film is placed into the camera and the filter firmly secured over the strobe unit so that the flash will not be seen by the subject. Because infrared rays are refracted a little differently than visible light, an adjustment in focus is necessary. Most 35mm SLR lenses have an infrared focusing adjustment mark on the lenses' focusing ring. The set up described will enable one to take a picture of someone in the dark at a range of about 50 feet, depending of course upon the strength of the strobe unit being used (see Figure 100).

ELECTRONIC LIGHT INTENSIFIERS

Electronic light intensifiers, called by different names by different manufacturers, operate on the principle of light intensification. Gen-

erally, one star will provide sufficient illumination for a scope of this nature to function satisfactorily.

This product has proven very useful for visual observation at night and for photographic applications, inasmuch as camera adapters are available so that almost any type of camera system may be adapted such as 35mm SLR, motion picture and video. One may also use a variety of telephoto lenses (see Figures 101 and 102).



Figure 101. Smith & Wesson Star-tron MK 222 with 85mm, f/1.8 objective lens, mounted on a 35mm camera body (Courtesy of Smith & Wesson).

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objectiv




Figure 102. Passive night vision systems showing variety of catadioptric objective lenses (Courtesy of Smith & Wesson).

APPENDICES

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Appendix A

MINIMANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

Carlos Marighella

AUTHORS NOTE: Carlos Marighella, believed born around 1904, and killed in a police ambush in Brazil in late 1969, was a Marxist terrorist. Among the writings of Marighella was a work titled "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," which was published in France and later outlawed, and also banned by Latin American authorities. That manual has been found circulating among terrorist groups in many parts of the world, including the United States, in mimeographed form. Excerpts have also appeared frequently in many underground newspapers.

It is fortunate that almost all terrorist groups operate, at least in part, in accordance with the views set forth in Marighella's manual. That being the case, governmental authority and protective services personnel can better understand the basic thinking behind terrorist strategy and more readily counter it.

The reader should be alert to six phases set forth in the manual: (1) Urban Terrorism, (2) Governmental Repression, (3) Public Disaffection, (4) Extended Insurrection, (5) Governmental Collapse, (6) Insurgents to Power.

A DEFINITION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

The chronic structural crisis characteristic of Brazil today, and its resultant political instability, are what have brought about the upsurge of revolutionary war in the country. The revolutionary war manifests itself in the form of urban guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, or rural guerrilla warfare. Urban guerrilla warfare or psychological warfare in the city depends on the urban guerrilla.

The urban guerrilla is a man who fights the military dictatorship with arms, using unconventional methods. A political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, he is a fighter for his country's liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom. The area in which the guerrilla acts is in the large Brazilian cities. There are also bandits, commonly known as

outlaws, who work in the big cities. Many times assaults by outlaws are taken as actions by urban guerrillas.

The urban guerrilla, however, differs radically from the outlaw. The outlaw benefits personally from the action, and attacks indiscriminately without distinguishing between the exploited and the exploiters, which is why there are so many ordinary men and women among his victims. The urban guerrilla follows a political goal and only attacks the government, the big capitalists, and the foreign imperialists, particularly North Americans.

Another element just as prejudicial as the outlaw and also operating in the urban area is the right-wing counterrevolutionary who creates confusion, assaults banks, hurls bombs, kidnaps, assassinates, and commits the worst imaginable crimes against urban guerrillas, revolutionary priests, students and citizens who oppose fascism and seek liberty.

The urban guerrilla is an implacable enemy of the government and systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and on the men who dominate the country and exercise power. The principal task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear out, to demoralize the militarists, the military dictatorship and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the North Americans, the foreign managers and the Brazilian upper class.

The urban guerrilla is not afraid of dismantling and destroying the present Brazilian economic, political, and social system, for his aim is to help the rural guerrilla and to collaborate in the creation of a totally new and revolutionary social and political structure, with the armed people in power.

The urban guerrilla must have a certain minimal political understanding. To gain that he must read certain printed or mimeographed works, such as the following:

- Guerrilla Warfare* by Che Guevara
- Memories of a Terrorist*
- Some Questions about the Brazilian Guerrillas*
- Guerrilla Operations and Tactics*
- On Strategic Problems and Principles*
- Certain Tactical Principles for Comrades Undertaking Guerrilla Operations*
- Organizational Questions*
- O Guerrilheiro*, newspaper of the Brazilian revolutionary groups.

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PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA AND HOW HE SUBSISTS

The urban guerrilla is characterized by his bravery and decisive nature. He must be a good tactician and a good shot. The urban guerrilla must be a person of great astuteness to compensate for the fact that he is not sufficiently strong in arms, ammunition and equipment.

The career militarists or the government police have modern arms and transport and can go about anywhere freely, using the force of their power. The urban guerrilla does not have such resources at his disposal and leads a clandestine existence. Sometimes he is a convicted person or is out on parole and is obliged to use false documents.

Nevertheless, the urban guerrilla has a certain advantage over the conventional military or the police. It is that, while the police act on behalf of the enemy, whom the people hate, the urban guerrilla defends a just cause, which is the people's cause.

The urban guerrilla's arms are inferior to the enemy's, but from a moral point of view, the urban guerrilla has an undeniable superiority.

This moral superiority is what sustains the urban guerrilla. Thanks to it, the urban guerrilla can accomplish his principal duty, which is to attack and to survive.

The urban guerrilla has to capture or divert arms from the enemy to be able to fight. Because his arms are not uniform, since what he has are expropriated or have fallen into his hands in different ways, the urban guerrilla faces the problem of a variety of arms and a shortage of ammunition. Moreover, he has no place to practice shooting and marksmanship.

These difficulties have to be surmounted, forcing the urban guerrilla to be imaginative and creative, qualities without which it would be impossible for him to carry out his role as a revolutionary.

The urban guerrilla must possess initiative, mobility, and flexibility, as well as versatility and a command of any situation. Initiative especially is an indispensable quality. It is not always possible to foresee everything, and the urban guerrilla cannot let himself become confused or wait for orders. His duty is to act, to find adequate solutions for each problem he faces, and not to retreat. It is better to err acting than to do nothing for fear of erring. Without initiative there is no urban guerrilla warfare.

Other important qualities in the urban guerrilla are the following: to be a good walker; to be able to stand up against fatigue, hunger, rain, heat; to know how to hide and to be vigilant; to conquer the art of

dissembling; never to fear danger; to behave the same by day as by night; not to act impetuously; to have unlimited patience; to remain calm and cool in the worst conditions and situations; never to leave a track or trail; not to get discouraged.

In the face of the almost insurmountable difficulties of urban warfare, sometimes comrades weaken, leave, give up the work.

The urban guerrilla is not a businessman in a commercial firm nor is he a character in a play. Urban guerrilla warfare, like rural guerrilla warfare, is a pledge the guerrilla makes to himself. When he cannot face the difficulties or knows that he lacks the patience to wait, then it is better to relinquish his role before he betrays his pledge, for he clearly lacks the basic qualities necessary to be a guerrilla.

The urban guerrilla must know how to live among the people and must be careful not to appear strange and separated from ordinary city life.

He should not wear clothes that are different from those which other people wear. Elaborate and high fashion clothing for men or women may often be a handicap if the urban guerrilla's mission takes him into working-class neighborhoods or sections where such dress is uncommon. The same care has to be taken if the urban guerrilla moves from the South to the North or *vice versa*.

The urban guerrilla must live by his work or professional activity. If he is known and sought by the police, if he is convicted or is on parole, he must go underground and sometimes must live hidden. Under such circumstances, the urban guerrilla cannot reveal his activity to anyone, since that is always and only the responsibility of the revolutionary organization in which he is participating.

The urban guerrilla must have a great capacity for observation, must be well informed about everything, principally about the enemy's movements, and must be very searching and knowledgeable about the area in which he lives and operates or through which he moves.

But the fundamental and decisive characteristic of the urban guerrilla is that he is a man who fights with arms; given this condition, there is very little likelihood that he will be able to follow his normal profession for long without being identified. The role of expropriation thus looms as clear as high noon. It is impossible for the urban guerrilla to exist and survive without fighting to expropriate.

Thus, within the framework of the class struggle, as it inevitably and necessarily sharpens, the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points toward two essential objectives:

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- (a) The physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed forces and of the police;
- (b) The expropriation of government resources and those belonging to the big capitalists, latifundists, and imperialists, with small expropriations used for the maintenance of individual urban guerrillas and large ones for the sustenance of the revolution itself.

It is clear that the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla also has other objectives. But, here we are referring to the two basic objectives, above all expropriation. It is necessary for every urban guerrilla to keep in mind always that he can only maintain his existence if he is disposed to kill the police and those dedicated to repression, and if he is determined—truly determined—to expropriate the wealth of big capitalists, the latifundists, and the imperialists.

One of the fundamental characteristics of the Brazilian revolution is that from the beginning it developed around the expropriation of the wealth of the major bourgeois, imperialist, and latifundist interests, without excluding the richest and most powerful commercial elements engaged in the import-export business.

By expropriating the wealth of the principal enemies of the people, the Brazilian revolution was able to hit them at their vital center, with preferential and systematic attacks on the banking network; that is to say, the most telling blows were levelled against capitalism's nerve system.

The bank robberies carried out by the Brazilian urban guerrillas hurt such big capitalists as Moreira Salles and others, the foreign firms that insure and reinsure the banking capital, the imperialist companies, the federal and state governments—all of them systematically expropriated as of now.

The fruit of these expropriations has been devoted to the work of learning and perfecting urban guerrilla techniques, the purchase, the production, and the transportation of arms and ammunition for the rural areas, the security apparatus of the revolutionaries, the daily maintenance of the fighters, (of those who have been liberated from prison by armed force and those who are wounded or persecuted by the police), or to any kind of problem concerning comrades liberated from jail or assassinated by the police and the military dictatorship.

The tremendous costs of the revolutionary war must fall on the big capitalists, on imperialism, and on the latifundists and on the government too, both federal and state, since they are all exploiters and oppressors of the people.

Men of the government, agents of the dictatorship and of North American imperialism principally, must pay with their lives for the crimes committed against the Brazilian people.

In Brazil, the number of violent actions carried out by urban guerrillas, including deaths, explosions, seizures of arms, ammunition, and explosives, assaults on banks and prisons, etc., is significant enough to leave no room for doubt as to the actual aims of the revolutionaries. The execution of CIA spy Charles Chandler, a member of the United States Army who came from the war in Vietnam to infiltrate the Brazilian student movement, the military henchmen killed in bloody encounters with urban guerrillas are all witness to the fact that we are in full revolutionary war and that the war can be waged only by violent means.

This is the reason why the urban guerrilla uses armed struggle and why he continues to concentrate his activity on the physical extermination of the agents of repression and to dedicate twenty-four hours a day to expropriation from the people's exploiters.

TECHNICAL PREPARATION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

No one can become an urban guerrilla without paying special attention to technical preparation. The technical preparation of the urban guerrilla runs from the concern for his physical preparedness, to knowledge of and apprenticeship in professions and skills of all kinds, particularly manual skills.

The urban guerrilla can have strong physical resistance only if he trains systematically. He cannot be a good fighter if he has not learned the art of fighting. For that reason, the urban guerrilla must learn and practice various kinds of fighting, of attack, and of personal defence.

Other useful forms of physical preparation are hiking, camping, practice in survival in the woods, mountain climbing, rowing, swimming, skin diving, training as a frogman, fishing, harpooning, and hunting birds or small and big game.

It is very important to learn how to drive; pilot a plane; handle a motorboat and a sailboat; understand mechanics, radio, telephone, electricity; and have some knowledge of electronic techniques.

It is also important to have a knowledge of topographical information to be able to locate one's position by instruments or other available resources, to calculate distances, to make maps and plans, to draw to scale, to make timings, to work with an angle protractor or a compass, etc.

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A knowledge of chemistry and of color combination, of stamp-making, the domination of the technique of calligraphy and the copying of letters and other skills are part of the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla, who is obligated to falsify documents in order to live within a society that he seeks to destroy.

In the area of auxiliary medicine he has the special role of being a doctor or understanding medicine, nursing, pharmacology, drugs, elementary surgery, and emergency first aid.

The basic question in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla is nevertheless to know how to handle arms such as machine gun, revolver, automatic, FAL, various types of shotguns, carbines, mortars, bazookas, etc.

A knowledge of various types of ammunition and explosives is another aspect to consider. Among the explosives, dynamite must be well understood. The use of incendiary bombs, smoke bombs and other types are indispensable prior knowledge.

To know how to make and repair arms, prepare Molotov cocktails, grenades, mines, homemade destruction devices, how to blow up bridges, tear up and put out of service rails and sleepers, these are requisites in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla that can never be considered unimportant.

The highest level of preparation for the urban guerrilla is the center for technical training. But, only the guerrilla who has already passed the preliminary examination can go on to this school, that is, one who has passed the proof of fire in revolutionary action, in actual combat against the enemy.

THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S ARMS

The urban guerrilla's arms are light arms, easily exchanged, usually captured from the enemy, purchased, or made on the spot.

Light arms have the advantage of fast handling and easy transport. In general, light arms are characterized as short barrelled. This includes many automatic arms.

Automatic and semiautomatic arms considerably increase the fighting power of the urban guerrilla. The disadvantage of this type of arm for use is the difficulty in controlling it, resulting in wasted rounds or in a prodigious use of ammunition, compensated for only by optimal aim and firing precision. Men who are poorly trained convert automatic weapons into an ammunition drain.

Experience has shown that the basic arm of the urban guerrilla is the light machine gun. This arm, in addition to being efficient and easy to shoot in an urban area, has the advantage of being greatly respected by the enemy. The guerrilla must know thoroughly how to handle the machine gun, now so popular and indispensable to the Brazilian urban guerrilla.

The ideal machine gun for the urban guerrilla is the Ina .45 caliber. Other types of machine guns of different calibers can be used—understanding, of course, the problem of ammunition. Thus, it is preferable that the industrial potential of the urban guerrilla permit the production of a single machine gun so that the ammunition used can be standardized.

Each firing group of urban guerrillas must have a machine gun managed by a good marksman. The other components of the group must be armed with .38 revolvers, our standard arm. The .32 is also useful for those who want to participate, but the .38 is preferable since its impact usually puts the enemy out of action.

Hand grenades and conventional smoke bombs can be considered light arms, with defensive power for cover and withdrawal.

Long barrel arms are more difficult for the urban guerrilla to transport and attract much attention because of their size. Among the long barrel arms are the FAL, the Mauser guns or rifles, hunting guns such as the Winchester, and others.

Shotguns can be useful if used at close range and point blank. They are useful even for a poor shot, especially at night when precision is not much help. A pressure airgun can be used for training in marksmanship. Bazookas and mortars can also be used in action, but the conditions for using them have to be prepared, and the people who use them must be trained.

The urban guerrilla should not try to base his actions on the use of heavy arms, which have major drawbacks in a type of fighting that demands lightweight weapons to insure mobility and speed.

Homemade weapons are often as efficient as the best arms produced in conventional factories, and even a cut-off shotgun is a good arm for the urban guerrilla.

The urban guerrilla's role as gunsmith has a fundamental importance. As gunsmith he takes care of the arms, knows how to repair them, and in many cases can set up a small shop for improvising and producing efficient small arms.

Work in metallurgy and on the mechanical lathe are basic skills the urban guerrilla should incorporate into his industrial planning, which

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The construction and courses in explosives and sabotage must be organized. The primary materials for practice in these courses must be obtained ahead of time to prevent an incomplete apprenticeship, i.e. to leave no room for experimentation.

Molotov cocktails, gasoline, homemade contrivances such as catapults and mortars for firing explosives, grenades made of tubes and cans, smoke bombs, mines, conventional explosives such as dynamite and potassium chloride, plastic explosives, gelatin capsules, ammunition of every kind are indispensable to the success of the urban guerrilla's mission.

The method of obtaining the necessary materials and munitions will be to buy them or to take them by force in expropriation actions especially planned and carried out.

The urban guerrilla will be careful not to keep explosives and materials that can cause accidents around very long but will try always to use them immediately on their destined targets.

The urban guerrilla's arms and his ability to maintain them constitute his firepower. By taking advantage of modern arms and introducing innovations in his firepower and in the use of certain arms, the urban guerrilla can change many of the tactics of city warfare. An example of this was the innovation made by the urban guerrillas in Brazil when they introduced the machine in their attacks on banks.

When the massive use of uniform machine guns becomes possible, there will be new changes in urban guerrilla warfare tactics. The firing group that utilizes uniform weapons and corresponding ammunition, with reasonable support for their maintenance, will reach a considerable level of efficiency. The urban guerrilla increases his efficiency as he improves his firing potential.

THE SHOT: THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S REASON FOR EXISTENCE

The urban guerrilla's reason for existence, the basic condition in which he acts and survives, is to shoot. The urban guerrilla must know how to shoot well because it is required by his type of combat.

In conventional warfare, combat is generally at a distance with long-range arms. In unconventional warfare, in which urban guerrilla warfare is included, the combat is at close range, often very close. To prevent his own extinction, the urban guerrilla has to shoot first and he cannot err in his shot. He cannot waste his ammunition because he does

not have large amounts; he must save it. Also, he cannot replace his ammunition quickly, since he is part of a small group in which each guerrilla has to take care of himself. The urban guerrilla can lose no time and must be able to shoot at once.

One fundamental fact, which we want to emphasize fully and whose particular importance cannot be overestimated, is that the urban guerrilla must not fire continuously, using up his ammunition. It may be that the enemy is not responding to the fire precisely because he is waiting until the guerrilla's ammunition is used up. At such a moment, without having time to replace his ammunition, the urban guerrilla faces a rain of enemy fire and can be taken prisoner or be killed.

In spite of the value of the surprise factor, which many times makes it unnecessary for the urban guerrilla to use his arms, he cannot be allowed the luxury of entering combat without knowing how to shoot. Face to face with the enemy, he must always be moving from one position to another, because to stay in one position makes him a fixed target and, as such, very vulnerable.

The urban guerrilla's life depends on shooting, on his ability to handle his arms well and to avoid being hit. When we speak of shooting, we speak of marksmanship as well. Shooting must be learned until it becomes a reflex action on the part of the urban guerrilla.

To learn how to shoot and to have good aim, the urban guerrilla must train himself systematically, utilizing every apprenticeship method, shooting at targets, even in amusement parks and at home.

Shooting and marksmanship are the urban guerrilla's water and air. His perfection of the art of shooting makes him a special type of urban guerrilla, i.e. a sniper, a category of solitary combatant indispensable in isolated actions. The sniper knows how to shoot, at close range and at long range, and his arms are appropriate for either type of shooting.

THE FIRING GROUP

In order to function, the urban guerrillas must be organized in small groups. A group of no more than four or five is called *the firing group*.

A minimum of two firing groups, separated and sealed off from other firing groups, directed and coordinated by one or two persons, is what makes a *firing team*.

Within the firing group there must be complete confidence among the comrades. The best shot and the one who best knows how to manage the machine gun is the person in charge of operations.

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The firing group plans and executes urban guerrilla actions, obtains and guards arms, studies and corrects its own tactics.

When there are tasks planned by the strategic command, these tasks take preference. But, there is no such thing as a firing group without its own initiative. For this reason it is essential to avoid any rigidity in the organization in order to permit the greatest possible initiative on the part of the firing group. The old-type of hierarchy, the style of the traditional left does not exist in our organization.

This means that except for the priority of objectives set by the strategic command, any firing group can decide to assault a bank, to kidnap or to execute an agent of the dictatorship, a figure identified with the reaction, or a North American spy, and can carry out any kind of propaganda or war of nerves against the enemy without the need to consult the general command.

No firing group can remain inactive, waiting for orders from above. Its obligation is to act. Any single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a firing group and begin action can do so and thus can become a part of the organization.

This method of action eliminates the need for knowing who is carrying out which actions, since there is free initiative and the only important point is to increase substantially the volume of urban guerrilla activity in order to wear out the government and force it into the defensive.

The firing group is the instrument of organized action. Within it, guerrilla operations and tactics are planned, launched, and carried through to success.

The general command counts on the firing groups to carry out objectives of a strategic nature and to do so in any part of the country. For its part, it helps the firing groups with their difficulties and their needs.

The organization is an indestructible network of firing groups, and of coordinations among them, that functions simply and practically with a general command that also participates in the attacks; an organization that exists for no purpose other than pure and simple revolutionary action.

THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

Conventional logistics can be expressed by the formula CCEM:

C—food (*comida*).

C—fuel (*combustivel*).

E—equipment.

M—ammunition (*municoes*).

Conventional logistics refer to the maintenance problems for an army or a regular armed force, transported in vehicles with fixed bases and supply lines.

Urban guerrillas, on the contrary, are not an army but small armed groups, intentionally fragmented. They have no vehicles or fixed bases. Their supply lines are precarious and insufficient and have no established base except in the rudimentary sense of an arms factory within a house.

While the goal of conventional logistics is to supply the war needs of the gorillas to be used to repress urban and rural rebellion, urban guerrilla logistics aim at sustaining operations and tactics that have nothing in common with a conventional war and are directed against the military dictatorship and North American domination of the country.

For the urban guerrilla, who starts from nothing and has no support at the beginning; logistics are expressed by the formula MDAME, which is—

M—mechanization.

D—money (*ainneiro*).

A—arms.

M—ammunition (*municoes*).

E—explosives.

Revolutionary logistics takes mechanization as one of its bases. Nevertheless, mechanization is inseparable from the driver. The urban guerrilla driver is as important as the urban guerrilla machine gunner. Without either, the machines do not work, and as such the automobile, like the machine gun, becomes a dead thing. An experienced driver is not made in one day, and the apprenticeship must begin early. Every good urban guerrilla must be a good driver. As to the vehicle, the urban guerrilla must expropriate what he needs.

When he already has resources, the urban guerrilla can combine the expropriation of vehicles with other methods of acquisition.

Money, arms, ammunition and explosives, and automobiles as well, must be expropriated. And the urban guerrilla must rob banks and armories and seize explosives and ammunition wherever he finds them.

None of these operations is undertaken for just one purpose. Even when the assault is for money, the arms that the guards bear must also be taken.

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Expropriation is the first step in the organization of our logistics, which itself assumes an armed and permanently mobile character.

The second step is to reinforce and extend logistics, resorting to ambushes and traps in which the enemy will be surprised, and his arms, ammunition, vehicles, and other resources can be captured.

Once he has the arms, ammunition and explosives, one of the most serious logistics problems the urban guerrilla faces at any time and in any situation, is a hiding place in which to leave the material and appropriate means for transporting it and assembling it where it is needed. This has to be accomplished even when the enemy is on the lookout and the roads blocked.

The knowledge that the urban guerrilla has of the terrain, and the devices he uses or is capable of using, such as guides especially prepared and recruited for this mission, are the basic elements in the solution of the external logistics problem the revolutionary faces.

THE TECHNIQUE OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

In its most general sense, technique is the combination of methods man uses to carry out any activity. The activity of the urban guerrilla consists in waging guerrilla warfare and psychological warfare.

The urban guerrilla has five basic components:

- (a) One part is related to the specific characteristics of the situation;
- (b) One part is related to the requisites that match these characteristics, requisites represented by a series of initial advantages without which the urban guerrilla cannot achieve his objectives;
- (c) One part concerns certain and definite objectives in the actions initiated by the urban guerrilla;
- (d) One part is related to the types and characteristic modes of action for the urban guerrilla;
- (e) One part is concerned with the urban guerrilla's method of carrying out his specific actions.

The technique of the urban guerrilla has the following characteristics:

- (a) It is an aggressive technique, or in other words, it has an offensive character. As is well known, defensive action means death for us. Since we are inferior to the enemy in fire power and have neither his resources nor his power force, we cannot defend ourselves against an offensive or a concentrated attack by the gorillas. And that is the reason why our urban technique can never be permanent, can never defend a fixed base or remain in any one spot waiting to repel the circle of reaction:

(b) It is a technique of attack and retreat by which we preserve our forces;

(c) It is a technique that aims at the development of urban guerrilla warfare, whose function will be to wear out, demoralize, and distract the enemy forces, permitting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla warfare which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war.

THE INITIAL ADVANTAGES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

The dynamics of urban guerrilla warfare lie in the urban guerrilla's violent clash with the military and police forces of the dictatorship. In this clash, the police have the superiority. The urban guerrilla has inferior forces. The paradox is that the guerrilla, although weaker, is nevertheless the attacker.

The military and police forces, for their part, respond to the attack by mobilizing and concentrating infinitely superior forces in the persecution and destruction of the urban guerrilla. He can only avoid defeat if he counts on the initial advantages he has and knows how to exploit them to the end to compensate for his weaknesses and lack of *material*.

The initial advantages are the following:

- (a) He must take the enemy by surprise;
- (b) He must know the terrain of the encounter better than the enemy;
- (c) He must have greater mobility and speed than the police and the other repressive forces;
- (d) His information service must be better than the enemy's;
- (e) He must be in command of the situation and demonstrate a decisiveness so great that everyone on our side is inspired and never thinks of hesitating, while on the other side the enemy is stunned and incapable of responding.

SURPRISE

To compensate for his general weakness and shortage of arms compared to the enemy, the urban guerrilla uses surprise. The enemy has no way to fight surprise and becomes confused or is destroyed.

When urban guerrilla warfare broke out in Brazil, experience proved that surprise was essential to the success of any urban guerrilla operation.

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The technique of surprise is based on four essential requisites:

- (a) We know the situation of the enemy we are going to attack, usually by means of precise information and meticulous observation, while the enemy does not know he is going to be attacked and knows nothing about the attacker;
- (b) We know the force of the enemy that is going to be attacked and the enemy knows nothing about our force;
- (c) Attacking by surprise, we save and conserve our forces, while the enemy is unable to do the same and is left at the mercy of events;
- (d) We determine the hour and the place of the attack, fix its duration, and establish its objective. The enemy remains ignorant of all this.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN

The urban guerrilla's best ally is the terrain, and because this is so, he must know it like the palm of his hand.

To have the terrain as an ally means to know how to use with intelligence its unevenness, its high and its low points, its turns, its irregularities, its regular and its secret passages, abandoned areas, its thickets, etc., taking maximum advantage of all this for the success of armed actions, escapes, retreats, cover, and hiding places.

Its impasses and narrow spots, its gorges, its streets under repair, police control points, military zones and closed-off streets, the entrances and exits of tunnels and those that the enemy can close off, viaducts to be crossed, corners controlled by the police or watched, its lights and signals, all this must be thoroughly known and studied in order to avoid fatal errors.

Our problem is to get through and to know where and how to hide, leaving the enemy bewildered in areas he does not know.

Familiar with the avenues, streets, alleys, ins and outs, and corners of the urban centers, its paths and shortcuts, its empty lots, its underground passages, its pipes and sewer system, the urban guerrilla safely crosses through the irregular and difficult terrain unfamiliar to the police, where they can be surprised in a fatal ambush or trapped at any moment.

Because he knows the terrain the guerrilla can go through it on foot, on bicycle, in automobile, jeep, or truck and never be trapped. Acting in small groups with only a few people, the guerrillas can reunite at an hour and place determined beforehand, following up the attack with

new guerrilla operations, or evading the police circle and disorienting the enemy with their unprecedented audacity.

It is an insoluble problem for the police in the labyrinthian terrain of the urban guerrilla, to get someone they cannot see, to repress someone they cannot catch, to close in on someone they cannot find.

Our experience is that the ideal urban guerrilla is one who operates in his own city and knows thoroughly its streets, neighborhoods, transit problems and peculiarities.

The guerrilla outsider who comes to a city whose corners are unfamiliar to him is a weak spot, and if he is assigned certain operations can endanger them. To avoid grave errors, it is necessary for him to get to know well the layout of the streets.

MOBILITY AND SPEED

To ensure a mobility and speed that the police cannot match, the urban guerrilla needs the following prerequisites:

- (a) mechanization;
- (b) knowledge of the terrain;
- (c) a rupture or suspension of enemy communications and transport;
- (d) light arms.

By carefully carrying through operations that last only a few moments and leaving the site in mechanized vehicles, the urban guerrilla beats a rapid retreat, escaping persecution.

The urban guerrilla must know the way in detail and, in this sense, must go through the schedule ahead of time as a training to avoid entering alleyways that have no exit or running into traffic jams or becoming paralyzed by the transit department's traffic signals.

The police pursue the urban guerrilla blindly without knowing which road he is using for his escape.

While the urban guerrilla quickly flees because he knows the terrain, the police lose the trail and give up the chase.

The urban guerrilla must launch his operations far from the logistics base of the police. An initial advantage of this method of operation is that it places us at a reasonable distance from the possibility of persecution, which facilitates the evasion.

In addition to this necessary precaution, the urban guerrilla must be concerned with the enemy's communications system. The telephone is the primary target in preventing the enemy from access to information by knocking out his communications system.

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Even if he knows about the guerrilla operation, the enemy depends on modern transport for his logistics support, and his vehicles necessarily lose time carrying him through the heavy traffic of the large cities.

It is clear that the tangled and treacherous traffic is a disadvantage for the enemy, as it would be for us if we were not ahead of him.

If we want to have a safe margin of security and be certain to leave no tracks for the future, we can adopt the following methods:

- (a) Purposely intercept the police with other vehicles or by apparently casual inconveniences and damages; but in this case the vehicles in question should not be legal nor should they have real license numbers;
- (b) Obstruct the road with fallen trees, rocks, ditches, false traffic signs, dead ends or detours, and other ingenious methods;
- (c) Place homemade mines in the way of the police, use gasoline, or throw Molotov cocktails to set their vehicles on fire;
- (d) Set off a burst of machine-gun fire such as the FAL aimed at the motor and tires of the cars engaged in pursuit.

With the arrogance typical of the police and the military fascist authorities, the enemy will come to fight us with heavy guns and equipment and with elaborate maneuvers by men armed to the teeth. The urban guerrilla must respond to this with light weapons easily transported, so he can always escape with maximum speed, without ever accepting open fighting. The urban guerrilla has no mission other than to attack and retreat.

We would leave ourselves open to the most stunning defeats if we burdened ourselves with heavy arms and with the tremendous weight of the ammunition necessary to fire them, at the same time losing our precious gift of mobility.

When the enemy fights against us with cavalry we are at no disadvantage as long as we are mechanized. The automobile goes faster than the horse. From within the car we also have the target of the mounted police, knocking him down with machine gun and revolver fire or with Molotov cocktails and grenades.

On the other hand, it is not so difficult for an urban guerrilla on foot to make a target of a policeman on horseback. Moreover, ropes across the streets, marbles, cork stoppers are very efficient methods of making them both fall. The great disadvantage of the mounted policeman is that he presents the urban guerrilla with two excellent targets; the horse and its rider.

Apart from being faster than the horseman, the helicopter has no

better chance of persecution. If the horse is too slow compared to the urban guerrilla's automobile, the helicopter is too fast. Moving at 200 kilometers an hour, it will never succeed in hitting from above a target lost among the crowds and the street vehicles, nor can it land in public streets in order to catch someone. At the same time, whenever it tries to fly low, it will be excessively vulnerable to the fire of the urban guerrilla.

INFORMATION

The possibilities that the government has for discovering and destroying the urban guerrillas lessen as the potential of the dictatorship's enemies becomes greater and more concentrated among the popular masses.

This concentration of opponents of the dictatorship plays a very important role in providing information as to moves on the part of the police and men in government, as well as in hiding our activities. The enemy can also be thrown off by false information, which is worse for him because it is a tremendous waste.

By whatever means, the sources of information at the disposal of the urban guerrilla are potentially better than those of the police. The enemy is observed by the people, but he does not know who among the people transmits information to the urban guerrilla. The military and the police are hated for the injustices and violence they commit against the people, and this facilitates obtaining information prejudicial to the activities of government agents.

The information, which is only a small area of popular support, represents an extraordinary potential in the hands of the urban guerrilla. The creation of an intelligence service with an organized structure is a basic need for us. The urban guerrilla has to have essential information about the plans and movements of the enemy, their location, and their method of moving, the resources of the banking network, the means of communication, and the secret moves the enemy makes.

The trustworthy information passed along to the urban guerrilla represents a well-aimed blow at the dictatorship. It has no way to defend itself in the face of an important leak that jeopardizes its interests and facilitates our destructive attack.

The enemy also wants to know what steps we are taking so he can destroy us or prevent us from acting. In this sense the danger of betrayal is present and the enemy encourages betrayal or infiltrates spies into the

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organization. The urban guerrilla's technique against this enemy tactic is to denounce publicly the traitors, spies, informers, and provocateurs.

Since our struggle takes place among the masses and depends on their sympathy (while the government has a bad reputation because of its brutality, corruption and incompetence) the informers, spies, traitors and police come to be enemies of the people, without supporters, denounced to the urban guerrillas, and, in many cases, properly punished.

For his part, the urban guerrilla must not evade the duty (once he knows who the spy or informer is) of wiping the spy out physically. This is the correct method, approved by the people, and it minimizes considerably the incidence of infiltration or enemy spying.

For the complete success of the battle against spies and informers, it is essential to organize a counterespionage or counterintelligence service. Nevertheless, as far as information is concerned, it cannot all be reduced to a question of knowing the enemy's motives and avoiding the infiltration of spies. Information must be broad, it must embrace everything, including the most insignificant matters. There is a technique of obtaining information and the urban guerrilla must master it. Following this technique, information is obtained naturally, as a part of the life of the people.

The urban guerrilla, living in the midst of the people and moving about among them, must be attentive to all types of conversations and human relations, learning how to disguise his interest with great skill and judgment.

In places where people work, study, live, it is easy to collect all kinds of information on payments, business, plans of all types, points of view, opinions, people's state of mind, trips, interiors of buildings, offices and rooms, operation centers, etc.

Observation, investigation, reconnaissance, and exploration of the terrain are also excellent sources of information. The urban guerrilla never goes anywhere absentmindedly and without revolutionary precaution, always on the lookout lest something occur. Eyes and ears open, senses alert, his memory engraved with everything necessary, now or in the future, to the uninterrupted activity of the fighter.

Careful reading of the press with particular attention to the organs of mass communication, the investigation of accumulated data, the transmission of news and everything of note, a persistence in being informed and in informing others, all this makes up the intricate and immensely complicated question of information that gives the urban guerrilla a decisive advantage.

DECISION

It is not enough for the urban guerrilla to have in his favor surprise, speed, knowledge of the terrain, and information. He must also demonstrate his command of any situation and a capacity for decision without which all other advantages will prove useless.

It is impossible to carry out any action, however well planned, if the urban guerrilla turns out to be indecisive, uncertain, irresolute.

Even an action successfully begun can end in defeat if the command of the situation and the capacity for decision falter in the middle of the actual execution of the plan. When this command of the situation and a capacity for decision are absent, the void is filled with vacillation and terror. The enemy takes advantage of this failure and is able to liquidate us.

The secret for the success of any operation, simple or complicated, easy or difficult, is to rely on determined men. Strictly speaking, there are no easy operations. All must be carried out with the same care exercised in the case of the most difficult, beginning with the choice of the human element, which means relying on leadership and capacity for decision in every test.

One can see ahead of time whether an action will be successful or not by the way its participants act during the preparatory period. Those who are behind, who fail to make designated contracts, are easily confused, forget things, fail to complete the basic elements of the work, possibly are indecisive men and can be a danger. It is better not to include them.

Decision means to put into practice the plan that has been devised with determination, with audacity, and with an absolute firmness. It takes only one person who vacillates to lose all.

OBJECTIVES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S ACTIONS

With his technique developed and established, the urban guerrilla bases himself on models of action leading to attack and, in Brazil, with the following objectives:

(a) To threaten the triangle in which the Brazilian state system and North American domination are maintained in Brazil, a triangle whose points are Rio, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte and whose base is the axle Rio-São Paulo, where the giant industrial-financial-economic-political-cultural-military-police complex that holds the entire decisive power of the country is located;

(b) to dictatorship, defending, position with national m strategic ne when that

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(d) To nation, and order to pe urban gue problems, i time and su repressive t armories, r sion station ships, aircr stores, gara regime, suc organization

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(b) to weaken the local guards or the security system of the dictatorship, given the fact that we are attacking and the gorillas defending, which means catching the government in a defensive position with its troops immobilized in defense of the entire complex of national maintenance, with its ever-present fears of an attack on its strategic nerve centers, and without ever knowing where, how, and when that attack will come;

(c) to attack on every side with many different armed groups, few in number, each self-contained and operating separately, to disperse the government forces in their pursuit of a thoroughly fragmented organization instead of offering the dictatorship the opportunity to concentrate its forces of repression on the destruction of one tightly organized system operating throughout the country;

(d) To give proof of its combativeness, decision, firmness, determination, and persistence in the attack on the military dictatorship in order to permit all malcontents to follow our example and fight with urban guerrilla tactics. Meanwhile, the government, with all its problems, incapable of halting guerrilla operations in the city, will lose time and suffer endless attrition and will finally be forced to pull back its repressive troops in order to mount guard over the banks, industries, armories, military barracks, prisons, public offices, radio and television stations, North American firms, gas storage tanks, oil refineries, ships, aircraft, ports, airports, hospitals, health centers, blood banks, stores, garages, embassies, residences of outstanding members of the regime, such as ministers and generals, police stations, and official organizations, etc.;

(e) To increase urban guerrilla disturbances gradually in an endless ascendancy of unforeseen actions such that the government troops cannot leave the urban area to pursue the guerrillas in the interior without running the risk of abandoning the cities and permitting rebellion to increase on the coast as well as in the interior of the country;

(f) To oblige the army and the police, with the commanders and their assistants, to change the relative comfort and tranquillity of their barracks and their usual rest, for a state of alarm and growing tension in the expectation of attack or in search of tracks that vanish without a trace;

(g) To avoid open battle and decisive combat with the government, limiting the struggle to brief and rapid attacks with lightning results;

(h) To assure for the urban guerrilla a maximum freedom of maneuver and of action without ever relinquishing the use of armed

violence, remaining firmly oriented towards helping the beginning of rural guerrilla warfare and supporting the construction of the revolutionary army for national liberation.

ON THE TYPES AND NATURE OF ACTION MODELS FOR THE URBAN GUERRILLA

In order to achieve the objectives previously enumerated, the urban guerrilla is obliged, in his technique, to follow an action whose nature is as different and as diversified as possible. The urban guerrilla does not arbitrarily choose this or that action model. Some actions are simple, others are complicated. The urban guerrilla without experience must be incorporated gradually into actions and operations that run from the simple to the complex. He begins with small missions and tasks until he becomes a completely experienced urban guerrilla.

Before any action, the urban guerrilla must think of the methods and the personnel at his disposal to carry out the action. Operations and actions that demand the urban guerrilla's technical preparation cannot be carried out by someone who lacks that technical skill. With these cautions, the action models that the urban guerrilla can carry out are the following:

- (a) assaults;
- (b) raids and penetrations;
- (c) occupations
- (d) ambush;
- (e) street tactics;
- (f) strikes and work interruptions;
- (g) desertions, diversions, seizures, expropriations of arms, ammunition, explosives;
- (h) liberation of prisoners;
- (i) executions;
- (j) kidnappings;
- (k) sabotage;
- (l) terrorism;
- (m) armed propaganda;
- (n) war of nerves.

ASSAULTS

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prisoners; capture explosives, machine guns and other types of arms and ammunition.

Assaults can take place in broad daylight or at night.

Daytime assaults are made when the objective cannot be achieved at any other hour, as, for example, the transport of money by the banks, which is not done at night.

Night assault is usually the most advantageous to the urban guerrilla. The ideal is for all assaults to take place at night when conditions for a surprise attack are most favorable and the darkness facilitates flight and hides the identity of the participants. The urban guerrilla must prepare himself, nevertheless, to act under all conditions, daytime as well as night-time.

The most vulnerable targets for assault are the following:

- (a) credit establishments;
- (b) commercial and industrial enterprises, including the production of arms and explosives;
- (c) military establishments;
- (d) commissaries and police stations;
- (e) jails
- (f) government property;
- (g) mass communication media;
- (h) North American firms and properties;
- (i) government vehicles, including military and police vehicles, trucks, armored vehicles, money carriers, trains, ships and planes.

The assaults on establishments are of the same nature because in every case the property and buildings represent a fixed target.

Assaults on buildings are conceived as guerrilla operations, varied according to whether they are against banks, a commercial enterprise, industries, military camps, commissaries, prisons, radio stations, warehouses for imperialist firms, etc.

The assaults on vehicles—money-carriers, armored cars, trains, ships, aircraft—are of another nature since they are moving targets. The nature of the operations varies according to the situation and the possibility, that is, whether the target is stationary or moving.

Armored cars, including military cars, are not immune to mines. Obstructed roads, traps, ruses, interception of other vehicles, Molotov cocktails and shooting with heavy arms are efficient methods of assaulting vehicles.

Heavy vehicles, grounded planes and anchored ships can be seized and their crews and guards overcome. Aircraft in flight can be diverted

from their course by guerrilla action or by one person.

Ships and trains in movement can be assaulted or taken by guerrilla operations in order to capture the arms and munitions or to prevent troop displacement.

THE BANK ASSAULT AS POPULAR MODEL

The most popular assault model is the bank assault. In Brazil, the urban guerrilla has begun a type of organized assault on the banks as a guerrilla operation. Today this type of assault is widely used and has served as a sort of preliminary examination for the urban guerrilla in his apprenticeship for the techniques of revolutionary warfare.

Important innovations in the technique of assaulting banks have developed, guaranteeing flight, the withdrawal of money, and the anonymity of those involved. Among these innovations we cite shooting the tires of cars to prevent pursuit; locking people in the bank bathroom, making them sit on the floor; immobilizing the bank guards and removing their arms; forcing someone to open the coffer or the strong box; using disguises.

Attempts to install bank alarms or to use guards or electronic detection devices of United States origin prove fruitless when the assault is political and is carried out according to urban guerrilla warfare techniques. This technique tries to utilize new resources to meet the enemy's tactical changes, has access to fire power that is growing every day, becomes increasingly astute and audacious, and uses a larger number of revolutionaries every time; all to guarantee the success of operations planned down to the last detail.

The bank assault is a typical expropriation. But, as is true in any kind of armed expropriatory action, the revolutionary is handicapped by a twofold competition:

- (a) competition from the outlaw;
- (b) competition from the right-wing counter revolutionary.

This competition produces confusion, which is reflected in the people's uncertainty. It is up to the urban guerrilla to prevent this from happening, and to accomplish this he must use two methods:

- (a) he must avoid the outlaw's technique, which is one of unnecessary violence and appropriation of goods and possessions belonging to the people;
- (b) he must use the assault for propaganda purposes, at the very moment it is taking place, and later distribute material, leaflets, every possible means of explaining the objectives and the principles of the

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RAIDS AND PENETRATION

Raids and penetration are quick attacks on establishments located in neighborhoods or even in the center of the city, such as small military units, commissaries, hospitals, to cause trouble, seize arms, punish and terrorize the enemy, take reprisal, or rescue wounded prisoners, or those hospitalized under police vigilance.

Raids and penetrations are also made on garages and depots to destroy vehicles and damage installations, especially if they are North American firms and property.

When they take place on certain stretches of the highway or in certain distant neighborhoods, the raids can serve to force the enemy to move great numbers of troops, a totally useless effort since he will find nobody there to fight.

When they are carried out in certain houses, offices, archives, or public offices, their purpose is to capture or search for secret papers and documents with which to denounce involvements, compromises, and the corruption of men in government, their dirty deals and criminal transactions with the North American.

Raids and penetrations are most effective if they are carried out at night.

OCCUPATIONS

Occupations are a type of attack carried out when the urban guerrilla stations himself in specific establishments and locations for a temporary resistance against the enemy or for some propaganda purpose.

The occupation of factories and schools during strikes or at other times is a method of protest or of distracting the enemy's attention.

The occupation of radio stations is for propaganda purposes.

Occupation is a highly effective model for action, but in order to prevent losses and material damage to our ranks, it is always a good idea to count on the possibility of withdrawal. It must always be meticulously planned and carried out at the opportune moment.

Occupation always has a time limit, and the faster it is completed, the better.

AMBUSH

Ambushes are attacks typified by surprise when the enemy is trapped across a road or when he makes a police net surrounding a house or an estate. A false message can bring the enemy to the spot where he falls into the trap.

The principal object of the ambush tactic is to capture enemy arms and punish him with death.

Ambushes to halt passenger trains are for propaganda purposes, and when they are troop trains, the object is to annihilate the enemy and seize his arms.

The urban guerrilla sniper is the kind of fighter especially suited for ambush because he can hide easily in the irregularities of the terrain, on the roofs and the tops of buildings and apartments under construction. From windows and dark places, he can take careful aim at his chosen target.

Ambush has devastating effects on the enemy, leaving him unnerved, insecure, and fearful.

STREET TACTICS

Street tactics are used to fight the enemy in the streets, utilizing the participation of the masses against him."

In 1968 the Brazilian students used excellent street tactics against police troops, such as marching down streets against traffic, utilizing slings and marbles as arms against the mounted police.

Other street tactics consist in constructing barricades; pulling up paving blocks and hurling them at the police; throwing bottles, bricks, paperweights, and other projectiles from the top of apartment and office buildings against the police; using buildings under construction for fleeing, for hiding, and for supporting surprise attacks.

It is equally necessary to know how to respond to enemy tactics. When the police troops come protected with helmets to defend themselves against flying objects, we have to divide ourselves into two teams: one to attack the enemy from the front, the other to attack him in the rear, withdrawing one as the other goes into action to prevent the first from becoming a target for projectiles hurled by the second.

By the same token, it is important to know how to respond to the police net. When the police designate certain of their men to go into the masses to arrest a demonstrator, a larger group of urban guerrillas must surround the police group, disarming and beating them and at the same time letting the prisoner escape. This urban guerrilla operation is called

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When the police net is formed at a school building, a factory, a place where the masses assemble, or some other point, the urban guerrilla must not give up or allow himself to be taken by surprise. To make his net work the enemy is obliged to transport the police in vehicles and special cars to occupy strategic points in the streets in order to invade the building or chosen locale. The urban guerrilla, for his part, must never clear a building or an area and meet in it without first knowing its exits, the way to break the circle, the strategic points that the police might occupy, and the roads that inevitably lead into the net, and he must hold other strategic points from which to strike at the enemy.

The roads followed by the police vehicles must be mined at key points along the way and at forced stopping points. When the mines explode, the vehicles will fly into the air. The police will be caught in the trap and will suffer losses or will be victims of ambush. The net must be broken by escape routes unknown to the police. The rigorous planning of the retreat is the best way of frustrating any encircling effort on the part of the enemy.

When there is no possibility of a flight plan, the urban guerrilla must not hold meetings, assemblies, or do anything else since to do so will prevent him from breaking through the net the enemy will surely try to throw around him.

Street tactics have revealed a new type of urban guerrilla, the urban guerrilla who participates in mass demonstrations. This is the type we designate as the urban guerrilla demonstrator, who joins the ranks and participates in popular marches with specific and definite aims.

These aims consist of hurling stones and projectiles of every type, using gasoline to start fires, using the police as a target for their firearms, capturing police arms, kidnapping agents of the enemy and *provocateurs*, shooting with careful aim at the henchmen torturers and the police chiefs who come in special cars with false plates in order not to attract attention.

The urban guerrilla demonstrator shows groups in the mass demonstration the flight route if that is necessary. He plants mines, throws Molotov cocktails, prepares ambushes and explosions.

The urban guerrilla demonstrator must also initiate the *net within the net*, going through government vehicles, official cars, and police vehicles before turning them over or setting them on fire, to see if any of them have money and arms.

Snipers are very good for mass demonstrations and, along with the urban guerrilla demonstrators, can play a valuable role.

Hidden at strategic points, the snipers have complete success, using shotguns, machine guns, etc., whose fire and recoil easily cause losses among the enemy.

STRIKES AND WORK INTERRUPTIONS

The strike is a model of action employed by the urban guerrilla in work centers and schools to damage the enemy by stopping work and study activities. Because it is one of the weapons most feared by the exploiters and oppressors, the enemy uses tremendous fighting power and incredible violence against it. The strikers are taken to prison, suffer beatings, and many of them wind up assassinated.

The urban guerrilla must prepare the strike in such a way as to leave no tracks or clues that identify the leaders of the action. A strike is successful when it is organized through the action of a small group, if it is carefully prepared in secret and by the most clandestine methods.

Arms, ammunition, Molotovs, homemade weapons of destruction and attack, all this must be supplied beforehand in order to meet the enemy. So that it can do the greatest possible damage, it is a good idea to study and put into effect a sabotage plan.

Work and study interruptions, although they are of brief duration, cause severe damage to the enemy. It is enough for them to crop up at different points and in different sections of the same area, disrupting daily life, occurring endlessly one after the other, in authentic guerrilla fashion.

In strikes or simple work interruptions, the urban guerrilla has recourse to occupation or penetration of the locale or can simply make a raid. In that case his objective is to take hostages, to capture prisoners or to kidnap enemy agents and propose an exchange for the arrested strikers.

In certain cases, strikes and brief work interruptions can offer an excellent opportunity for preparing ambushes or traps whose aim is the physical liquidation of the cruel, bloody police.

The basic fact is that the enemy suffers losses and material and moral damage, and is weakened by the action.

DESERTIONS, DIVERSIONS, SEIZURES, EXPROPRIATIONS OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, EXPLOSIVES

Desertion and the diversion of arms are actions effected in military camps, ships, military hospitals, etc. The urban guerrilla soldier, chief, sergeant, subofficial, and official must desert at the most opportune

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One of the opportune moments is when the military urban guerrilla is called upon to pursue and to fight his guerrilla comrades outside the military quarters. Instead of following the orders of the gorillas, the military urban guerrilla must join the revolutionaries by handing over the arms and ammunition he carries or the military plane he pilots.

The advantage of this method is that the revolutionaries receive arms and ammunition from the army, the navy, and the air force, the military police, the civilian guard, or the firemen without any great work, since it reaches their hands by government transport.

Other opportunities may occur in the barracks, and the military urban guerrilla must always be alert to this. In case of carelessness on the part of the commanders or in other favorable conditions, such as bureaucratic attitudes and behavior or relaxation of discipline on the part of sublieutenants and other internal personnel, the military urban guerrilla must no longer wait but must try to advise the organizations and desert alone or accompanied, but with as large a supply of arms as possible.

With information from and participation of the military urban guerrilla, raids on barracks and other military establishments for the purpose of capturing arms can be organized.

When there is no possibility of deserting and taking arms and ammunition, the military urban guerrilla must engage in sabotage, starting explosions and fires in munitions and gunpowder.

This technique of deserting with arms and ammunition, of raiding and sabotaging the military centers, is the best way of wearing out and demoralizing the gorillas and leaving them confused.

The urban guerrilla's purpose in disarming an individual enemy is to capture his arms. These arms are usually in the hands of sentinels or others whose task is guard duty or repression.

The capture of arms may be accomplished by violent means or by astuteness and by tricks or traps. When the enemy is disarmed, he must be searched for arms other than those already taken from him. If we are careless, he can use the arms that were seized to shoot the urban guerrilla.

The seizure of arms is an efficient method of acquiring machine guns, the urban guerrilla's most important arms.

When we carry out small operations or actions to seize arms and ammunition, the material captured may be for personal use or for armaments and supplies for the firing groups.

The necessity to provide firing power for the urban guerrilla is so great that, in order to take off from zero point, we often have to purchase one weapon, divert or capture a single arm. The basic point is to begin, and to begin with a great spirit of decisiveness and of boldness. The possession of a single arm multiplies our forces.

In a bank assault, we must be careful to seize the arm or arms of the bank guard. The remainder of the arms we find with the treasurer, the bank teller, or the manager must also be seized ahead of time.

The other method we can use to capture arms is the preparation of ambushes against the police and the cars they use to move around in.

Quite often we succeed in capturing arms in the police commissaries as a result of raids from outside.

The expropriation of arms, ammunition, and explosives is the urban guerrilla's goal in assaulting commercial houses, industries, and quarries.

LIBERATION OF PRISONERS

The liberation of prisoners is an armed operation designed to free the jailed urban guerrilla. In daily struggle against the enemy, the urban guerrilla is subject to arrest and can be sentenced to unlimited years in jail. This does not mean that the revolutionary battle stops here. For the guerrilla, his experience is deepened by prison and continues even in the dungeons where he is held.

The imprisoned urban guerrilla views jail as a terrain he must dominate and understand in order to free himself by a guerrilla operation. There is no prison, either on an island, in a city penitentiary, or on a farm, that is impregnable to the slyness, the cleverness, and the firing potential of the revolutionaries.

The urban guerrilla who is free views the penal establishments of the enemy as the inevitable site of guerrilla action designed to liberate his ideological brothers from prison.

It is this combination of *the urban guerrilla in freedom and the urban guerrilla in jail* that results in the armed operations we refer to as the liberation of prisoners.

The guerrilla operations that can be used in liberating prisoners are the following:

- (a) riots in penal establishments, in correctional colonies and islands, or on transport or prison ships;
- (b) assaults on urban or rural penitentiaries, houses of detention, commissaries, prisoner depots, or any other permanent, occa-

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- sional, or temporary place where prisoners are held;
- (c) assaults on prisoner transport trains and cars;
- (d) raids and penetrations of prisons;
- (e) ambushing of guards who are moving prisoners.

EXECUTION

Execution is the killing of a North American spy, of an agent of the dictatorship, of a police torturer, of a fascist personality in the government involved in crimes and persecutions against patriots, of a stool pigeon, informer, police agent, or police *provocateur*.

Those who go to the police of their own free will to make denunciations and accusations, who supply clues and information and finger people, must also be executed when they are caught by the urban guerrilla.

Execution is a secret action in which the least possible number of urban guerrillas are involved. In many cases, the execution can be carried out by one sniper, patiently, alone and unknown, and operating in absolute secrecy and in cold blood.

KIDNAPPING

Kidnapping is capturing and holding in a secret spot a police agent, a North American spy, a political personality, or a notorious and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement.

Kidnapping is used to exchange or liberate imprisoned comrades, or to force suspension of torture in the jail cells of the military dictatorship.

The kidnapping of personalities who are known artists, sports figures, or are outstanding in some other field, but who have evidenced no political interest, can be a useful form of propaganda for the revolutionary and patriotic principles of the urban guerrilla, provided it occurs under special circumstances and provided the kidnapping is handled so that the public sympathizes with it and accepts it.

The kidnapping of North American residents or visitors in Brazil constitutes a form of protest against the penetration and domination of United States imperialism in our country.

SABOTAGE

Sabotage is a highly destructive type of attack using very few persons and sometimes requiring only one to accomplish the desired result.

When the urban guerrilla uses sabotage the first phase is isolated sabotage. Then comes the phase of dispersed and generalized sabotage carried out by the people.

Well-executed sabotage demands study, planning, and careful execution. A characteristic form of sabotage is explosion using dynamite, fire, and the placing of mines.

A little sand, a trickle of any kind of combustible, a poor lubrication, a screw removed, a short circuit, pieces of wood or of iron, can cause irreparable damage.

The objective of sabotage is to hurt, to damage, to make useless and to destroy vital enemy points such as the following:

- (a) the economy of the country;
- (b) agricultural and industrial production;
- (c) transport and communications systems;
- (d) the military and police systems and their establishments and deposits;
- (e) the repressive military-police system;
- (f) the firms and properties of North Americans in the country.

The urban guerrilla should endanger the economy of the country, particularly its economic and financial aspects, such as its domestic and foreign commercial network, its exchange and banking systems, its tax collection system, and others.

Public offices, centers of government services and government warehouses are easy targets for sabotage.

Nor will it be easy to prevent the sabotage of agricultural and industrial production by the urban guerrilla, with his thorough knowledge of the local situation.

Industrial workers acting as urban guerrillas are excellent industrial saboteurs since they, better than anyone, understand the industry, the factory, the machine, or the part most likely to destroy an entire operation, doing far more damage than a poorly informed layman could do.

With respect to the enemy's transport and communications systems, beginning with railway traffic, it is necessary to attack them systematically with sabotage arms.

The only caution is against causing death and fatal injury to passengers, especially regular commuters on suburban and long-distance trains.

Attacks on freight trains, rolling or stationary stock, stoppage of military transport and communications systems, are the major sabotage objectives in this area.

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Sleepers can be damaged and pulled up, as can rails. A tunnel blocked by a barrier after an explosion or an obstruction by a derailed car cause tremendous harm.

The derailment of a cargo train carrying fuel is of major damage to the enemy. So is dynamiting railway bridges. In a system where the weight and the size of the rolling equipment is enormous, it takes months for workers to repair or rebuild the destruction and damage.

As for highways, they can be obstructed by trees, stationary vehicles, ditches, dislocations of barriers by dynamite and bridges blown up by explosion.

Ships can be damaged at anchor in seaports and river ports or in the shipyards. Aircraft can be destroyed or sabotaged on the ground.

Telephonic and telegraphic lines can be systematically damaged, their towers blown up and their lines made useless.

Transport and communications must be sabotaged at once because the revolutionary war has already begun in Brazil, and it is essential to impede the enemy's movement of troops and munitions.

Oil lines, fuel plants, depots for bombs and ammunition, powder magazines and arsenals, military camps, commissaries must become targets *par excellence* in sabotage operations, while vehicles, army trucks, and other military and police cars must be destroyed wherever they are found.

The military and police repression centers and their specific and specialized organs, must also claim the attention of the urban guerrilla saboteur.

North American firms and properties in the country, for their part, must become such frequent targets of sabotage that the volume of actions directed against them surpasses the total of all other actions against vital enemy points.

TERRORISM

Terrorism is an action, usually involving the placement of a bomb or fire explosion of great destructive power, which is capable of effecting irreparable loss against the enemy.

Terrorism requires that the urban guerrilla should have an adequate theoretical and practical knowledge of how to make explosives.

The terrorist act, apart from the apparent facility with which it can be carried out, is no different from other urban guerrilla acts and actions whose success depends on the planning and determination of the revolutionary organization. It is an action the urban guerrilla must

execute with the greatest cold bloodedness, calmness, and decision.

Although terrorism generally involves an explosion, there are cases in which it may also be carried out by execution and the systematic burning of installations, properties, and North American depots, plantations, etc. It is essential to point out the importance of fires and the construction of incendiary bombs, such as gasoline bombs, in the technique of revolutionary terrorism. Another thing is the importance of the material the urban guerrilla can persuade the people to expropriate in moments of hunger and scarcity resulting from the greed of the big commercial interests.

Terrorism is an arm the revolutionary can never relinquish.

ARMED PROPAGANDA

The coordination of urban guerrilla actions, including each armed action, is the principal way of making armed propaganda.

These actions, carried out with specific and determined objectives, inevitably become propaganda material for the mass communications systems.

Bank assaults, ambushes, desertions and diverting of arms, the rescue of prisoners, executions, kidnappings, sabotage, terrorism, and the war of nerves are all cases in point.

Aircraft diverted in flight by revolutionary action and moving ships and trains assaulted and seized by guerrillas can also be solely for propaganda effects.

But the urban guerrilla must never fail to install a clandestine press and must be able to turn out mimeographed copies using alcohol or electric plates and other duplicating apparatus, expropriating what he cannot buy in order to produce small clandestine newspapers, pamphlets, flyers and stamps for propaganda and agitation against the dictatorship.

The urban guerrilla engaged in clandestine printing facilitates enormously the incorporation of large numbers of people into the revolutionary struggle by opening a permanent work front for those willing to carry on revolutionary propaganda, even when to do so means acting alone and risking their lives as revolutionaries.

With the existence of clandestine propaganda and agitational material, the inventive spirit of the urban guerrilla expands and creates catapults, artifacts, mortars, and other instruments with which to distribute the antigovernment pamphlets at a distance.

Tape recordings, loudspeakers, and other forms.

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Tape recordings, the occupation of radio stations, and the use of loudspeakers, drawings on walls and in other inaccessible places are other forms of propaganda.

In using them, the urban guerrilla should give them the character of armed operations.

A consistent propaganda by letters sent to specific addresses, explaining the meaning of the urban guerrillas' armed actions, produces considerable results and is one method of influencing certain segments of the population.

Even this influence exercised in the heart of the people by every possible propaganda device revolving around the activity of the urban guerrilla does not indicate that our forces have everyone's support.

It is enough to win the support of a part of the people and this can be done by popularizing the following slogan: "Let he who does not wish to do anything for the revolutionaries, do nothing against them."

THE WAR OF NERVES

The war of nerves or psychological war is an aggressive technique based on the direct or indirect use of mass means of communication and news transmitted orally in order to demoralize the government. In psychological warfare, the government is always at a disadvantage since it imposes censorship on the mass media and winds up in a defensive position by not allowing anything against it to filter through.

At this point it becomes desperate, is involved in greater contradictions and loss of prestige, and loses time and energy in an exhausting effort at control, which is subject to being broken at any moment.

The object of the war of nerves is to misinform, spreading lies among the authorities, in which everyone can participate, thus creating an air of nervousness, discredit, insecurity, uncertainty, and concern on the part of the government.

The best methods used by the urban guerrilla in the war of nerves are the following:

- (a) using the telephone and the mail to announce false clues to the police and the government, including information on the planting of bombs and any other act of terrorism in public offices and other places, kidnapping and assassination plans, etc., to oblige the authorities to wear themselves out, following up the information fed them;
- (b) letting false plans fall into the hands of the police to divert their attention;

- (c) planting rumors to make the government uneasy;
- (d) exploiting by every means possible the corruption, the errors, and the failures of the government and its representatives, forcing them into demoralizing explanations and justifications in the very mass communications media they maintain under censorship;
- (e) presenting denunciations to foreign embassies, the United Nations, the papal nunciature, and the international judicial commissions defending human rights or freedom of the press, exposing each concrete violation and use of violence by the military dictatorship and making it known that the revolutionary war will continue its course with serious danger for the enemies of the people.

HOW TO CARRY OUT THE ACTION

The urban guerrilla who correctly carries through his apprenticeship and training must give the greatest importance to his method of carrying out action, for in this he cannot commit the slightest error.

Any carelessness in the assimilation of the method and its use invites certain disaster, as experience teaches every day.

The outlaws commit errors frequently because of their methods, and this is one of the reasons why the urban guerrillas must be so insistently preoccupied with following the revolutionary technique and not the technique of the bandits.

And this is not the only reason. There is no urban guerrilla worthy of the name who ignores the revolutionary method of action and fails to practice it rigorously in the planning and execution of his activity.

The giant is known by his toe. The same can be said of the urban guerrilla who is known from afar for his correct methods and his absolute fidelity to principles.

The revolutionary method of carrying out action is strong and forcefully based on the knowledge and use of the following elements:

- (a) investigation of information;
- (b) observation;
- (c) reconnaissance or exploration of the terrain;
- (d) study and timing of routes;
- (e) mapping;
- (f) mechanization;
- (g) selection of personnel and relief;
- (h) selection of firing capacity;

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- (i) study and practice in completion;
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- (k) cover;
- (l) retreat;
- (m) dispersal
- (n) liberation or transfer of prisoners;
- (o) elimination of clues;
- (p) rescue of wounded.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE METHOD

When there is no information, the point of departure for the planning of the action must be investigation, observation, or *paquera*. This method also has good results.

In any event, including when there is information, it is essential to take observations or *paquera*, to see that the information is not at odds with observation or *vice versa*.

Reconnaissance or exploration of the terrain, study and timing of routes are so important that to omit them is to make a stab in the dark.

Mechanization, in general, is an underestimated factor in the method of conducting the action. Frequently mechanization is left to the end, to the eye of the action, before anything is done about it.

This is an error. Mechanization must be considered seriously, must be undertaken with considerable foresight and according to careful planning, also based on information, observation, or *paquera*, and must be carried out with rigorous care and precision. The care, conservation, maintenance, and camouflaging of the vehicles expropriated are very important details of mechanization.

When transport fails, the principal action fails with serious moral and material consequences for the urban guerrilla activity.

The selection of personnel requires great care to avoid the inclusion of indecisive or vacillating personnel with the danger of contaminating the other participants, a difficulty that must be avoided.

The withdrawal is equal to or more important than the operation itself, to the point that it must be rigorously planned, including the possibility of failure.

One must avoid rescue or transfer of prisoners with children present, or anything to attract the attention of people in casual transit through the area. The best thing is to make the rescue as natural as possible, always winding through, or using different routes or narrow streets that scarcely permit passage on foot, to avoid an encounter of two cars. The

elimination of tracks is obligatory and demands the greatest caution in hiding fingerprints and any other sign that could give the enemy information. Lack of care in the elimination of tracks and clues is a factor that increases nervousness in our ranks and that the enemy often exploits.

RESCUE OF THE WOUNDED

The problem of the wounded in urban guerrilla warfare merits special attention. During guerrilla operations in the urban area, it may happen that some comrade is accidentally wounded or shot by the police. When a guerrilla in the firing group has a knowledge of first aid he can do something for the wounded comrade on the spot. In no circumstances can the wounded urban guerrilla be abandoned at the site of the battle or left to the enemy's hands.

One of the precautions we must take is to set up nursing courses for men and women, courses in which the urban guerrilla can matriculate and learn the elementary techniques of first aid.

The urban guerrilla doctor, student of medicine, nurse, pharmacologist, or simply the person trained in first aid is a necessity in modern revolutionary struggle.

A small manual of first aid for the urban guerrilla, printed on mimeographed sheets, can also be undertaken by anyone who has enough knowledge.

In planning and completing an armed action, the urban guerrilla cannot forget the organization of medical logistics. This will be accomplished by means of a mobile or motorized clinic. You can also set up a mobile first aid station. Another solution is to utilize the skills of a nursing comrade who waits with his bag of equipment in a designated house to which the wounded are brought.

The ideal would be to have our own well-equipped clinic, but this is very costly unless we use expropriated materials.

When all else fails, it is often necessary to resort to legal clinics, using armed force if necessary to demand that the doctors attend to our wounded.

In the eventuality that we fall back on blood banks to buy blood or whole plasma, we must not use legal addresses and certainly not addresses where the wounded can really be found, since they are under our care and protection, nor should we supply addresses of those involved in the organization's clandestine work to the hospitals and health centers where we take them. Such concerns are indispensable to cover any track or clue.

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The houses in which the wounded stay cannot be known to anybody with the unique and exclusive exception of the small group of comrades responsible for their treatment and transport.

Sheets, bloody clothing, medicine, and any other indication of treatment of the comrades wounded in combat with the police, must be completely eliminated from any place they visit to receive medical treatment.

GUERRILLA SECURITY

The urban guerrilla lives in constant danger of the possibility of being discovered or denounced. The chief security problem is to make certain that we are well hidden and well guarded and that there are secure methods to keep the police from locating us or our whereabouts.

The worst enemy of the urban guerrilla and the major danger we run is infiltration into our organization by a spy or an informer.

The spy trapped within the organization will be punished with death. The same goes for those who desert and inform the police.

A good security is the certainty that the enemy has no spies and agents infiltrated in our midst and can receive no information about us even by indirect or distant means. The fundamental way to ensure this is to be cautious and strict in recruiting.

It is not permissible for everyone to know everyone and everything else. Each person should know only what relates to his work. This rule is a fundamental point in the ABCs of urban guerrilla security.

The battle that we are waging against the enemy is arduous and difficult because it is a class struggle. Every class struggle is a battle of life or death when the classes are antagonistic.

The enemy wants to annihilate us and fights relentlessly to find us and destroy us, so that our great weapon consists in hiding from him and attacking him by surprise.

Then danger to the urban guerrilla is that he may reveal himself through imprudence or allow himself to be discovered through lack of class vigilance. It is inadmissible for the urban guerrilla to give out his own or any other clandestine address to the enemy or to talk too much. Annotations in the margins of newspapers, lost documents, calling cards, letters or notes, all these are clues that the police never underestimate.

Address and telephone books must be destroyed and one must not write or hold papers; it is necessary to avoid keeping archives of legal or illegal names, biographical information, maps, and plans. The points

of contact should not be written down but simply committed to memory.

The urban guerrilla who violates these rules must be warned by the first one who notes his infraction, and if he repeats it, we must avoid working with him.

The need of the urban guerrilla to move about constantly and the relative proximity of the police, given the circumstances of the strategic police net that surrounds the city, forces him to adopt variable security methods depending on the enemy's movements.

For this reason it is necessary to maintain a service of daily news about what the enemy appears to be doing, where his police net is operating and what gorges and points of strangulation are being watched. The daily reading of police news in the newspapers is a great fountain of information in these cases.

The most important lesson for guerrilla security is never, under any circumstances, to permit the slightest sign of laxity in the maintenance of security measures and regulations within the organization.

Guerrilla security must be maintained also and principally in cases of arrest. The arrested guerrilla can reveal nothing to the police that will jeopardize the organization. He can say nothing that may lead, as a consequence, to the arrest of other comrades, the discovery of addresses and hiding places, the loss of arms and ammunition.

THE SEVEN SINS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

Even when the urban guerrilla applies his revolutionary technique with precision and rigorously abides by security rules, he can still be vulnerable to errors. There is no perfect urban guerrilla. The most he can do is to make every effort to diminish the margin of error since he cannot be perfect.

One of the methods we should use to diminish the margin of error is to know thoroughly the seven sins of the urban guerrilla and try to fight them.

The first sin of the urban guerrilla is inexperience. The urban guerrilla, blinded by this sin, thinks the enemy is stupid, underestimates his intelligence, believes everything is easy and, as a result, leaves clues that can lead to his disaster.

Because of his inexperience, the urban guerrilla can also overestimate the forces of the enemy, believing them to be stronger than they really are. Allowing himself to be fooled by this presumption, the urban guerrilla becomes intimidated and remains insecure and indecisive,

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The second sin of the urban guerrilla is to boast about the actions he has completed and broadcast them to the four winds.

The third sin of the urban guerrilla is vanity. The urban guerrilla who suffers from this sin tries to solve the problems of the revolution by actions erupting in the city, but without bothering about the beginnings and the survival of the guerrilla in rural areas. Blinded by success, he winds up organizing an action that he considers decisive and that puts into play all the forces and resources of the organization. Since the city is the area of the strategic circle that we cannot avoid or break while rural guerrilla warfare has not yet erupted and is not at the point of triumph, we always run the fatal error of permitting the enemy to attack us with decisive blows.

The fourth sin of the urban guerrilla is to exaggerate his strength and to undertake projects for which he lacks forces and, as yet, does not have the required infrastructure.

The fifth sin of the urban guerrilla is precipitous action. The urban guerrilla who commits this sin loses patience, suffers an attack of nerves, does not wait for anything, and impetuously throws himself into action, suffering untold reverses.

The sixth sin of the urban guerrilla is to attack the enemy when he is most angry.

The seventh sin of the urban guerrilla is to fail to plan things and to act out of improvisation.

POPULAR SUPPORT

One of the permanent concerns of the urban guerrilla is his identification with popular causes to win public support.

Where government actions become inept and corrupt, the urban guerrilla should not hesitate to step in to show that he opposes the government and to gain mass sympathy. The present government, for example, imposes heavy financial burdens and excessively high taxes on people. It is up to the urban guerrilla to attack the dictatorship's tax collection system and to obstruct its financial activity, throwing all the weight of violent revolutionary action against it.

The urban guerrilla fights not only to upset the tax and collection system; the arm of revolutionary violence must also be directed against those government organs that raise prices and those who direct them, as well as against the wealthiest of the national and foreign profiteers and the important property owners; in short, against all those who

accumulate huge fortunes out of the high cost of living, the wages of hunger, excessive prices and rents.

Foreign trusts, such as refrigeration and other North American plants that monopolize the market and the manufacture of general food supplies, must be systematically attacked by the urban guerrilla.

The rebellion of the urban guerrilla and his persistence in intervening in public questions is the best way of ensuring public support of the cause we defend. We repeat and insist on repeating: *it is the best way of ensuring public support*. As soon as a reasonable section of the population begins to take seriously the action of the urban guerrilla, his success is guaranteed.

The government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police networks, house searches, arrests of innocent people and of suspects, closing off streets, make life in the city unbearable. The military dictatorship embarks on a massive political persecution. Political assassinations and police terror become routine.

In spite of all this, the police systematically fail. The armed forces, the navy, and the air force are mobilized and undertake routine police functions. Even so, they find no way to halt guerrilla operations nor to wipe out the revolutionary organization with its fragmented groups that move around and operate throughout the national territory persistently and contagiously.

The people refuse to collaborate with the authorities, and the general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents.

The political situation in the country is transformed into a military situation in which the guerrillas appear more and more to be the ones responsible for errors and violence, while the problems in the lives of the people become truly catastrophic.

When they see the militarists and the dictatorship on the brink of the abyss, and fearing the consequences of a revolutionary war that is already at a fairly advanced and irreversible level, the pacifiers, always to be found within the ruling classes, and the right-wing opportunists, partisans of nonviolent struggle, join hands and circulate rumors behind the scenes, begging the hangmen for elections, "redemocratization," constitutional reforms, and other tripe designed to fool the masses and make them stop the revolutionary rebellion in the cities and the rural areas of the country.

But, watching the revolutionaries, the people now understand that it is a farce to vote in elections that have as their sole objective

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Attacking wholeheartedly this election farce and the so-called "political solution" so appealing to the opportunists, the urban guerrilla must become more aggressive and violent, resorting without let-up to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations, assaults, kidnappings, executions, etc.

This answers any attempt to fool the masses with the opening of Congress and the reorganization of political parties—parties of the government and of the opposition it allows—when all the time the parliament and the so-called parties function thanks to the license of the military dictatorship in a true spectacle of marionettes and dogs on a leash.

The role of the urban guerrilla, in order to win the support of the people, is to continue fighting, keeping in mind the interests of the masses and heightening the disastrous situation in which the government must act. These are the circumstances, disastrous for the dictatorship, that permit the revolutionaries to open rural guerrilla warfare in the midst of the uncontrollable expansion of urban rebellion.

The urban guerrilla is engaged in revolutionary action in favor of the people and with it seeks the participation of the masses in the struggle against the military dictatorship and for the liberation of the country from the yoke of the United States. Beginning with the city and with the support of the people, the rural guerrilla war develops rapidly, establishing its infrastructure carefully while the urban area continues the rebellion.

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE, SCHOOL FOR SELECTING THE GUERRILLA

Revolution is a social phenomenon that depends on men, arms and resources. Arms and resources exist in the country and can be taken and used, but to do this, it is necessary to count on men. Without them, the arms and the resources have no use and no value. For their part, the men must have two basic and indispensable obligatory qualities:

- (a) they must have a politicorevolutionary motivation;
- (b) they must have the necessary technical-revolutionary preparation.

Men with a politicorevolutionary motivation are found among the vast and clearheaded contingents of enemies of the military dictatorship and of the domination of United States imperialism.

Almost daily such men gravitate to urban guerrilla warfare, and it is

for this reason that the reaction no longer announces that it has thwarted the revolutionaries and goes through the unpleasantness of seeing them rise up again out of their own ashes.

The men who are best trained, most experienced, and dedicated to urban guerrilla warfare and at the same time to rural guerrilla warfare, constitute the backbone of the revolutionary war and, therefore, of the Brazilian revolution. From this backbone will come the marrow of the revolutionary army of national liberation, rising out of guerrilla warfare.

This is the central nucleus, not the bureaucrats and opportunists hidden in the organizational structure, not the empty conferees, the clichéd writers of resolutions that remain on paper, but rather the men who fight—the men who from the very first have been determined and ready for anything, who personally participate in revolutionary actions, who do not waver or deceive.

This is the nucleus indoctrinated and disciplined with a long-range strategic and tactical vision consistent with the application of Marxist theory, of Leninism and of Castro-Guevara developments applied to the specific conditions of the Brazilian situation. This is the nucleus that will lead the rebellion through its guerrilla phase.

From it will come men and women with politicomilitary development, one and indivisible, whose task will be that of future leaders after the triumph of the revolution, in the construction of the new Brazilian society.

As of now, the men and women chosen for urban guerrilla warfare are workers; peasants whom the city has attracted as a market for manpower and who return to the countryside indoctrinated and politically and technically prepared; students, intellectuals, priests. This is the material with which we are building—starting with urban guerrilla warfare—the armed alliance of workers and peasants, with students, intellectuals, priests.

Workers have infinite knowledge in the industrial sphere and are best for urban revolutionary tasks. The urban guerrilla worker participates in the struggle by constructing arms, sabotaging and preparing saboteurs and dynamiters, and personally participating in actions involving hand arms, or organizing strikes and partial paralysis with the characteristics of mass violence in factories, workshops and other work centers.

The peasants have an extraordinary intuition for knowledge of the land, judgment in confronting the enemy, and the indispensable ability to communicate with the humble masses. The peasant guerrilla is

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already participating in our struggle, and it is he who reaches the guerrilla core; establishes support points in the countryside; finds hiding places for individuals, arms, munitions, supplies; organizes the sowing and harvesting of grain for use in the guerrilla war; chooses the points of transport, cattle raising posts, and sources of meat supplies; trains the guides that show the rural guerrillas the road; and creates an information service in the countryside.

Students are noted for being politically crude and coarse, and thus, they break all the taboos. When they are integrated into urban guerrilla warfare, as is now occurring on a wide scale, they show a special talent for revolutionary violence and soon acquire a high level of political-technical-military skill. Students have plenty of free time on their hands because they are systematically separated, suspended, and expelled from school by the dictatorship, and so, they begin to spend their time advantageously, on behalf of the revolution.

The intellectuals constitute the vanguard of resistance to arbitrary acts, social injustice, and the terrible inhumanity of the dictatorship of the guerrillas. They spread the revolutionary call and they have great influence on people. The urban guerrilla intellectual or artist is the most modern of the Brazilian revolution's adherents.

Churchmen, those ministers or priests and religious men of various hierarchies and persuasions, represent a sector that has special ability to communicate with the people, particularly with workers, peasants, and the Brazilian woman. The priest who is an urban guerrilla is an active ingredient in the ongoing Brazilian revolutionary war, and constitutes a powerful arm in the struggle against military power and North American imperialism.

As for the Brazilian woman, her participation in the revolutionary war, and particularly in urban guerrilla warfare, has been marked by an unmatched fighting spirit and tenacity, and it is not by chance that so many women have been accused of participation in guerrilla actions against banks, quarries, military centers, etc., and that so many are in prison while others are sought by the police.

As a school for choosing the guerrilla, urban guerrilla warfare prepares and places at the same level of responsibility and efficiency the men and women who share the same dangers of fighting, rounding up supplies, serving as messengers or runners, as drivers, sailors, or aircraft pilots, obtaining secret information, and helping with propaganda and the task of indoctrination.

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Appendix B

SAMPLE EXECUTIVE PROTECTION PROGRAM OF AN AMERICAN BASED MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION

PURPOSE

To establish guidelines for preventing and, if necessary, reacting to criminal and terrorist activities perpetrated against Company personnel.

POLICY

Company executives are primarily responsible for the safety and security of themselves and their families. Security will provide Company executives with a security framework that will assist them in their protection efforts. When deemed necessary, physical measures will be taken by the Company to protect the well-being of its personnel.

The following procedures are provided in an effort to lessen the possibility of company personnel falling victim to criminals and terrorists.

PROCEDURE

The threat of a kidnapping or extortion attempt will vary by location. Within these different locations, lines of communication should be established between Company security functions and local, state and federal government law enforcement agencies. In foreign locations a liaison should be established with the Regional Security Officer at the United States Embassy or Consulate.

In developing a threat assessment, it is necessary to determine the overall criminal and/or terrorist threat for the location concerned and the extent to which companies such as ours, and in the case of foreign locations United States companies, and their employees have been targets. Once general information has been gathered, it is then necessary to develop detailed, specific information on each incident. Political conditions that may affect the locations of Company facilities and

vulnerable employees' domiciles should be determined at the same time. Once this type of information has been outlined, in detail, a realistic protection program for Company executives can be constructed.

Since the risk level of executives and employees will vary, identify those considered most vulnerable and apply extra security precautions accordingly. Normally, the most vulnerable personnel are those which are most prominent or visible, i.e. general managers, facility managers and senior financial managers. Staff management personnel are normally not very visible, with the exception of senior administrative positions. Not only are victims chosen for their prominence, but they are also chosen for their affluence or symbolic value. In foreign countries, American expatriates holding managerial positions are symbolic figures, although not necessarily prominent or affluent. In the same vein, foreign nationals holding senior managerial positions with American companies in foreign countries are usually considered by the average person as being affluent, prominent and symbolic figures.

Affirmative actions, including Company and individual security precautions, will be determined by the severity of a threat. However, since kidnapping and extortion attempts cannot be predicted regardless of the accuracy of intelligence data available, apparent lack of a valid threat will not obviate the necessity for appropriate management personnel to familiarize themselves with these instructions.

There are actions that each company location should take to prevent or discourage possible kidnapping or extortion attempts and assure proper reaction if an incident should occur.

These actions include but are not limited to the following:

1. Establish and maintain a physical security program for all facilities in accordance with *Security and Asset Protection*.

Access to facilities must be controlled at all times, including nonworking hours. Visitors will be escorted at all times while on Company property; employees working during nonbusiness hours will sign in and out.

2. Disclosure or dissemination of information concerning top executives and their families will be closely monitored, particularly travel plans. Restrict home addresses and telephone numbers of these persons.

3. Screen requests for information concerning Company employees. Do not disclose such information unless the source is determined to be legitimate and the information is approved for release.

4. Executives and members of their families will be specifically briefed or provided information concerning personal security pre-

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cautions to be taken. Frequency and scope of briefing will be dictated by threat assessment for the area concerned.

5. Jurisdiction over offenses of kidnapping and extortion will be determined and agencies to be notified made a matter of record for future ready reference. Kidnapping is not always a *federal crime*. Do not automatically call the FBI, RCMP, Scotland Yard or Interpol. In many cases, kidnapping is a *local crime* (at least in the early stages when prompt action is essential). Develop Company response plans with local law enforcement and follow their guidelines. Normally, in the United States, local city, county or state police have initial primary jurisdiction over kidnapping. However, if the victim is not released within twenty-four hours, a presumption is made that the victim has been transported across state lines, and this permits the FBI to enter the case. If interstate communication of a kidnap threat or ransom demand occurs, the FBI also has jurisdiction.

6. A confidential profile should be prepared on executives considered vulnerable to threat of kidnapping. These profiles may be maintained by executive's secretaries if there is an objection to providing them to the Security Department. The profile is to provide information that can be used to determine if a kidnapping is authentic and the victim is still alive and well before negotiations are undertaken with the abductors. There have been occasions when extortionists claimed to have kidnapped either the wife or children, when in fact the family was not at home. Profiles should contain the following for all family members:

- a. Full name, including middle name and nicknames (useful for codes or identification).
- b. Physical description such as; height, weight, coloring including hairpieces and wigs; eyeglasses and hearing aids.
- c. Scars or special identifying marks.
- d. Date and place of birth (also useful for code or identification).
- e. Names, addresses, telephone numbers of doctors, dentists, pharmacists, etc. (Access to these records may be essential to victim's health and welfare.)
- f. Special medication requirements.
- g. Locations and telephone numbers of spouse and adult children's employment or regular volunteer activity.
- h. Names, addresses, telephone numbers of schools plus names of school principals.

i. Names, locations and telephone numbers, including instructors' home telephone numbers, for recreational classes of children and adults.

j. Regularly scheduled events (hairstresser appointments, association dinners, etc.) including times, dates, locations, telephone numbers.

k. Auto registration, descriptions, license numbers.

l. Simple floor plan of residence and vacation homes with addresses.

m. Recent photographs of persons listed. Photos may be simple full-face Polaroid shots. The photographs should be kept current.

n. Other data pertinent to complete individual profiles.

7. Establish a procedure and brief persons likely to receive telephonic notice of a kidnapping or extortion attempt to assure that they do the following:

a. Obtain maximum information from the caller to help in determining if the threat is genuine and whether the demand has terrorist or criminal overtones. Be sure to obtain *call back* times and locations.

b. Make written notes of details which may help police, such as sex of caller, accent, background noises, and anything unusual.

c. Keep the caller engaged in conversation as long as possible. The more he talks, the greater chance he may let *slip* a vital detail. Try to communicate with the alleged victim.

d. Alert appropriate law enforcement agencies but specify silent approach. Identify specific police officers to be consulted, and keep a record of their names, positions and telephone numbers. Be prepared to furnish all facts pertinent to the incident. In some localities, there may be definite reasons to contact one law enforcement agency rather than another. This matter should be clearly resolved prior to any incident.

e. Make a list of readily available and secure telephones for use on a short notice to communicate with kidnappers.

f. If technical equipment is available, tape all conversations with kidnappers.

Bomb threats are usually made to switchboards or rank and file employees (terrorists hope they'll be unprepared and panic). But kidnap-extortion calls are made to either a family member or to management (an extortionist wanting hundreds of thousands of dollars is not going to leave a message, hoping it gets to the decision-makers).

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8. Designate an Emergency Response Team. Minimum composition should include the following plus anyone else uniquely able to contribute to resolution of the problem:

SECURITY. Security officers will coordinate details of the Company contingency plan—externally with police, internally with management, their staffs and families. If no security officer has been appointed, appoint a responsible member of management as a security officer and insure that he becomes completely knowledgeable of this procedure.

CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER. Company policy must be set at the highest level and comply with all legal requirements. The Chief-Executive Officer, or his appointed representative, on a local basis, shall be a member of the team. Decision-making authority must be immediately available.

TREASURY. If the company has the legal authority to do so, and the decision to pay ransom has been made, funds must be available in specified denominations. A financial representative must have immediate access to the cash required. Recording of currency and inclusion of *bait money* will be his responsibility.

NEGOTIATOR. Kidnappers usually want to deal with the top man in the company. Since he may be the victim, a decision should be made concerning who in the company will negotiate. He should be someone in authority who is calm, cool, unflappable, and able to make quick, logical decisions under pressure. This is a tough, demanding job. There are negotiators who have amassed expertise in kidnap bargaining who may be consulted.

If the incident occurs in a foreign country the negotiator *must* have a comprehensive knowledge of the country's language and the ability to speak it fluently. He must also be completely familiar with the customs of the country.

PUBLIC RELATIONS/MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE. One person will be designated and authorized to release incident information approved by management. Answers to inquiries will be restricted to those possessing a specific need-to-know. Immediate members of the victim's family possess a need-to-know.

9. If the threat assessment is severe and certain executives are particularly vulnerable to kidnapping, consider devising a secret code for these persons.

a. Assume everything said to the hostage is heard by the kidnappers, and is recorded for later scrutiny. In talking with company representatives (or in taped messages), let the hostage be the judge of whether or not the use of codes will place him in jeopardy. Do not ask

questions, let him judge the wisdom of transmitting coded information. Be sure to note all details of conversations so the company team may analyze content.

b. In developing *the code*, establish what the code is intended to convey:

- (1) hostage alone, or captured with others?
- (2) hostage in good condition?
- (3) hostage in extreme jeopardy?
- (4) should entire statement be accepted at face value?
- (5) Other information applicable to specific needs (possibly the location and identification of captors, if under continued threat by a specific group).

c. Codes need not be complex. In some cases, use of middle names or excess formality (or informality, not the norm) tells the person receiving the call that the caller is under duress. Suggesting ransom be taken from *my joint account* (to indicate the family is held hostage) versus *withdraw the funds from my personal account* (to indicate only the caller is held hostage), or even the simple device of repeating key words (*Listen, listen to what I tell you...*) can transmit information to the Emergency Response Team—if it's a prearranged code. Disseminate codes verbally; do not publish.

10. Members of the management team who have a role or decision-making responsibility, in the event a kidnapping or extortion attempt occurs, are to familiarize themselves with the mandatory actions that are to be taken prior to any negotiations being conducted. These actions are enumerated in Section 1, Mandatory Requirements.

1. Mandatory Requirements

a. If a kidnapping or extortion incident should occur, it is to be reported immediately to the following:

(Call List)

It is mandatory that negotiations with kidnappers, extortionists or other terrorists not be opened or conducted until the above notification is made and appropriate instructions received.

b. Regardless of instructions received from the kidnappers, extortionists or terrorists, appropriate local, state and federal law enforcement agencies will ultimately be notified. In foreign countries, the U.S. Embassy or Consulate will also be notified.

c. Comply with reasonable instructions from responsible law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction.

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d. Most overseas kidnappings have been perpetrated by radical political terrorist groups. However, some kidnappings have been perpetrated by criminal-type gangs whose main purpose is to collect money. Once a kidnapping becomes known, expect false contacts from imposters claiming to have the victim in an effort to collect the ransom. See positive evidence to prove they are holding the victim. For example, using the profile, ask to have the victim answer questions only he can answer; or deliver one of the victim's personal possessions, such as an initialed wedding ring. Establish a code word for use in future conversations to ensure continued dealings with the same people.

e. Maintain secrecy. Do not permit facts regarding the kidnapping or ransom demands to be known to anyone outside the Emergency Response Team, immediate family and investigating officers. Unless there are witnesses to the actual kidnapping, or the victim's car is found under suspicious circumstances, the kidnapping will generally not be known, and it is highly desirable to keep it a secret as long as possible. Experience dictates many complications are eliminated or minimized if knowledge of the kidnapping is confined.

f. Do not handle letters of communications demanding ransom payment, you may obliterate possible fingerprints. Turn them over to the law enforcement representatives as soon as possible.

g. Neither touch nor disturb anything at the scene of the crime. Minute particles of evidence, invisible to the naked eye, may be destroyed.

h. Be calm and maintain a normal routine. The safest course of action is to await contact from the kidnappers. Within a matter of hours after abduction, the kidnappers will probably make contact. The first contact is likely to be in the form of a telephone call or a note to a specific individual.

i. Place full confidence in investigating law enforcement officers. In addition to photographs and a description of the victim, it is essential law enforcement officers have all facts relating to personal habits, characteristics and peculiarities of the victim. Again, the executive profiles will suffice.

2. Conduct of Negotiations

a. If overseas, try to negotiate full payment of the ransom in local currency instead of U.S. dollars. Large amounts of dollars are harder to get and involve risks in transportation, delays in payoff, etc.

b. Since money will have to come from a bank, contact the highest level in the company's bank as soon as the amount of ransom is known. If there is a likelihood that the money will be needed over a

weekend, advise the bank in advance. Usually, kidnappers specify ransom be paid in old bills of small denominations. Large amounts of money in *everyday* denominations will be surprisingly heavy, bulky packages. A sum of marked and treated money should be kept on hand to be included in the ransom payment and police advised.

c. Determine a secure location where the ransom can be safely held prior to actual delivery, and arrange to transfer it from the bank in an armored car service. The location must be kept secret.

d. If circumstances permit, let police handle any money drop. If this is not possible, select two or three people (kidnappers may limit the number) to make the ransom delivery. The risk is too great for one man alone but here again there may be no choice. Persons selected must be agile and in good physical condition, preferably cool and professional, a person who possesses a good knowledge of the drop area. Persons selected must be highly trustworthy and *fluent* in the kidnapper's language.

e. On the other hand, kidnappers may want the job done by somebody known to them and will designate the intermediary.

f. In the course of payoff, which may take three or four hours, payoff men will more than likely receive a series of instructions directing them to proceed to various locations prior to being instructed to leave the money at a specific location.

g. If the victim is a foreigner, the kidnappers may specify that he leaves the country immediately as one of the terms of his release. Careful consideration should be given to obeying this instruction. The kidnappers probably fear that the victim may be able to identify or testify against them. If the instruction is not carried out they may attempt to assassinate the subject.

h. The Emergency Response Team in formulating contingency plans, must not limit the ransom possibility to *just money*. Kidnappers may demand supplies, publicity, transportation, etc., in exchange for their prisoner.

i. Finally, response to kidnapping or extortion demands takes time. At the earliest point in the negotiations consider just how much time will be needed to meet the demands (if a decision has been made to meet them), then double the time estimate. Take the offensive in time requirements. It *will* take longer than assumed. Any extra time enables the Emergency Response Team and law enforcement agencies to put the next phase of the executive protection plan into motion. Remember all demands are *negotiable*, even if some may not be deliverable, i.e. arms. It may have to be pointed out that the original demand is either

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Behavior If Kidnapped—While it is recognized that hard and fast rules cannot be applied in kidnappings, law enforcement agents and others with experience emphasize the following points that a potential hostage should remember:

1. Under all circumstances, the hostage should attempt to stay calm and alert to situations which can be exploited to his advantage. Remember, the primary objective of the hostage's family and law enforcement officials is to secure his safe return as quickly as possible. The hostage should remember that there are hundreds working around the clock to secure his release: Law enforcement, family members and company personnel. Their primary concern is his life. Success often depends on his actions.

2. The hostage should not attempt to fight back or to struggle physically. No matter how *reasonable* the captors may appear on the surface, they cannot be trusted to behave normally and their action can be and usually is unpredictable. It is rational to object to life-threatening actions such as being placed into the trunk of a car.

3. The hostage should comply with instructions of the abductors as much as possible. Act only when directed to do so to avoid having intentions misinterpreted. There should be no discussion by the hostage as to what actions may be taken by his family, friends, or Company.

4. The hostage should make a mental note of all movements, including times in transit, direction, distances, speeds, landmarks along the way, special odors and sounds, etc.

5. Whenever possible, the hostage should take note of the characteristics of the abductors, their habits, surroundings, and what contacts they make, but he should not be obvious. Such information can be of great value in the ultimate apprehension of the abductors. If the abductors are attempting to mask their identity or if they blindfold the hostage, the hostage should not try to learn the abductors' identity through some overt action. The abductors normally want a hostage, not a witness. If it turns out that the hostage does recognize one or more of the abductors, *this knowledge should not be revealed to the abductors*.

6. Generally, the hostage cannot expect to have a real opportunity to escape; any attempt to escape, however, should not be made unless it has been carefully calculated to ensure the best possible odds for success. There are almost no circumstances in which an escape attempt can be recommended. But the key word here is *almost*. Escape attempts are a

last resort, not a time-saving device. Escape should be tried as an effort to saving one's life when the hostage is reasonably certain he will succeed and the likely alternative is death.

The hostage should remember that he may escape his captors but find himself lost in a remote, inaccessible, alien region; without transportation, often without money, food, water, shelter; perhaps even unable to speak the local language. If the hostage is not killed in a recapture attempt, he will surely be treated more harshly.

7. The hostage should avoid making provocative remarks to the abductors. As noted, they may be unstable individuals who may react explosively, violently, and abusively.

The captors will continually weigh the hostage's worth. If the hostage is troublesome and appears to jeopardize their plan, he may be eliminated. He must convince the captors that his well-being is *essential* to their success. They will not get the money, and their other demands will not be met without his being set free. He should make every effort to comply with their instructions.

8. The hostage should mentally prepare for a long seige. Captivity can be a rude cultural shock. He may have to endure personal privation, filth, starvation, cramped quarters, insects, infection and lack of privacy, or conversely, solitary confinement.

9. If the executive's family is to be held hostage with him, this is where planning pays off. In security planning the executive should stress what he will expect from his family, and what they can expect from him in the event they are all kidnapped. It should be stressed that they are *all* to be very cooperative.

Precautions For Management Personnel

The following recommendations will reduce the chances of kidnapping if properly observed. Since this list is by no means complete, innovation is strongly recommended along these same lines. Management personnel should:

1. Instruct family and business associates not to provide information concerning them or their family to strangers.

2. Avoid giving unnecessary personal details in response to inquiries from information collectors that would be used in such publications as business directories, social registers or community directories.

3. Establish simple, effective signal systems which, when activated, will alert business associates or family members that they are in danger.

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4. Be alert to strangers who are on business property for no apparent reason.
5. Vary daily routines. Avoid habitual patterns which kidnappers look for. Fluctuate travel times and routes to and from the office.
6. Refuse to meet with strangers at secluded or unknown locations.
7. Always advise a business associate or a family member of one's destination when leaving the office or home and time of expected return or arrival.
8. Stay alert to letters and packages, especially from an unknown source. Suspicious ones should not be opened, but given to Company security or law enforcement personnel.
9. Include security planning in any away-from-office business meetings or events. Notify the security department, as far in advance as possible, of any plans for meetings to be held outside company properties, or on-site meetings at which attendance is not tightly controlled.
10. Do not discuss Company's executive protection plan with outsiders.

Security While Traveling

Past experience strongly indicates that kidnappings occur when the victim is in *travel status*, either to or from work or to other locations. Because of this and the high incidence of travel outside their headquarters, executives should take particular note of the following suggestions:

1. Avoid routine routes and times of movements to and from work and around town. Past instances indicate kidnappers kept the victim under surveillance for a substantial period of time (several days to several months) to discover travel patterns. Unpredictability is one of the best weapons. Try to use different cars in traveling to and from work. Temporary car pools with different persons and use of a variety of cars on an irregular schedule are recommended.
2. Where possible, select the route to a destination and do not permit deviation.
3. When going out, try to travel with a group. There is safety in numbers.
4. When traveling in an automobile, keep doors locked and windows closed or only slightly opened. Avoid cars or actions that identify the occupant as someone affluent.

5. Insofar as possible, travel only on busy, well-traveled thoroughfares.

6. Most kidnappings have been accomplished when the victim's car was suddenly blocked, front and rear. In some cases, an old truck or even a tractor suddenly blocked the road ahead while another jammed the victim's vehicle from the rear. Be alert to detect such attempts. If it appears the car is being blocked for no apparent reason, make every effort to keep moving. Jam the accelerator and go around, even if it means going on the shoulder, but keep moving. Escape efforts might thwart a kidnapping attempt. Prospective kidnappers do not want their victims killed in an attempt to escape but alive in order to collect the ransom.

7. At destination, park and lock the car as close to the destination as possible. Parking area should be in a populated or guarded area.

8. Avoid carrying firearms. For an untrained person they can be more dangerous than helpful. A display of firearms would likely be suicidal against a heavily armed terrorist gang.

9. Get into the habit of being alert to surveillance. The potential victim is usually observed for at least several days prior to the event. Before leaving work or home, look about for suspicious vehicles. Note whether you are being followed to or from work.

10. Before entering a car, be sure there are no suspicious objects or unexplained wires or strings inside or underneath.

11. Private aircraft have also been involved in kidnappings. The same precautions should be used for company aircraft as for any other mode of transportation.

12. Terrorist activity can break out anywhere in the world, but some spots are hotter than others. If headed toward a country plagued by revolutionary activity, take precautionary measures. Check with the Director of Security or confer with the United States Foreign Office before departure; check with their representatives on arrival. Where possible, give the United States Embassy or Consulate a copy of your itinerary while in the foreign country and take their advice on special precautions.

13. For each country on the itinerary all members of the party should learn native phrases such as *I need the police, or doctor, telephone, ambulance, hospital, country's embassy*, etc. Learn the numbers in that language.

14. Learn to use local pay telephones and carry a good supply of local coins.

15. If possible, executive vehicles should be equipped with two-way

radios, and all the radios.

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radios, and all normal occupants of the vehicle should be instructed on the radios.

16. Do not mark parking stalls at facilities with the names of executives.

17. If the company utilizes a vehicle pool, vary use of vehicles among executives. There should be no logo on company cars.

18. Personal and Company vehicles, within reason, should be common to the locale (make, model, color, etc.). There should be no personalized license plates or other distinctive accessories.

19. Don't pick up hitchhikers.

20. Avoid rural driving, especially in other countries during critical times. If it's necessary, travel in convoy: two or three cars rather than a lone target.

21. Do not leave personal cars on the street overnight. Keep them in a locked garage.

22. Be alert in underground or covered garages. Do not leave the car without checking the area for suspicious individuals. If there are any, drive out.

23. Leave *only* your ignition key with parking attendants.

24. Parking lots where the car owner can lock his car are preferable.

25. If chauffeurs are utilized, managers should also:

a. Investigate and screen before hiring, including substitute or relief drivers no matter how infrequently used.

b. If possible, arrange defensive driver training for chauffeurs.

c. If a substitute driver shows up, establish his identity and assure he is not an imposter.

d. If the same chauffeur is used regularly, have a prearranged signal to be used to signify that the chauffeur is under duress and the executive should not enter or even approach the vehicle.

e. Have the chauffeur always open the door first. If the chauffeur is not present, await his return and do not enter the vehicle. If for any reason there is cause for suspicion, do not enter the vehicle at all. Summon professional assistance and let them decide if it is safe.

f. Do not provide chauffeurs with advance information concerning destination or schedule. If possible, inform him only after the vehicle is entered.

Security Procedures to be Followed By Company Chauffeurs

1. Do not report for work under influence of alcohol or medically prescribed drugs. A chauffeur should have adequate sleep and rest to

assure he is mentally and physically alert during his tour of duty.

2. When checking out vehicle for normal operation and daily maintenance, check also for signs of tampering.

3. Whenever vehicle is outside of a so-called secure area, keep it under reasonable surveillance. Do not leave the vehicle unattended.

4. Be constantly alert, someone may have booby-trapped a vehicle. Investigate immediately and extensively any suspicious circumstance. Leave nothing to chance.

5. If there is no other alternative and the vehicle has been left unattended, it should be thoroughly searched, inside and out, including, but not limited to, under hood, front and rear seats, dashboard, and inside trunk. Pay particular attention under and behind spare tire. Be attentive to all places underneath the vehicle which could conceal a foreign object.

6. To the fullest extent possible, the chauffeur should assume responsibility for the protection of his passenger's safety, whether it be by attempted abduction or assassination.

a. Be alert to possible threats to passenger safety from inside or outside of the vehicle.

b. Be alert to suspicious persons, actions or out of character items or materials in vicinity of the passenger.

c. Check out surroundings into which the passenger may be entering for business or social purposes.

d. Whenever possible, the chauffeur should escort his passenger to and from pick-up and discharge points.

7. Should some unauthorized person gain entry to the vehicle when the chauffeur is alone, the chauffeur should try to attract attention by any means possible, i.e. blinking headlights, blowing horn, swerving vehicle, driving on the wrong side of the road, speeding, excessive acceleration or excessive braking. He should consider a controlled collision into either a tree or lamp post, building or driving over a curb onto the sidewalk. If possible, he should intentionally collide with another vehicle. If any of these tactics cannot, in the judgment of the chauffeur, be accomplished without extreme danger to himself, he should proceed toward destination directed by abductor and remain alert to the possibility of eventually escaping or alerting someone along the route or at the destination.

The chauffeur should be alert in discerning specific information about the abductor: height, weight, build, color or eyes, color of hair, complexion, extraction, distinguishing marks, accents, peculiarities. No detail is insignificant.

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8. Should an unauthorized person gain admittance into a vehicle occupied by a Company executive, the chauffeur should always:

- a. Listen thoroughly to all instructions given by the abductor.
- b. Listen thoroughly to all instructions given by his passenger.
- c. Be alert for any chance to carry out the actions outlined in Paragraph 7.

9. If the chauffeur with a passenger sees what he believes to be an ambush ahead, he should:

a. Inform his passenger he suspects an ambush. Have the passenger get down onto the floor, out of sight.

b. Slow down but do not stop. Time is an ally. It should be used wisely to observe, think, and react accordingly.

c. If he has a radio or telephone, report his suspicions to police or the dispatcher. Describe type of danger anticipated, location, identity of the passenger in the vehicle and what plan of action and escape route he expects to follow.

d. Consider if the vehicle can execute a 180 degree turn and escape or drive around the ambush without a collision resulting, even to the extent of being fired upon, or will he have to crash the ambush and attempt to make a running escape.

e. If the chauffeur suspects an ambush he should attempt to keep the passenger concealed. If the passenger is not seen and the ambusher is not sure a passenger is in the vehicle, he may hesitate in attempting to stop the vehicle, thereby providing enough time for an escape.

f. Keep passenger well informed of the situation and circumstances. Curiosity more than anything will cause a passenger to get up and look around, thereby exposing himself.

g. Should the chauffeur have to crash a roadblock, he should do so with as little vehicle contact as possible, attempting to use only the fenders or sides of his vehicle, thus causing as little damage as possible to the engine, steering mechanism, radiator and other parts absolutely vital to the vehicle's continued operation and mobility. Remember, severe damage to steering controls, engine, etc., may render a vehicle inoperative and deliver the passenger into the hands of the abductors.

h. After a collision, do everything possible to keep moving, even with a flat tire, steering problems, etc. A moving object is more difficult to handle.

i. If a break through the ambush is successful, inform the police as soon as possible.

j. Get passenger away from the ambush area immediately and establish or reestablish communications with police and Company

officials.

k. In an attempt to escape all efforts can be considered rational, even to the point of colliding with another vehicle in a crowded area. Any action which will draw attention to your plight should be attempted.

Security For Home and Family

1. Make the residence as burglar-proof as possible by installing a burglar alarm system. Normal exterior lighting and an exterior floodlight system should be activated by intrusion detection devices.

2. All entrances, with special emphasis on often overlooked service doors and gates, must have top-quality locking devices, preferably a dead-bolt lock, to include:

a. Front door, rear door, garage doors, service doors, patio doors, sliding glass doors, gates, swimming pool gates, guest house doors and any others.

b. Change all locks when moving in after previous occupant.

c. Leave no keys in *hiding places* outside the home. The only people who cannot find keys are family members.

d. Install viewing devices (port, fisheye, etc.) on exterior doors. Identify callers before permitting entry.

e. Louvered windows must be locked, especially on the ground floor, and are better replaced with solid glass, or other form of ventilating window.

f. Windows must have adequate locks on first and upper floors. Attention must be paid to keeping them locked at appropriate times.

g. External power and fuse boxes should be locked.

h. Consider having a watchdog inside or outside the house, or both.

3. If local police protection is available, and protection appears needed, request a patrol through the neighborhood as frequently as possible. Where police patrols are infrequent or nonexistent, consider employing a private security patrol, perhaps in cooperation with neighboring residents.

4. Know where children are at all times. Arrange for children to be escorted to and from school. Instruct school authorities under no circumstances are they to be picked up by persons other than family members or other authorized people.

5. Do not permit unaccompanied children to use taxis or public transportation of other types.

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6. Instruct domestic employees and members of the household about their security responsibilities. Emphasize they are not to admit anyone not positively identified. They are to refuse information to strangers inquiring about activities or whereabouts of family members and are not to accept packages or other items unless they are positive of the source. Unless prior approval has been given and instructions, identification, etc., are clear, no one should be allowed to enter or take anything away from the house when family members are not present. All visiting workers and repairmen should be carefully watched and if needed supervised by a family member or servant.

7. Have Security perform a background check on all domestic help.

8. Recognize that the home telephone may be tapped. Be most discreet on the telephone in disclosing information concerning travels to an area where a kidnapping might be perpetrated.

9. Be alert to persons disguised as public utility crews, road repair workers, etc., who might station themselves near the home to observe activities. Report suspected incidents to Company Security or Police.

10. Other suggestions that will make a home safe:

a. Location: Homes that are located in established neighborhood housing developments and are close to police and fire protection are safer than homes located in outlying areas.

b. Develop sufficient rapport with neighbors so you can watch each other's homes, especially while away on business trips or vacations.

c. Observe unusual activity and report this immediately to local law enforcement personnel. If strangers are noticed entering neighbors' homes during their absence, and it turns out they were authorized to do so, they can conveniently identify themselves, their purpose, and establish their legitimacy to police.

d. Trees and shrubbery can shield intruders. They should be kept trimmed.

e. When away, keep selected lights on in the home, and a radio playing. *Talk shows* are good; they simulate household conversation. A timing device can be used to activate these appliances during your absence.

f. Children's rooms should not be accessible from outside. If they are, install secure locking devices on all doors and windows.

11. Walking the dog is good exercise for both the executive and the dog. Take care that a set routine is not established.

12. Don't entrust details of travel schedules to small children. They may not even know where Buenos Aires is, but they love to tell *secrets*.

a. Children must be instructed in proper use of the telephone.

Teach them not to give out personal information. Drill them on how and when to call for assistance.

b. Take the children to local police and fire stations so they have a better understanding of these Public Services. Attend Open House Days and include the children.

13. All home phones should have police, fire, ambulance and Company security phone numbers affixed. Check at intervals to be sure numbers have not changed or decals have not been removed.

a. Don't give out telephone numbers in response to *wrong number* calls. If the caller asks, *what number is this?* counter with *what number are you calling?*

b. If it appears that a rash of *wrong numbers* is occurring, report it to the phone company and security department for investigation.

14. Where possible, certain key executives should use the company PBX to relay after-hours calls and messages.

15. Give careful consideration to requests to photograph the home interior or to a photo interview of the family and home. Be selective in what is permitted to be photographed.

16. Do not open the door to accept *strange* deliveries. Packages should be left by the door. Wait a considerable time before opening the door to retrieve the package even if the deliveryman walks to his truck and drives off.

a. Strange packages requiring a signature can have the claim slip passed under the door or through the mail slot. If suspicious, don't be afraid to refuse to accept delivery of any package.

While the above does not purport to cover everything that can be done to protect the home, it is a representative list of suggestions. The Security department will assist in arranging security surveys of residences of designated executives.

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Appendix C

SAMPLE PROTECTIVE PLAN FOR VISITING GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL

AUTHORSNOTE. This sample protective plan will provide an understanding of how a government official's visit to a university campus may be handled by protective personnel at various levels. This plan is the result of an advance team contacting the various agencies and coordinating their efforts.

ITINERARY OF VISITING OFFICIAL

January 15, 197—

4:30 P.M. - 4:45 P.M.	Visiting official and Charles Marich arriving by plane at our Municipal Airport. Party and security detail transferred to four (4) vehicles transported to Chancellor's Guest House
Approximately 5:00 P.M.	Arrive at Chancellor's Guest House
Approximately 5:45 P.M.	Leave Chancellor's Guest House
5:55 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.	Arrive 2328 Belview Street
7:25 P.M. - 7:30 P.M.	Leave 2328 Belview Street
7:35 P.M. - 7:40 P.M.	Arrive Nelson Hall, room 341, for Press Conference, Room 339 available for holding room*
7:55 P.M. - 8:00 P.M.	Transfer to University Theater from room 341 and 339

*Probably enter E. & U. zone drive off Maryvale down sidewalk and in one of Nelson rear doors. Alternate entry will be loading dock area east side of Nelson.

NOTE: Nelson Hall and the Guest House will be searched and checked by a Bomb Detection Team.

8:00 P.M. - 8:45 P.M.	Speech
8:45 P.M. - 9:15 P.M.	Questions and answers
9:15 P.M. to A.M. (date)	Leave Nelson Hall to Chancellor's Guest House
Approximately 7:00A.M.	Three (3) vehicles will transport Official and party to our Municipal Airport

Protective Plan

Transport and Personal Team

Report to Stanley Auditorium at 1500 hours, room #206. University P.D. Detail Supervisor is *Lt. Adams* (plainclothes). This detail will provide escort for visitor and his party from the time they reach our city, approximately 1630 hours, until they leave, approximately 7:00 A.M. (date-following morning).

Detail make-up:

Driver: Unit 6658, *Lt. Adams* (plainclothes, University P.D. Detail Supervisor)
 Driver: Unit 3437, *Ptln. Arron* (uniform)
 Driver: Unit 2610, *Sgt. Schwartz* (uniform)
 Driver: State B of Icar, *Agent Roberts, Mason, M.T.* (plainclothes)

This detail will provide escort and security for all locations while in our city. Officers assigned will get detailed information from *Lt. Adams* upon their arrival to Stanley Auditorium at 1500 hours.

If *Sgt. Schwartz* is not needed for this detail, he is to report to *Lt. Bahn* at Nelson Hall.

Intelligence Team

Sgt. John (plainclothes) and State B of I *Agent Kern* report to Stanley Auditorium, room #206 at 1500 hours. These two officers will run each location approximately 15 minutes before party arrives. Details will be supplied by *Lt. Adams* at the briefing (1500 hours).

Bomb Team

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Ptln. Sainz

Ptln. Jones

Bomb Team

Sgt. Marks (O.I.C.) (uniform), *Sgt. Carretta* (uniform) and *Bates* (Capital City P.D.). Report to Stanley at 1630 hours in the Squad Room. Conduct search of locations where party will be held. Search areas in this order: Guest House before 1700 hours; room 339, Nelson Hall; room 341, Nelson Hall; other locations in Nelson Hall. The search of Nelson Hall cannot start until after 1800 hours.

Chancellor's Guest House

Lt. Myers (uniform) and *Ptln. Otto* (uniform). Report to Stanley Auditorium and meet *Sgt. Marks* at 1630 hours. *Sgt. Marks* will transport these officers to Guest House. *Lt. Myers* will secure Guest House from outside upper level, watch south and west side of House. *Ptln. Otto* will secure Guest House from outside, lower-level watch north and east side of House. Remain on assignment until relieved. A short break will be provided by on-duty patrol.

Nelson Hall

Site Supervisor: *Lt. Bahn* (uniform) 1800 hours, Nelson Hall.

The following officers will report to Nelson Hall, University Theater stage at 1800 hours. Bring the following equipment (to be stored backstage); helmet and baton. Assignments to be taken up after briefing on stage.

Sgt. Powers (uniform), *Sgt. Johnson* (uniform): Assist in moving camera equipment to Nelson Hall. Then report to hallway outside room 341. When speech starts, return to vehicle, remain parked at loading dock. If no assignment, assist in moving camera equipment back to Stanley Auditorium.

Ptln. Sainz (uniform)

before and during Press Conference, hallway outside room 341. Officer will take up assignment in the University Theater Lobby after Press Conference.

Ptln. Jones (uniform)

Front doors of Building Lobby.

<i>Ptln. Watson</i> (uniform)	University Theater Lobby.
<i>Ptln. Lyall</i> (uniform)	Building lobby in concession area
<i>Ptln. Maxwell</i> (uniform)	Balcony
<i>Lt. Saylor</i> (uniform)	Upper Lounge
<i>Sgt. Larkey</i> (uniform)	University Theater, stairs to balcony
<i>Ptln. Shibley</i> (uniform)	University Theater, stairs to balcony
<i>Ptln. Haig</i> (uniform)	Orchestra Room
<i>Ptln. Sharp</i> (uniform)	West stairs
<i>Ptln. Lantz</i> (uniform)	East stairs
<i>Sgt. Hutman</i> (uniform)	Roof entrance
<i>Sgt. Huxley</i> (uniform)	Southeast stage exit
<i>Sgt. Callons</i> (uniform)	Southeast backstage area

More details and information will be provided when you report at 1800 hours.

Camera Crews

Frost, Robert (OIC) (uniform)

1. Portable camera crew: *Jaeger* (uniform) and *Libert* (uniform). Report to room 206, Stanley Auditorium at 1600 hours. Special schedule provided by *Lt. Adams*; *Frost* will hold briefing.

2. Studio camera crew: *Frost, Robert* (uniform) and *Mauser* (uniform).

Report to room 206, Stanley Auditorium at 1600 hours. Special schedule provided by *Lt. Adams*. *Frost* will hold briefing.

3. Still camera: *Stover* (plainclothes)

Report to room 206, Stanley Auditorium at 1600 hours. Special schedule provided by *Lt. Adams*; *Frost* will hold briefing. Stand-by for other assignments.

Patrol

Lt. Smith, Lt. Saylor

Ptln. Derby, Ptln. Roberts

Ptln. Armer, Ptln. Haig

Ptln. Lantz, Ptln. Sharp

Lt. Romney will assist in the search for the bomb and see that the bomb is removed from the building.

On duty with the bomb squad.

Sgt. Power will assist in the search for the bomb. Assigned uniformed personnel will be in the building.

Communications

Stanley Auditorium will man the communications console.

Commander of the bomb squad will be in the building.

Uniform

Those in the building will have helmets and flashlights. Plainclothes will be in the building.

Plainclothes will be in the building.

Keys

Chief of Police

Report to room 206, Stanley Auditorium at 1600 hours. Special schedule provided by *Lt. Adams. Frost* will hold briefing and provide film. Stand-by Stanley Auditorium 1600 - 1800, if not needed for other assignment, report to Nelson Hall at 1800 hours.

Patrol

Lt. Smith, Lt. Costello

Ptln. Derby, Ptln. Brown

Ptln. Roberts, Ptln. Green

Ptln. Armer, Ptln. DeFoyd

Lt. Romney will make unit assignments except for *Sgt. Power's* unit and see that each unit (marked) has five gas masks and mace.

On duty will provide break for officers assigned to Guest House.

Sgt. Power and *Sgt. Johnson* have assignments before and during. Will assist in moving camera equipment to and from Nelson Hall. Assigned unit 6210 (Parking Vehicle).

Communications

Stanley Auditorium: 1600 hours. *Sgt. Wolford, Dispatcher McKnite* will man main console and phone banks.

Command Post: 1800 hours. *Shepard*, backstage, University Theater. Take porta pac radio 39.36 and UHF porta pac radio.

Uniform

Those in uniform will report in Class "A" uniform. All officers have helmet and baton with them, to be stored in Command Post or vehicles.

Plainclothes will be Class "A" except *Stover* who is class "B"

Keys

Chief Hall:

Grand Master - Nelson Hall

<i>Lt. Adams</i>	Grand Master - Nelson Hall, Guest House
<i>Lt. Bahn:</i>	Grand Master - Nelson Hall, PX 2453
<i>Sgt. Marks:</i>	Grand Master - Nelson Hall, Guest House, PX 2453

919

Visiting official and party will be referred to as 919 in all radio traffic.

Radio Assignments

U.H.F. Portables:

Adams	-	940
Schwartz	-	942
Mason	-	947
Kern	-	655
Powers	-	931

Command Post

UHF Porta Pac.

39.36 Portables:

John	-	943
Otto	-	922
Durant	-	971
Huxley	-	921
Carretta	-	941
Haig	-	986
Lantz	-	973
Williams	-	933
Van Allen	-	155
Myers	-	910
Maxwell	-	923
Stover	-	946
Sainz	-	913
Tulkki	-	944
Sharp	-	912
Saylor	-	970
Jones	-	927
Bahn	-	920
Hutman	-	911
Arron	-	924
Lyall	-	915

Pro

Mason
Comm

BOM

Officers:

Time:

Transportati

Equipment:

Preparatory:

INTER

Officers:

Time:

Mason 974
Command Post Porta Pac 39.36

BOMB SEARCH TEAM

Officers: *Marks(OIC), Carretta and Bates.*

Time: 1630 hours. Meet with Myers and Otto in Squad Room, Stanley Auditorium.

1700 hours - must have Guest House search complete. Turn over to Myers and Otto.

After 1800 hours - Search Nelson, beginning with Rooms 341 and 339. Secure with officers. Check with Bahn. Then check and secure prop room door to orchestra pit. Check orchestra room. Must be done prior to 1900 hours. Continue searching Nelson's University Theater. After search, assist with problems in area of Rooms 339, 341 and the University Theater.

Transportation: Bate's vehicle.

Equipment: Carretta 39.36 radio
Bate's equipment
Flashlights

Preparatory: Learn the buildings.
Remain on last assignment until relieved.

INTELLIGENCE TEAM

Officers: *John and Kern and two (2) FBI agents*

Time: 1500 hours. Meet Lt. Adams in room 206 Stanley Auditorium, final details

Transportation: Kern's vehicle (John and Kern) and one FBI vehicle.

Duties: Check sites approximately 15 minutes ahead of scheduled site arrivals. Relay information to transportation detail concerning situations in the area.

Approximate times of arrival:

Our Airport	1630 - 1645
Guest House	1730 - 1745
2425 Fjord	1755 - 1925
Nelson (Rooms 341/339)	1930 - 2000
Nelson Theater	2000 - 2115
Guest House	2115 - A.M.

At Nelson, assist with security around rooms 339 and 341. At residence, check surrounding areas until needed or scheduled at next site.

Equipment: Kern's UHF radio
John 39.36 radio (furnish own earplugs)

Preparatory: Check areas around site, know the terrain.
Make information contacts.

Studio Videotape Crew

Officers: Frost, Steven and Agar.

Time: 1600 hours meet in room 206, Stanley Auditorium (Frost O.I.C.). Meet Sgt. Powers at 1730 hours.
Transport equipment by 1800 hours to Nelson Hall, University Theater backstage.

Transportation: Sgt. Power in vehicle #184 to and from Nelson Hall.

Duties:

Equipment:

Preparatory

REMAIN C

Officers:

Time:

Duties:

Agar will provide for the safety of the operator and protection of the camera. Frost will operate the camera.

The team will take a position behind the front curtain. If a disruption occurs, the curtain will be parted or you will move the equipment to a point on stage that is visible to the crowd, and begin recording the disturbance.

Equipment:

studio camera
studio recorder/player
50mm F 1.4 lens and lens adapter
2 camera/recorder wires
heavy camera mount
tripod
microphone set on Hi-gain
6 cassette tapes
2 extension cords for power source
table

Preparatory:

Set up box for all supplies and equipment.
Check stage area for best position.
Obtain two extension cords that will reach your position and table.
THE NIGHT - test for lighting and focusing using the monitor on the camera; have everything preset and operational.

REMAIN ON LAST ASSIGNMENT UNTIL RELIEVED BY CHIEF FALL.

Portable Videotape Crew

Officers:

Monroy and Williams.

Time:

1600 hours, meet in room 206, Stanley Auditorium. Meet Frost, transported, if necessary, by Patrol, if needed prior to 1800.

- Transportation:** By Patrol, if needed somewhere other than Nelson Hall.
- Duties:** Williams will provide for the radio communications and the safety of the camera operator. Duty will be limited to responsibility for the protection of the camera and operator.
- Monroy will operate the camera, from the balcony after 2000.
- The team may take a position where the camera can record any disturbances at the residence. The lighter adaptor can be used, but it may be necessary to use the battery away from the vehicle.
- The team will use the Lounge of the University Theater as a location prior to 2000 hours. The team should be prepared to move from that location to the theater lobby, the front lobby, or outside the building to record any disturbance in progress. Make use of the exits and stairways available from the Lounge.
- Equipment:** Williams will have a 39.36 radio portable videotape camera
portable videotape recorder/player
normal videotape lens - 12 to 75mm
zoom lens
10 - one-half hour reels
lens filter for outdoor use
all 4 battery pairs
the cigarette lighter adaptor
- Preparatory:** Charge all batteries
Set up box for all supplies, batteries, and related equipment.

REMAIN ON

Officer:

Time:

Transporta

Duties:

Equipment

Preparator

Become familiar with all exits and stairways from the Lounge.
Set up your own cover/operation procedures.

REMAIN ON LAST ASSIGNMENT UNTIL RELIEVED BY CHIEF HALL

35mm Camera and Polaroid Camera

Officer:	Stover
Time:	1600 Stanley Auditorium, room 206. Meet Frost. Go with Monroy and Williams. If needed prior to 1800 hours, Patrol will provide ride. 1800 hours at Nelson Hall. After speech, stay with Portable Video Camera.
Transportation:	This is by Patrol if needed somewhere other than Nelson Hall.
Duties:	<p>Photograph all disturbances; those inside will be the priority. Work with portable videotape team prior to the speech, and move to the main floor of the theater during the speech. Use the southeast theater entrance (front row of seats) for location.</p> <p>After the speech, remain with the portable videotape team for other assignments.</p>
Equipment:	<p>39.36 portable radio 35mm camera 50mm f 1.2 lens flash attachment 10 rolls of 35mm Tri-X film, 400 ASA Polaroid camera and film</p>
Preparatory:	<p>Bring the equipment Pick up supplies</p>

Checkout vantage points

Use ASA 400 for any metering systems

REMAIN ON LAST ASSIGNMENT UNTIL RELIEVED BY CHIEF HALL

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Appendix D

AN EVALUATION OF THE UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORIST RESPONSE CAPABILITY*

W. Ronald Olin

W. Ronald Olin is a Crime Analyst, Lawrence Police Department, 111 East 11th Street, Lawrence, Kansas 66044. A member of the department since 1971, he has been in charge of the Crime Analysis Unit, an LEAA-funded project, since mid-1977. He completed undergraduate work at the University where he taught for two years after earning his master's degree at Wichita State University. His master's thesis was on urban guerilla warfare and the tactical application of force; tactical police response has been his special area of interest.

One of the most serious violent threats confronting society today is terrorism. Terrorism can be defined as *the organized use of violence with the aim of promoting political or social change and emphasizing the ruthlessness and desperate dedication of its advocates through the brutality or destructiveness of their actions.*†

The military calls it *low intensity conflict*, others describe it as *urban guerilla warfare*, a *war of liberation* or *people's struggle*. The activity called terrorism describes a highly organized effort of a group to advance its cause through the use of specific kinds of violence. The characteristics of a terrorist attack—surprise, deception, speed and selected location—makes its use by desperate small groups against larger social units almost inevitable.

Terrorist activities can seriously affect the country in which they occur. The event will almost certainly generate valuable publicity for the terrorists, in most cases, this is the overriding purpose of the terrorist act. The success of terrorists may demonstrate the inability of the security forces to deal with the tactic of terrorism. Continued failure of

*Reprinted with permission of *The Police Chief Magazine* in which this article originally appeared (June 1979, Vol. XLVI, No. 6).

†Samuel T. Francis, "The Terrorist International and Western Europe," *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, No. 47, April 18, 1978, p. 2.

the security forces may result in the loss of public confidence in the government. These results are considerably more dangerous to any government than is regular criminal activity.

A country's response to terrorism must come from its security forces, either military or police. The traditional law enforcement response to criminal activity has followed the development and sophistication of the criminal. Law enforcement training and expertise has been developed after the fact. The law enforcement response has not recognized that policing individual criminal misconduct and that of organized group activity cannot be based upon the same tactical and investigative assumptions. Individual investigative techniques have little effect when applied to combatting terrorism.

The United States has fortunately been the target of only intermittent and fairly unsuccessful terrorist incidents. However, there are predictions made by many law enforcement officials that the United States will be directly involved with terrorist incidents in the near future. There are many problems in the current state of United States preparedness for dealing with terrorism.

Several governments have developed successful programs in dealing with terrorism. Their solutions sometimes involved the use of military units, the suspension of human rights and even more radical action. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) has demonstrated a successful response to terrorism, which has been developed within the existing civilian police system. For this reason, West Germany provides the most valuable example of governmental response to terrorism that does not resort to military or dictatorial control. In the summer of 1978, the author (Mr. Olin) visited West Germany and studied police training and response with the assistance of the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior and the Polizei-Fuhrungsakademie, Hiltrup, Munster. This paper will compare the counterterrorist capabilities of the United States and West Germany and illustrate: (1) the current level of preparedness; and (2) what actions should be taken to prepare for, rather than react to, terrorism in the future.

THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE

The United States military option in counterterrorism has only recently been developed. The *Christian Science Monitor* reported the development of antiterrorist legislation in May of 1978:

The action on Capitol Hill comes amid other efforts to tighten this

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country's protections against the sort of terrorism surfacing elsewhere in the world. These include:

A series of White House strategy sessions evaluating the national capability to cope with such threats.

Formation of an elite Army commando unit to protect Americans against terrorism abroad. This move was ordered by President Carter in March. The commando unit will be patterned after the West German force that freed 91 hostages from a hijacked Lufthansa airliner last October at Mogadishu, Somalia.*

The commando unit described in this news article is the Rangers. The Army maintains two 600-man battalions, one on each coast. Members of these volunteer units are cross-trained in virtually all kinds of military response. In a recent interview, the commander of the unit discussed the Rangers: "You know what we are . . . We're light infantry. Basic light infantry. Take our weapons. We carry M-sixteens. Grenade launchers. M-sixty machine guns. Sixty-millimeter mortars and 90-millimeter recoilless rifles. That's it. Nothing fancy. We've got men who are qualified in all sorts of foreign weapons, just like we've got men who are demolitions specialists. But what we carry and what we train with is basic Army issue. Nothing like those stun grenades the West Germans used."*

The circumstances in which a military unit could be used are also questionable. The famous Somalia incident was an unusual situation. In this case, the government of Somalia allowed the BRD to intervene inside its borders at Mogadishu. This select circumstance will probably not be repeated for many years. This drastically differed from the unauthorized intervention of Israeli commandos at Entebbe, Uganda in 1976.

Counterterrorist operations demand the utmost sophistication in response. A delicate balance must be maintained between negotiation, concession and tactical action. Political sensitivities must also be considered to minimize indecision or mismanagement. A military response using infantry tactics would be analogous to using a machete, rather than a scalpel, to remove a tumor.

The United States law enforcement response to counterterrorism relies heavily on the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Even the military

*Peter C. Stuart, "World Terrorism: Congress Plots U.S. Response," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 12, 1978, p. 3.

*Geoffrey Norma, "Black Berets To the Rescue," *Esquire*, April 11, 1978, p. 44.

has been specifically directed to assist the FBI in the control of terrorist operations. As outlined in a recent directive to the United States Army:

B-4. Policy. a. The President has directed Federal departments and agencies to cooperate in an attempt to thwart terrorist incidents, and the FBI has been given the overall jurisdictional responsibility at the scene of a terrorist incident wherever it occurs, including military installations. Department of Defense components are authorized as described below to respond to certain reasonable requests of the FBI for military resources for use in combatting acts of terrorism. Assistance may include requests for material, facilities and technical personnel acting in an advisory capacity. Military personnel may not be used in a law enforcement role outside Presidential authorization. If the President approves, troops may be made available for missions designated by the FBI pursuant to its responsibility for overall direction of operations, but actual command and operational control of the troops will remain with the Military.*

The FBI capabilities in the area of counterterrorism have been summarized by Director William Webster in a recent news release. He stated, "The FBI's antiterrorist efforts today are directed toward strengthening our reactive capabilities. Preparedness is our objective. Contingency plans, centrally coordinated at FBI headquarters, are in effect in each of the FBI's 59 field divisions. Channels of cooperation and communication have been established among local, state and other federal agencies.†

The FBI's counterterrorist capabilities in handling major incidents similar to activities encountered in Western Europe appear inadequate at this time. However, these inadequacies are not the result of a lack of desire or lack of ability on the part of its personnel.

The terrorist threat is unconsciously aided by Department of Justice guidelines on domestic security investigations. Counterterrorist operations must rely on timely, pertinent intelligence information. An examination of the guidelines covering domestic intelligence shows that many of the activities necessary to collect information are legally curtailed. This lack of basic intelligence limits activity to response after the fact. A comparison of the numbers of investigations which were

*Army Regulation No. 190-52, *Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations*, August 1, 1978, B-1.

†William H. Webster, "The FBI and Terrorism," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 29, 1978, p. 23.

conducted before the attack reveals the character of the threat.

Another common criticism of the Department of Justice is its tactical response to hijacking and other terrorist incidents. The responsibility for the investigation is a heavy workload. The Department's resources are limited than those of the FBI, perhaps a lack of coordination with economic factors.

A real terrorist threat is not defined by the law enforcement community. The local law enforcement agencies are to notify the FBI of a catastrophic event. The nature of the threat is but another factor.

Although the FBI's law enforcement handling of terrorist incidents in the United States is a multitude of factors, its responsibility is not limited to the state, county or city level.

The state, county or city level is a difficult item to handle. It complicates the task of the agencies, and the sophistication of the capability. The FBI has several ways of handling intelligence information.

There are several agencies, the Department of Defense in handling intelligence information. The writer observes that the stripping away of terrorism. With terrorism structured, not

conducted before and after recent congressional hearings on this topic reveals the change of emphasis in this area.

Another consideration is that the FBI is the investigative arm of the Department of Justice; it is not a combat unit. SWAT training and tactical response have only been stressed since the responsibility for hijacking and other selected incidents was given to the Bureau. The full responsibility for terrorist actions is a recent addition to the present workload. The specialized weaponry available to the FBI is even more limited than that of the military. The result is a lack of emphasis and perhaps a lack of preparedness dictated by political, administrative and economic factors.

A real terrorist incident would be handled, successfully or disastrously, by the law enforcement agency immediately on the scene. In most cases, the local law enforcement agency would not know when it is appropriate to notify the FBI. The incident would be admirably handled or catastrophically bungled by the time the unit with *authority* arrives. The nature of tactical response is so complex that any added confusion is but another prohibitive factor.

Although the FBI has official authority, there are twenty-six federal law enforcement agencies that might have a direct responsibility in the handling of a terrorist incident. The FBI, with 8,000 agents in the United States and its territories, is overextended investigating a multitude of crimes. Counterterrorism is just one of the many domestic responsibilities.

The state, county and local police response against terrorists is a more difficult item to grasp. Current problems concerning these agencies complicate the possibility of a timely response. Decentralized police agencies, unclear jurisdictional lines and constantly varying levels of sophistication, training and equipment undermine the total response capability. These problems may provide assistance to terrorists in several ways. These problems are most obvious in discussions of intelligence gathering, specialization and clear lines of authority.

There are no centralized intelligence capabilities. For many local agencies, the cost far exceeds its returns. Intelligence is the first line of defense in handling terrorist incidents. As a result of alleged abuse, *intelligence* has become a dirty word to some influential groups. One writer observes "that for the past five years the United States has been stripping away its organizational, legal and ideological defenses against terrorism. Without exception, every person who has any acquaintance with terrorism understands that such forms of underground, cell-structured, nonnationalist, absolutely disciplined organizations can be

successfully combatted only with the help of counteractions that intersect the terrorist universe: secret surveillance, wiretaps, mail checks, computerized files of millions of persons throughout the world, secret communications with counterterrorist agencies in other nations, informers, (and) infiltration."*

These techniques are currently unacceptable in the existing political climate. In some cases, these techniques may be necessary for successful handling of these critical situations.

Another problem of many small police agencies is that their size limits specialization. While several large police agencies in the United States have model tactical response teams, most others cannot justify the development of such capabilities. Even though the local jurisdiction would assume responsibility for handling these crises for some period of time, most of them lack the ability to successfully do so. The varying levels of training, types of equipment and even tactics create a myriad of complications for tactical response.

There are few clear lines of authority for dealing with terrorist incidents. "Typically, authority for dealing with various aspects of a terrorist incident is dispersed over a number of government departments and jurisdictions in a manner which is well suited to handling day-to-day concerns, but which may impede efforts to deal with a crises."*

One example of difficulty in establishing clear lines of responsibility was demonstrated recently. The former prime minister of Israel was scheduled to deliver a guest lecture at a major university. A meeting was set up to determine questions of jurisdiction and authority. A significant contingent of Arab students existed within the student body. Rumors of possible actions were prevalent for nearly one week prior to and during the visit. The question, which remained unresolved, was simply: who would be in charge of a terrorist incident targeted against this figure? Present during the speech were the following:

1. University police,
2. City police,
3. Sheriff's deputies,
4. State Highway Patrol,
5. State police,
6. FBI, and the
7. Private bodyguard accompanying the figure.

*James Burnham, "Terror: Our Turn Soon?," *National Review*, June 9, 1978, p. 700.

*Robert H. Kupperman, *Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today*, October, 1977, pp. 16-17.

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A serious incident having international repercussions could have resulted without anyone knowing who was in command or how to effectively respond. Perhaps this jurisdictional separation of powers is one of the prices we pay for freedom. However, it is the worst enemy of any tactical response, whether to a bank robbery, gang warfare or a terrorist incident.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The West German response to terrorist actions is dependent upon the country's police agencies rather than the military. The West German military response is limited as the result of guidelines developed by the occupation governments after World War II. The military has not been allowed to expand for any reasons other than limited defense. In fact, even the border patrol responsibilities are assigned to police agencies. As a result of these policies, the West German military has little offensive capability. The existing offensive capability would be utilized only under the most unusual circumstances. Political pressures would prohibit the military from acting in most instances.

There are two types of police agencies in West Germany: the federal and the state police. Within each of these organizations there are many divisions and specialized units. The federal police are responsible for border patrol and miscellaneous occurrences assigned to them by the Chancellor. The federal border police are well-known for their anti-terrorist unit, the GSG 9 (*Grenzschutzgruppe*—border group 9). Much of the publicity surrounding the GSG 9 is the result of the dramatic rescue of hostages at Mogadishu, Somalia. The GSG 9 is also responsible for the physical security of the Chancellor and is visible in that capacity.

The state police are organized for each of the ten states plus Berlin. Each state has many subdivisions and specialized units. As with the federal police, a separate criminal police organization exists. This is the plainclothes, investigative police organization. The criminal police and the state police cooperate under the direction of the Minister of the Interior in each state or the Federal Republic. Each state has a special counterterrorist unit similar to that of the GSG 9.

The current state of police preparedness and response is the result of historical developments and experience in dealing with terrorist incidents. To fully grasp the current state of readiness in West Germany, it is important to review historical events such as the kidnapping of Berlin politician Peter Lorenz, the development of the Baader-Meinhof

Gang (Red Army Faction), the Olympic massacre in Munich and most recently the abduction and murder of Hans Martin Schleyer. Adverse world attention was focused on West Germany as the result of these acts of terrorism. These activities forced the government to develop counterterrorist capabilities.

The responsibility for dealing with terrorist acts has passed from the state to federal governments and then back again to the states. In the case of Lorenz, the Berlin police had jurisdiction. However, to assist the Berlin police, over one hundred other police specialists were flown in for the investigation. Simple considerations such as a knowledge of the city, an absence of police space and other logistical matters minimized the impact of this assistance.

In the case of Hans Martin Schleyer, the federal police rather than the state, took control of the operation. While later evidence indicates that Schleyer was taken out of the country prior to his death, the federal police did not successfully handle the case and political pressures have now returned the ultimate authority for handling a terrorist incident to the state. The individual German states have responded by developing counterterrorist capabilities.

The German police have formed units which they call "kommandos." The kommandos have a variety of specialists and the units are trained to function independently, yet collectively directed to accomplish the counterterrorist objectives. The kommando's training is similar to that available in the United States. Specialists are trained in weapons use, law, hostage negotiation, intelligence gathering and other related areas. The difference between the United States and West Germany is the fact that the kommandos are assigned to train full time. Their training is only interrupted by an actual exercise. An additional difference is that all police supervisors in West Germany over the rank of captain are trained at one school. This similarity in training, tactics and chain of command assists in reducing many of the preliminary difficulties which are encountered in such a tactical deployment.

West German kommando teams have availed themselves of many developments from other countries. The use of British stun grenades and eavesdropping devices at Mogadishu were a major influence in the eventual success. The H&K MP submachinegun may be the most advanced and ideal counterterrorist weapon in the world today. The police computer system at Wiesbaden is constantly in use screening border entries and police checks throughout the country. Tactics and training from Israeli kommandos, the FBI or other sources are incorporated into the most effective counterterrorist response possible.

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West Germany has a predetermined chain of command in handling any criminal matter. While counterterrorist operations are subject to differences of opinion, the ultimate decision-maker is specified and the police response set before the act. Police officials are lifetime professionals but come under the direction of the Minister of the Interior. This man has final authority over police operations. This mixture of police and civilian control seems to balance police response.

The current system of counterterrorist response in West Germany is favorable because it is—

1. clearly organized,
2. cost-effective, and
3. supported by the population and parliament.

There have been problems with the German police system in developing this capability. There have been many parliamentary debates on new laws and police authority. The state of Bavaria abolished over 150 police departments and consolidated into a single state police. The GSG 9 was in training for three years before the incident at Mogadishu. During this time the GSG 9 was not always considered economically feasible or realistically workable. The publicity that resulted from the successful handling of the Somalia incident justified the expense of this and occasional ridicule. The administrative decision and planning in this case preceded the need for the unit. The West German police have continued to build upon this solid base and to further develop their counterterrorist response.

SUMMARY

The terrorist organizations which operate in the world have a philosophical, psychological and tactical similarity that directly influences other terrorist groups. The similarities in hatred of institutions, in financial support, tactics and training are very important considerations. The same underground literature and training materials have been found in many different terrorist organization *safe houses*. International terrorist cooperation has been documented on many occasions. One constant tactic in nearly all terrorist organizations is the use of the bomb. William Webster, director of the FBI stated, "When the European groups found that bombings failed to achieve their goals, they graduated to kidnapping and, later, assassinations. While American terrorism is still embryonic in development, it could follow a similar course when it finds that American society cannot be altered through

bombs, or when the public finds itself no longer interested in the news of bombings."*

Mr. Webster finds the current state of terrorism in the United States *embryonic*. It is very fortunate that an active terrorist organization does not exist considering the development of the underground in this country after the unrest and violence of the 1960s and early 70s. The police response to the SDS or Weather Underground, black and white radical groups may have prevented the development of terrorism beyond its initial stages. It is possible that the very steps that are now condemned for use in the police community were responsible for prohibiting the further development of terrorist organizations in the U.S. There may be other immeasurable social conditions or considerations that contribute to the United States citizen's level of satisfaction with the government. Perhaps an aura of invincibility still surrounds the FBI about its ability to deal with kidnappings or underground guerrilla groups. If this is the case, we must seek ways to maintain this subtle impression. If this is not the case, the United States may soon be the object of further terrorist development and activity.

In the past several years terrorism has evolved from relatively simple incidents of criminal activity to more and more dramatic gestures of violence. The threat of a terrorist group obtaining a nuclear weapon has received excessive publicity. While the threat of nuclear blackmail may be a possibility, there is also an *intermediate level* of violence which must be considered.*

In these cases, hundreds could be killed as the result of a terrorist crime. Such an incident would result in a serious loss of life, necessitating a major governmental action.

Another trend in terrorist development is the concept of surrogate warfare. "The realities of a nuclear age and the present uneasy balance of power suggest that more of the technology and resources of some nations will support vicious, desperate terrorists whose mission is to create terror for carefully designed, coercive purposes."* These groups have the advantage of diplomatic cover, sophisticated weaponry and established intelligence capabilities. Such groups further complicate

*William H. Webster, "The FBI and Terrorism," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 29, 1978, p. 23.

*Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today, p. 1.

*National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism*, December, 1976, p. 10.

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the concept of terrorism.

The United States must decide now what specific actions should be undertaken to prepare for future terrorist incidents. The United States is recovering from many recent disclosures about its intelligence and police systems. Some critics have gone so far as to assert that there has been a collapse in the internal security of the United States. United States law enforcement must seek to reassert its superiority through careful prior planning. The concepts of democracy do not exclude the exercise of protection for the common good.

Some of the steps necessary to deal with terrorism are controversial and break historical precedent. Others are only logical approaches. These steps include:

- Development of national antiterrorist laws to provide clear lines of responsibility and authority for intervention.
 - Reassert and guarantee the right to a *speedy* trial for terrorists.
 - Reinstate the death penalty on a federal level for specific terrorist crimes.
 - Correct existing informational leaks in domestic and international security and recultivate international and antiterrorist cooperation.
- Designate to one federal agency the responsibility for counterterrorist response. Its responsibilities should include:
 - Coordinating federal, state and local interagency informational exchange.
 - Promoting special research in the interdisciplinary perspectives of terrorism.
 - Developing consolidated, advanced training programs for law enforcement officials.
 - Developing an analytical and research capability concerning terrorist incidents.
 - Implementing the intelligence and surveillance requirements of counterterrorist operations.
 - Creating a tactical response capability nationally on a two- to four-hour response time.

There is no question that many of these solutions are controversial and would have a difficult fight through Congress. But terrorism is not

regular criminal activity. Its effects may be far-reaching and may even undermine the confidence of the citizenry in the existing government. The United States can adopt the precedents of preparation, training, and an immediate tactical capability. The United States must take further steps to insure the proper handling of terrorist incidents. If a government fails in this regard, the eventual outcome may be decided in the opening battle.

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